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ABSTRACT 
Practitioners and academics clearly established that participation in the EU system of 
foreign policy-making transforms national foreign policies. Whilst there have been 
detailed studies of the impact of participation in EU foreign policy on the original fifteen 
member states there are, as yet, few academic studies that have thoroughly investigated 
the impact of progressive integration in the area of EU foreign and security policy on the 
new (i. e. those who joined since 2004) member states. This thesis aims to address this 
deficit by focusing on the impact of Poland's participation in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). It examines the processes of `downloading', as it is argued here 
that involvement in CFSP has had a direct effect on both the procedures of foreign 
policy-making in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and, on the substance of 
Polish foreign policy as well as the impact of `uploading' from member states to the EU 
level and `crossloading' between EU member states. 
The thesis addresses the relevant conceptual issues and provides an outline of the 
academic debate regarding Europeanisation and foreign policy. It identifies three 
mechanisms that are responsible for change: conditionality, socialisation and learning. It 
suggests that a member state first adapts its national foreign policy to bring it in line with 
the EU's acquis politique and introduces basic changes in its institutional procedures in 
order to effectively participate in the EU's CFSP. Only later, does socialisation and 
learning result in changes to how national foreign policy is made, which then facilitates 
both changes to the substance of national policy and the uploading of national 
preferences to the EU level. A two-phase model of change is introduced which identifies 
April 2003, when Poland first became an active observer within the EU, as the date when 
Europeanisation began. 
The thesis provides a brief explanation of the transformation of Polish foreign policy 
after 1989, in order to provide contextual background for the four substantive chapters 
which follow: one procedural on the changes in the Polish MFA and three related to 
policy substance. The latter three chapters examine the Europeanisation of policy towards 
Poland's East European neighbours in general and policies towards Ukraine and Belarus 
in particular. The thesis concludes with a set of methodological and conceptual 
observations followed by analysis of the empirical findings. 
Key words: European Union, Polish foreign policy, Europeanisation, Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Neighbourhood Policy 
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INTRODUCTION 
The day of Poland's accession to the EU was a very emotional time for many Poles. Vast 
numbers celebrated the fact that their country had eventually joined the Western 
structures. For many, it marked a symbolic end to the period of Soviet dominance, 
followed by efforts to build a democratic, independent state that culminated in 
membership of NATO and the EU. The latter has also served to legitimise the changes 
and reforms that took place in Poland after 1989. This transformation process was often 
perceived as Poland's `return to Europe', which was successfully concluded in 2004 and 
which had a profound impact on the political, economic and social dimensions of public 
life. 
In striving for EU membership, Poland had to fulfil a number of entry criteria and adopt 
the body of the EU legislation; here the `impact of Europe' is most clear. However, there 
were other, less tangible effects in many spheres of politics. This thesis aims to explore 
the implications that the EU accession bid and later EU membership had for Polish 
foreign policy. This is done in four substantive chapters. One focuses on procedural 
changes in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), while the other three 
investigate change in policy substance, focusing on the policy towards the EU's Eastern 
neighbours in general and Ukraine and Belarus in particular. 
The thesis examines changes in Polish foreign policy in the time period 1998 - 2006 
between the start of the accession negotiations and the second anniversary of Poland's 
accession to the EU. A large part of the analysis relates to the period after Poland became 
an active observer within the EU in April 2003, after which the impact of likely EU 
membership intensified. 
All three chapters which examine policy substance focus on Poland's immediate Eastern 
neighbours, first on the general approach within the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and then on Ukraine and Belarus in particular. This choice 
has been made for several reasons. Firstly, Poland had demonstrated long before actual 
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enlargement took place that it wanted to play a leading role in shaping the EU's policy 
towards the East. At the time when enlargement was taking place, the Union was in the 
process of re-defining its approach towards that region and formulating new policies. 
This was already a promising situation for any researcher of Europeanisation. At the 
same time, the danger of choosing a non-representative policy area was avoided, as 
relations with both Ukraine and Belarus are of a very special, even strategic importance 
for Poland. Therefore, they would be perhaps the least likely to become the subject of 
national adaptation and change due to EU accession. In this respect, if there was evidence 
of Europeanisation in the case of policy towards Poland's Eastern neighbours, one could 
assume that it would also be present in the case of other areas of foreign policy. 
This brief introduction first presents the structure of the thesis and then explains the 
research methods and sources that were used in the course of the study. 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis begins by establishing an analytical framework for the study in chapter one. It 
is not the primary aim of this study to make a theoretical contribution, but this chapter is 
necessary to guide the analysis of the substantive chapters that follow. The concept of 
Europeanisation is critically approached and its application to date is reviewed. Its 
meaning is related to other similar concepts that are occasionally confused with 
Europeanisation, such as adaptation, globalisation and convergence. Later, the use of this 
particular approach in studies of the interactions between national and European foreign 
policy is discussed and a two-phase model of Europeanisation is proposed. For 
methodological purposes and in order to add explanatory value to the study, three 
mechanisms responsible for change are identified: conditionality, learning and 
socialisation. 
Before the framework that has been established in chapter one is applied to the 
substantive chapters, the historical context to the analysis is given in chapter two. The 
chapter pays special attention to the tradition of modern foreign policy-making in Poland 
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and the effects that the fall of the `iron curtain' had on the MFA and on the substance of 
policy. Such analysis is especially vital because the thesis attempts to study the notion of 
change, and for identifying and explaining change one has to establish as clearly as 
possible the status quo at the onset of the research timeframe. It is also important, after 
identifying certain trends and `dogmas' present in Polish foreign policy for centuries, to 
establish whether they had any significance in the Europeanisation process (for example 
they could be factors obstructing Europeanisation). The background presented in chapter 
two also allows for identifying the post-communist `baggage' that Poland brought to the 
EU. 
The thesis then proceeds to apply the analytical framework to the substantive chapters. 
By engaging in the study of both procedures and policy-substance, it attempts to make a 
more complete contribution on the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy than it could 
do had it only looked at one of these two elements. By doing so, it tries to find links 
between Europeanisation of procedures and substance, between the policy-making 
processes and policy-outputs. The substantive chapters look for evidence of 
Europeanisation, but also verify how useful the analytical framework is: whether it is 
useful to make a distinction between adaptation and Europeanisation; what is the role of 
`change agents'; whether processes of conditionality, learning and socialisation are 
indeed crucial drivers underpinning change. The analysis focuses on identifying 
examples of `uploading', `downloading' and `crossloading'. 
The first case study, in chapter three, analyses policy procedures and focuses on the 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Due to the nature of this chapter, some additional 
contextual background is presented with regard to the institutional setting of both 
European and Polish foreign policy. The chapter focuses on different dimensions of 
change, identified as systemic, organisational, cultural and process-related and it pays 
special attention to the shift from adaptation to Europeanisation that took place in April 
2003. It will be argued that it was very clear in the case of institutions, while less evident 
in the case of policy substance. One part of the chapter is devoted to the role of `change 
agents', who are identified as Polish representatives sent to the Permanent Representation 
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in Brussels. Both their role in the Europeanisation process, as well as the significance of a 
gap that appears between them and their colleagues who remain in Warsaw are 
investigated. 
Next, the thesis moves on to investigate the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy 
substance. This is done in chapters four, five and six. They are all related to the policy 
towards Poland's (and hence the EU's) Eastern neighbours. Chapter four bears a special 
significance. While constituting a case study in its own right, it also provides a 
background for the more detailed analysis concerning Ukraine and Belarus in chapters 
five and six by discussing the general approach of Poland and the EU to the region. All 
three substantive chapters follow the same structure. First, the EU's approach to the 
region/country is explained. Because of the nature of European foreign policy, where 
national foreign policies remain divergent, special emphasis is put on the different 
interests of the member states and how they are eventually reconciled at the European 
level. Second, Poland's policy towards the region/country is explained, with prominence 
given to any points where Polish and EU's approach differ. This is because such 
difference, sometimes called a `misfit' in Europeanisation literature, usually leads to 
either `uploading' efforts on the part of a member state in order to bring the European 
policy closer to its own or in national adaptation ('downloading') or changing national 
foreign policy so it would be in line with the EU's approach. Finally, each chapter 
analyses the interaction between Polish and EU policy on chosen examples, which can be 
either a more general principle of a policy (e. g. the issue of potential EU membership for 
Ukraine or the choice between isolation and engagement with regard to Belarus) or a 
reaction to a specific event (e. g. the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or the undemocratic 
elections in Belarus). This analysis is designed to establish if and how national and 
European foreign policies influence one another. 
The thesis ends with two sets of conclusions in the final chapter seven. The first set 
refers to the issue of how the research has been done and highlights its contribution to the 
conceptual debate on Europeanisation, as well as methodological issues that might be 
relevant to further research. The second set of conclusions presents the results of the 
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analysis of the empirical evidence in the four substantive chapters and presents the 
overall conclusions with regard to the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy. 
Research methods and sources 
This section outlines the research methods and sources that were used in order to develop 
this thesis. A large amount of data was obtained with the use of qualitative methods, such 
as semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The thesis also uses primary 
sources, mainly official EU documents and Polish documents predominately originating 
from the MFA. This material is complemented, where possible, by secondary literature, 
especially in chapter two and in chapters four and five. It has to be noted, however, 
that the number of primary sources concerning the Polish MFA and its recent adaptation 
to CFSP accessible to researchers is extremely limited. This is partly because of the 
nature of foreign policy as an issue area, which is to a large extent confidential. Referring 
to any Polish secondary sources has also been difficult, as there are no comprehensive 
accessible academic studies on the Polish MFA. Additionally, the changes examined are 
fairly recent. This difficulty has been overcome by using different methods of qualitative 
data gathering. 
In the course of this research, 46 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out 
with officials from the Polish MFA, mainly from the Department of the EU and in the 
Polish Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels. Other interviews involved 
national representatives sitting in the Council from old and new member states and 
officials from the European Commission (DG External Relations) and the Council 
Secretariat General. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for some 
flexibility. The practitioners would often share their information on an issue that would 
later be followed-up in other interviews. This form of interviewing also allowed me to 
ask additional questions or to expand on some chosen topics. The access was most 
difficult in the case of the Polish MFA and easiest in the case of Brussels-based officials. 
Generally, once an initial contact was made with one person, who often acted as a 
`gatekeeper', he or she was very helpful in establishing further connections within the 
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same institution. A six-week period in which I was able to participate in EU Council 
meetings reduced the problem of access and made possible the establishment of contacts 
within the institution. 
In the early stages of data gathering, three interviews were conducted in Brussels with the 
Polish representatives to the Council working groups. Then, the possibility of conducting 
an internship (with the goal of gathering data and observing the work of the Polish 
Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels) was suggested. The next phase involved 
a two-month stay in Warsaw, as a visiting scholar at Warsaw University, during which 
time I was able to conduct interviews in the Polish MFA. Gaining access to this 
institution proved to be a much more difficult and time-consuming task than previously 
expected. Polish officials are not yet used to being approached by academics and 
especially not those from foreign universities. This deadlock was finally overcome when 
official permission for interviewing staff was granted by the Deputy Director of the 
Department of the EU, who also agreed to be interviewed himself. From that moment 
numerous officials were approached and proved to be in most cases very enthusiastic and 
informative sources of information. Finally, a number of officials from the MFA and the 
Permanent Representations were interviewed more than once, in a follow-up procedure. 
Such a methodological approach, however, may lead to obtaining data that is biased by 
the personal agendas of the policy-makers. This is because the practitioners would often 
give just `their side of the story', that might have been influenced by their personal 
experiences, disappointments or attempts to justify some of their actions. For this reason, 
when possible, the evidence obtained was checked against the information available from 
other sources. In order to verify the statements and the self-perception of Polish 
diplomats, two techniques were used. First, a number of national representatives to the 
Council Working Groups from other member states and relevant officials from the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat were interviewed. Their views and accounts of 
events were then compared with the ones given by the Polish officials. Secondly, 
participant observation was conducted for six weeks in the Permanent Representation of 
Poland to the EU and in the Council of the EU. Two Polish representatives were 
6 
`shadowed'. The meetings of three Council working groups (COEST, COTRA and 
COWEB) were attended and followed closely for six weeks in June and July 2005. 
COEST and COWEB met twice a week, while COTRA meetings took place on a weekly 
basis. Some meetings of COREPER II and PSC were also attended. 
Most of the interviews were recorded. However, in a few cases permission to do so was 
denied or the recording device was stopped by the interviewee and shorthand was taken 
by the author. All officials who were interviewed were informed about the nature of the 
project; about how the material would be used in the thesis and about the possibility of 
switching between the `on' and `off the record' modes during the interview. Additionally, 
in most cases, a research declaration was sent via e-mail before the interview took place 
(see annex I at the end of the thesis). The vast majority of interviews were off the record, 
and a detailed list with names and institutions of those interviewed has been provided for 
the examiners but not bound into this thesis. 
In the process of writing this thesis, the results of the empirical work were presented at 
various conferences. This has resulted in parts of the work being published as the 
following articles: 
" `The Impact of Enlargement: Europeanisation of Polish Foreign Policy? Tracking 
adaptation and change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (2007) The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. I (contains some findings from chapter three) 
" `The deadlock that never happened: The impact of enlargement on the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy Council Working Groups', European Political Economy 
Review, no. 6 (March 2007), pp. 4-30 (co-written with A. E. Juncos) 
" `Playing the Brussels game: strategic socialisation in CFSP Council Working 
Groups' (2006) European Integration online Papers, vol. 10 no. 11 (co-written with A. E. 
Juncos) 
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" `Learning the ropes and embracing the rules: Institutions as arenas for learning 
and socialisation in CFSP', Working Paper of the Observatory of European Foreign 
Policy, no. 70, July 2006, Bellaterra (Barcelona): Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus 
(co-written with A. E. Juncos) 
" `Poland and the European Neighbourhood Policy' (2006) Foreign Policy in 
Dialogue, vol. 6 no. 19, pp. 34-43 (co-written with Piotr Buras) 
0 `Europeanisation: framework or fashion? ' (2005) CFSP Forum, vol. 3, no. 5 (co- 
written with Claudia Major) 
A few of the above articles were written jointly with young academics working on similar 
subjects, in which cases the results of our empirical work were combined. However, all 
evidence presented and analysed in this thesis originate from the work conducted solely 
by the author. The thesis now moves on to chapter one and presents an analytical 
framework for the study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY AND POLISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
EU: AN ANALYTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to establish an analytical framework to study the interactions 
between Polish national foreign policy and EU foreign policy. Due to the nature of the 
research topic, there are several requirements that such a research design must meet. 
Firstly, it has to encompass the processes and interconnections between two levels of 
analysis: a European foreign policy (CFSP) and a national one, and to accommodate a 
third level: the international environment in which the EU and its member states operate. 
In this way, the impact that the EU exerts on the candidate country (later a member state) 
and the reverse can be captured. Secondly, it should allow for studying changes in both 
procedures and policy substance. Finally, it has to comprise the study of a candidate state 
that then becomes a member of the EU, taking into account differences between the two 
statuses. 
The chapter has been structured as follows: the first section discusses the Europeanisation 
approach with its advantages and disadvantages. It has recently become a very 
fashionable term, but its meaning has been blurred by applying it without much 
methodological rigidity, while it has been used to describe various different processes 
and phenomena. Therefore, the section starts with a brief literature review, focusing on 
how Europeanisation has been conceptualized so far and defining it for the purpose of 
this study. With the aim of achieving conceptual clarity, it is then compared to other 
similar concepts, such as globalization or convergence which are sometimes confused 
with Europeanisation. The concept of a distinctive Eastern-style Europeanisation is also 
examined, as regards its usefulness for this research. The chapter then proceeds with a 
brief overview of how the Europeanisation approach can be applied to the study of 
9 
foreign policy. The utility and any added value of such an analytical choice are discussed 
while at the same time several methodological challenges are pinpointed. The following 
section introduces mechanisms of change in foreign policy: conditionality, learning and 
socialisation. Finally, a two-level model for studying the Europeanisation of Polish 
foreign policy is outlined. 
Europeanisation: challenges and advantages of the approach 
The main research question of this thesis is how did the participation in CFSP influence / 
change Polish foreign policy-making procedures based on a detailed analysis of the 
Polish MFA and the substance of Polish foreign `policy based on a detailed analysis of 
Poland's policies towards its Eastern neighbours. The study examines national adaptation 
to the CFSP on the one hand, and the extent to which Poland has been able to influence 
European foreign policy on the other. This implies that research has to be conducted at 
both the national and European levels and that national foreign policy is treated as 
dependent, but later also as an independent variable. A somewhat natural choice for such 
a study was to start with the Europeanisation approach, as it seems to fulfill the 
requirements of providing a flexible framework for analysing a dynamic process on 
different levels. 
Europeanisation has recently become a `fashionable' term among academics, but its 
unsystematic use easily obscures its meaning. The importance of the process has been 
recently assessed as "central to understanding of the contemporary politics of the 
continent" (Featherstone 2003: 20). Nevertheless, while its proponents attempt to achieve 
greater methodological and conceptual clarity, the Europeanisation agenda remains 
contested. The concept itself is disputed and used to describe a variety of processes. ' Its 
1 For a discussion of institution building at the EU level see: Risse at al. (2001: 3); of a shift in attention of 
institutions see Wessels and Rometsch (1996: 328); of the influence of European governance on domestic 
politics see Buller and Gamble (2002); of Western institutional integration and consensus building see 
Zaborowski (2002); of the development and sustenance of the European arrangements for cross-border 
connections see Wallace (2000a); of the development of new norms see Checkel (2001b: 180); of the 
similar concept of `Europeification' referring to transnational authority and policy-making in the EU see 
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frequent and inconsistent exploitation poses the danger of, what Radaelli calls, 
conceptual stretching (Radaelli, 2000: 4) and some have even argued that it has lost any 
precise meaning (Kassim, 2000: 235). Recently, the term has become so fashionable that 
some researchers with broad academic interests "jumped on the bandwagon" of 
Europeanisation studies (Lehmkuhl, 2007: 339). Doubts were raised whether 
Europeanisation means nothing more than putting a new label on the wider processes of 
globalisation or democratisation, in other words, whether it is "a cause or a symptom of a 
wider phenomenon" (Stavridis, 2003: 14). On the other hand, it was also argued that 
different concepts of Europeanisation complement each other (Olsen, 2002) and it should 
not be defined in too narrow teens (Hannsen and Wilson, 2000: 20). 
Europeanisation has been researched from a historical perspective, as a matter of cultural 
diffusion and as a process of adaptation of the institutions or the adaptation of policy and 
policy process (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003: 6-7). As observed by Bulmer (2007: 47) 
this already implies that there have been competing agendas of Europeanisation - namely 
the temporal, sociological and institutional. This study engages with the latter two and 
tries to bring them closer together. 
The term Europeanisation was used as a synonym for `Westernisation' with regard to the 
`return to Europe' of Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (for example: Agh, 
1999). In this respect, some authors, focusing on CEECs, have " reflected on 
Europeanisation as a process of adapting Western norms and patterns of governance. 2 
Most definitions of Europeanisation, however, agree on one of its aspects, being "a 
national-supranational nexus regarding authoritative policy decisions" (Ladrech, 2001). 
Despite this broad interest and a rising number of studies referring to Europeanisation, 
there still remains a lack of a comprehensive explanatory framework to account for 
varying patterns of domestic adaptation across policies and countries (Knill and 
Andersen and Eliassen (1993); and of the increase of cross-border and private issue-formation in Europe 
see van Schendelen (2003: 31). 
2 Adopting such understanding of Europeanisation, Agh surprisingly concludes that the Europeanisation of 
the CEEC polities has been "relatively well-accomplished" (Agh, 1999: 839). Lippert at a!. (2001: 983) 
refer to the "pre-EU Europeanisation" of the CEECs that preceded "EU Europeanisation". 
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Lehmkuhl, 1999: 1). It appears that different aspects of Europeanisation have been 
studied in depth, but there is still not enough "systematic study of why, how and under 
what conditions Europeanisation shapes a variety of domestic structures in a number of 
countries" (Risse, Cowles et al., 2001: 3). 
Which Europeanisation? 
Europeanisation has been designed for and initially applied to the study of policies falling 
under the so-called first pillar of the EU, such as the environment, agriculture or 
telecommunications. One of the first definitions of the term, proposed by Robert Ladrech, 
is still widely cited by many academics. It considers Europeanisation as a "process of 
reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and 
economic dynamics become part of organizational logic of national politics and policy- 
making" (Ladrech, 1994: 69). The emphasis is put on the organisational adaptation, 
learning and policy-change (Ladrech, 2001). In response, Radaelli suggested a definition 
that also focused on norms and values, additionally to Ladrech's national policy and 
policy-making, describing Europeanisation as a: 
"process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making 
of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies" (Radaelli, 2000: 4). 
Whereas Ladrech mentions only `organisational logic', Radaelli also includes individuals 
in his understanding of the term. Furthermore, he clarifies that concepts like convergence, 
harmonisation and political integration should not be confused with Europeanisation. 
However, these definitions, both perceiving Europeanisation mainly as a process, only 
refer to `downloading', which gives a very reactive role to the member states. In other 
words, they define the impact the EU has on the member states and their adaptation but 
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they do not mention the reverse effect that the states have on the EU and the interaction 
occurring between the member states. 
This is related to the fact that the study of inter-relations between the EU and its member 
states initially focused specifically on national adaptation. Bulmer (2007: 49) identified 
two phases of Europeanisation writing: the first one dealt with the consequences of 
European integration at the national level and treated the latter as an independent 
variable, whereas the second one also included domestic factors as explanatory variables. 
However, with time, studies began to investigate Europeanisation as a two-way process, 
including the reverse dimension (e. g. Bomberg, Peterson, 2000; Torreblanca, 2001; 
Börzel, 2002; Börzel, 2003; Beyers and Trondal, 2003). 
As Tanja Börzel (2002) emphasised, governments tend to reduce the costly `misfit' 
between the domestic and European level with their responses which are shaped by 
policy preferences and action capacity. This process has been named a `bottom-up' 
Europeanisation or policy `projection'. Recently, Vink and Graziano (2007: 9-10) 
proposed adopting a `bottom-up-down' approach, which would begin the analysis at the 
domestic level, then move on to see how the policies or institutions were being formed at 
the EU level and finally assess their impact on the national level. They defined 
Europeanisation very broadly as "the domestic adaptation to European regional 
integration" (Vink and Graziano: 7). In spite of their argument that "there is nothing 
necessarily top-down" about this approach (Vink and Graziano: 8), it seems to be 
primarily focused on the national level and favours the `downloading' dimension of the 
process. 
An additional dimension was added by Howell (2004), who conceptualised 
Europeanisation as a meso-theory with three substantive theories concerning: 
downloading, uploading and cross-loading. Reuben Wong (2005: 141) has recently 
named identity reconstruction as a third dimension of Europeanisation, next to policy 
convergence and national projection. Such distinctions, however, seem to be mixing up 
the process (direction) of Europeanisation with its mechanisms and potential results. It 
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seems that identity reconstruction may occur also both in the case of downloading and 
uploading and does not necessarily constitute a separate dimension of Europeanisation. 
As outlined above, there is still no agreement among the scholars using the 
Europeanisation approach as to whether it is just one side of the picture or whether it 
should be treated as a circular process. Here, Europeanisation is conceptualised as an 
ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change, linking national and European 
levels, capturing the growing interdependence of both (Major and Pomorska, 2005). It is 
composed of the following dimensions (see Figure 1): 
  `uploading' (bottom up): the projections of national preferences to the EU level 
leading to the emergence of the new structures of government and policy substance 
  `downloading' (national adaptation, top down): the reception of EU generated 
incentives and their integration into the national level 
The two dimensions above may be complemented by the third dimension of 
`crossloading', which has, however, less significance for the Europeanisation process. It 
can be defined as the exchange of ideas, norms, `ways of doing things' between the states 
or other entities, so that the change takes place not only `due to' but also within Europe. 
In other words, it encompasses the processes that are not included in the two main 
dimensions of Europeanisation: `uploading' and `downloading'. `Crossloading' usually 
involves horizontal learning of practices and institutional arrangements that takes place 
for example between the ministries but outside of the EU context. Therefore, its 
significance for this study, which is mainly focusing on the ongoing dynamics between 
the European and national levels, is limited. 
The above conceptualisation of Europeanisation allows us to analyse domestic change in 
a dynamic perspective, as opposed to providing a snap-shot approach. Nonetheless, such 
an approach results in several methodological challenges, such as blurring the boundaries 
between cause and effect and between dependent and independent variables. If the role of 
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`Crossloading' dimension: 
0 Was there a process of learning from other member states? 
0 Did the state try to influence other member states outside of the EU institutional 
context? 
Alternatively, some scholars are more concerned about the effects of Europeanisation 
processes. Ian Bache and Adam Marshall (2004) proposed the following typology (see 
Figure 2): 
Figure 2. Source: I. Bache, A. Marshall (2004) 
Voluntary Coercive 
Direct Intended impact of an EU Intended impact of an EU 
initiative unopposed by initiative opposed by dominant 
dominant member state actors member state actors 
Indirect Unintended or inadvertent Spillover consequences of 
impact of an EU initiative on the coercive-direct Europeanisation 
member state unopposed by in one area to other 
dominant member state actors 
From this model, the most problematic concept is the one of indirect and coercive 
Europeanisation. In other words, can Europeanisation be unintended by the EU and at the 
same time forced by it? An assumption sometimes made in the literature is that voluntary 
changes are more long-lasting than coercive ones. This fact could be demonstrated by a 
case study of the adaptation of new member states, especially in the area of foreign 
policy, where most Europeanisation effects would be indirect (because of the specific 
policy field). Before accession, arguably, the Europeanisation process was forced by 
conditionality and the prospect of prompt accession. As some evidence suggests, the 
CFSP chapters were relatively `easy' to close and generally the states declared full 
compatibility with the acquis politique. Nonetheless, this change may soon turn out to be 
just `provisional'. This may serve as an example of indirect-coercive Europeanisation. 
After the accession, however, the change would be voluntary and hence longer lasting. 
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Delimiting the concept from other similar terms 
There are a number of concepts in the literature that are occasionally associated with 
Europeanisation. This section attempts to explain the differences between those terms and 
Europeanisation as defined above in order to delimit its meaning and avoid conceptual 
stretching. 
Adaptation 
The basic definition of adaptation was given by Rosenau (1981). He argued that state 
interactions and responses to internal and external demands result in "daily fluctuations" 
within its structures. Adaptive behaviour is the process "whereby actors maintain a 
balance between internal needs and external demands" (Rosenau, 1981: 3,29). It is 
directed one way only and the role of the state is as a passive recipient. Europeanisation 
is understood here in a broader sense. Apart from adaptation, it encompasses active 
responses of the state, which uploads its policies onto a higher level, and a process of 
cross-loading, as explained above. 
Globalisation 
Europeanisation is often compared to globalisation when it comes to `overstretching' the 
concepts and is sometimes called a regional dimension of global processes. In fact, 
despite similarities, Europeanisation has many distinctive features, and the EU itself is 
often perceived as a sui generis organisation. There is no global equivalent of the EU 
institutions that would exert pressure on states, as the member states voluntarily pooled 
some sovereign economic and also political powers in Brussels. Nonetheless, as will be 
explained later, sometimes it is difficult to clearly distinguish the changes caused by both 
processes. For example, in the case of institutional and organisational change in foreign 
ministries, some are caused by global changes and the transformation in the way the 
foreign policy is conducted generally and some are related to EU membership. 
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Con vereeitce 
Convergence, defined as a growing similarity of policies over time (Holzinger and Knill, 
2005: 776), may be one of the results produced by the Europeanisation process. 3 
However, these are not synonymous terms. Europeanisation is mediated by domestic 
conditions and thus the same adaptational pressures often lead to different outcomes. 
Some authors, focusing on the end-effects of Europeanisation, expect that convergence 
would eventually occur, sometimes even defining Europeanisation as convergence, for 
example in foreign policy (Wong, 2005: 146; 2006: 3). Others prefer to examine 
Europeanisation as a process and stress that the approach does not make any assumptions 
regarding convergence (e. g. Radaelli, 2004: 3) and that treating the two as synonymous 
would create confusion between the process and its outcomes. In fact, as observed by 
Radaelli (2004: 5), there is more evidence of differentiated impact than of the 
convergence. This study is more sympathetic to the latter opinion, and focuses on the 
processes, rather than the result, without making any predictions regarding the final 
outcomes. 
EU-i. satiorr 
Europeanisation is sometimes understood as a broader concept than EU-isation, which 
usually focuses on the impact of the EU on its member states or third countries that 
involve direct pressures from the first one. An example is a debate on the Eastern-style 
Europeanisation or the impact that the EU exerts on its neighbours. However, here, the 
two concepts bear the same meaning and, in practice, refer to the same processes. The 
term Europeanisation is used more often in the literature. 
3 As noted by Radaelli and Pasquier (2007: 39), some studies indeed demonstrate that Europeanization 
results in convergence, such as in the case of competition policy. 
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Europeanisation and foreign policy4 
As asserted by Brian White and confirmed by numerous empirical studies, "foreign 
policies of member states have been significantly changed, if not transformed, by 
participation over time in foreign policy-making at the European-level" (White, 2001: 6). 
The conceptual approach of Europeanisation has been applied to similar studies in an 
extensive range of policy areas in the community pillar of EU policies. 5 However, foreign 
policy has been analysed less often in this respect. Arguably, one of the reasons for this is 
the very nature of CFSP. The EU has been described as `weak' in this policy, in relation 
to the member states, and in comparison to other policies, such as those related to the 
single market or competition (Featherstone, 2003). Hix and Goetz (2001) judged that in 
the sphere of foreign policy there has been only a limited impact on national policy 
choices. On the other hand, the predominant stream in the Europeanisation studies so far, 
4 For the sake of clarity, it needs to be explained what is understood in this study as foreign policy, even 
though, as claimed by Chris Hill, definitions of any political activities are "notoriously difficult" (llill, 
2003: 3). Smith and Webber understood foreign policy as being "composed of the goals sought, values set, 
decisions made and actions taken by the states, and national governments acting on their behalf, in the 
context of external relations of the national societies. It constitutes an attempt to design, manage and 
control the foreign relations of national societies" (2002: 2). This conceptualisation, however, limits the 
agency to the state (and its government). Such point of view might be disputed today, having in mind 
modern `entities' emerging in the international arena, like the multinational corporations, international 
NGOs, or nations without a state. As this research is focused not only on Polish national foreign policy, but 
also on the CFSP of the EU, it would be problematic to employ a definition that does not encompass the 
Union as an actor capable of conducting a foreign policy. Another definition of foreign policy was given by 
I Lill as "the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in 
international relations" (hill, 2003: 3). Ile then argued that the concept of an "independent actor" allows 
for inclusion of the European Union. From the perspective of agency, this definition is more suitable for the 
purpose of this study, however, with two further qualifications on the scope of the policy. On the one hand, 
we deal only with a narrow and traditional understanding of what foreign policy is, being very close to the 
concept of diplomacy, and largely exclude other dimensions of external relations, like security, trade or 
development aid. On the other hand, the study also analyses informal aspects of diplomatic relations, 
including the so-called `corridor diplomacy'. In this sense, it is in line with the recent definition of foreign 
policy given by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, as "that area of politics which is directed at the external 
environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, 
in order to pursue interests, values and goals" (Kaukeliere and MacNaughtan, 2008: 19). The more detailed 
insight into the debate concerning definitions of foreign policy and its changing nature remains beyond the 
scope of this study. 
s For an overview of different policies see a volume edited by Graziano and Vink (2007); other examples 
include: the Europeanisation of environmental policies (IIaverland, 2003b; Börzel 2002; Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998; 2001), immigration policy (Favell, 1998), telecommunications and electricity regimes 
(Levi-Faur, 2002; Schneider, 2001), airline policy (Lawton, 1999), financial services (Howell, 2002) and 
organised interests (Perez-Solorzano, 2004). 
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has focused on national adaptation, where adaptational pressures are necessary conditions 
for change to take place (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 41). This is probably another 
reason why the foreign policy domain has been marginalized in Europeanisation research. 
In the last two decades, there were only a few attempts in the academic literature to 
analyse member states' foreign policies as embedded in the CFSP. The major 
contributions are the two works edited by Christopher Hill (1996 and 1983), and a 
volume edited by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (2000). Ben Tonra (2001) 
conducted a comparative study of foreign policy Europeanisation in Ireland, Denmark 
and the Netherlands, Jose I. Torreblanca (2001) applied Europeanisation to Spanish 
foreign policy and Reuben Wong (2006a) to French foreign policy. When it comes to 
specifically analysing institutional change in foreign ministries, a comparative study was 
edited by Brian Hocking (1999) and later by Hocking and Spence (2002). Dave Allen and 
Tim Oliver have published on the Europeanisation of the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (Allen and Oliver, 2004 and 2006b). 6 
Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) classified CFSP governance within the `facilitated 
coordination' model, where national governments are key actors and unanimity is still a 
prevailing rule when it comes to decision-making. They characterised it as a non- 
hierarchical system with a horizontal pattern of Europeanization. Europeanisation takes 
place through a process of learning among the national elites. They argued, that if there is 
no agreement over a certain policy within CFSP, it points to the fact that the policy has 
not been Europeanised. This approach to Europcanisation seems to treat it as a 
convergence among the member states. Nonetheless, this does not tell us much about the 
member states', foreign policies, as every single one of them is able to veto the 
agreement. Additionally, it is not clear which policy they refer to as the independent 
variable: CFSP in a certain arena being a sum of national foreign policies. It seems that 
the `facilitated coordination' mode of governance and its main mechanisms of 
6 Recently, a debate on the subject has been unfolding within FORNET (www. fornet. info), with several 
short contributions published in the CFSPForum (www. fornet. info/CFSPforum. html). 
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Europeanisation, as described by Bulmer and Radaelli, are more relevant to the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) practices than to CFSP. 
The distinctive features of second pillar policies should be taken into account at the onset 
of this study. CFSP is an intergovernmental policy with unanimity remaining the general 
rule. This places the emphasis on the significance of national officials, who operate at 
both European and national levels, acting as change agents between the two. CFSP is also 
characterised by the lack of legal pressures and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) does 
not have prerogatives. Therefore, Europeanisation is expected to be voluntary, rather than 
coercive, with emphasis on the informal channels of change. 7 Finally, there is no clear 
template of policies to which the state could adapt and divergence persists between 
national foreign policies. Hence, an even more important role is expected of socialisation 
and learning processes. 
Beyond the original 15 member states: Eastern-style Europeanisation? 
The time-frame of this study begins before Poland became an EU member state. 
Therefore, this section of the chapter relates to the issue of Europeanisation prior to 
actual membership and raises the issue of the usefulness of adapting any special 
framework for the aspirant members. As some academics extended the scope of 
Europeanisation beyond the EU member states (e. g. Wallace 2000a: 370; Wallace, 
2000b: 36; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007), it was contested as to whether the 
same framework, previously developed for the study of change in the EU member states, 
could be used for researching the possible effects and nature of 
adaptation/Europeanisation of the `outsiders'. In other words can we still talk about the 
same process, channels and responses of the state as when we refer to the EU member 
states? In the current section of the chapter this question is discussed in relation to foreign 
and security policy issues. Eventually, the usefulness of making the distinction of 
Eastern-style Europeanisation in the analytical framework is challenged. 
7 An exception here would be the period prior to accession, when the EU uses the policy of conditionality 
towards the candidate states, also in the foreign policy area. Hence, the adaptation pressures are stronger 
and the motivation for change comes from the perspective of membership. 
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Most of the Europeanisation studies so far have been from within the EU and might be 
thought of as `inward-looking'. This tendency has recently been questioned (e. g. Wallace 
2000a; Wallace, 2000b; Goetz, 2000; Goetz 2001b; Grabbe 2003; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2007) and the challenge "to pin down the territory covered by the concept" 
acknowledged (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 39). The current study shares the arguments 
put forward in the debate and does not narrow down the range of Europeanisation to only 
the EU member states but also includes applicant states. As a result, the period prior to 
and during the accession negotiations has been included in this research. At the same 
time, the possibility that the processes of Europeanisation amongst the EU-25 are of a 
different nature to those of the original EU-15, should be carefully considered. 
The idea of an `Eastern style Europeanisation' has only recently emerged from the 
academic literature (Goetz, 2000; Goetz 2001b; Grabbe 2003; Dimitrova, 2002) and 
emphasised the exclusiveness of the 2004 enlargement with its genuinely novel 
characteristics. The studies of `Eastern style' Europeanization addressed the issue of 
power asymmetry between the EU and the applicant states, demonstrated by the principle 
of conditionality, and the requirements that the CEEC applicants had to fulfil in order to 
join the EU. The authors of the concept assumed that there were significant similarities in 
the Europeanisation process between the new member states, among which Poland is 
significantly the biggest country. Nonetheless, an immediate criticism of such concepts 
would point to the fact that the Europeanisation of Poland has more in common with the 
other large EU states, such as Spain, than with the other small new member states, such 
as Estonia or Slovenia. There are studies pointing out the differences between the process 
of Europeanisation of foreign policies among the big and small member states8 
(Aggestam, 1999; Tonra, 2001). In this respect, Poland may prove itself to be a `large' 
rather than an `Eastern' state, and, equally, it is possible that the processes described here 
are characteristic of enlargement in general and hence not exclusively `Eastern' 
8 Some academics would rather refer to the distinction between the `minor' and `major' member states, 
rightly pointing out that it is not the size that is crucial, but relative power over the state's environments 
(Tonra, 2001: 46). 
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Uncertainty concerning the outcome of negotiations was noted by Grabbe (2003) as being 
the distinctive characteristic of CEEC Europeanisation. 9 As it refers to the overall result, 
it seems to have relevance also for the foreign policy field. As Regelsberger (2004) 
conceded, the alignment with CFSP documents became more frequent at the end of the 
negotiations. This may be due to the fact that necessary changes were introduced, but it 
may also be because of the growing conviction that accession would be successful. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that this feature is by no means exclusive to the 
2004/2006 accession states. The same situation took place with other enlargements, 
combined with even greater uncertainty regarding the results of the membership 
referendum, i. e. the Norwegian experience. 
Notwithstanding the issue of the possible distinctiveness of the CEEC and their 
Europeanisation, the more general necessity of differentiating between the 
Europeanisation of member states and the candidate states was also emphasised in the 
literature. Lippert et al. (2001) proposed distinguishing five stages of the Europeanisation 
of the CEEC-5 (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia) executives. 
They are preceded by the pre-stage (first contacts) and include: the stage of Europe 
Agreements (characterised by disillusion of old ministries and restructuring of the 
executive and forming a backbone of institutional relations); pre-accession and basic 
institutional adaptation (between 1994 and 1997/8; characterised e. g. by establishing 
institutional arrangements for increasing contacts with the EU and introducing structures 
necessary for legal harmonisation with the EU); membership negotiations - concentrating 
. efforts 
(characterised mainly by creating institutional structures to explain, monitor and 
control the implementation of acquis) and finally post-accession (characterised by path- 
dependence in Europeanisation of national administrations). 10 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the case of Poland might be different to that of the other candidates. 
That is due to the fact that, with Poland being the biggest candidate state, it was generally difficult to 
picture enlargement proceeding without it. hence, Polish politicians were in a position to raise objections 
regarding some of the EU requirements and negotiate better conditions. 
10 The assumption underlying the last stage was a hypothesis, not backed by empirical research, as at the 
time of writing the article, in 2001, none of the CEE-5 was an EU member state, nor did it enter an active 
observer period. 
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Methodological challenges of applying Europeanisation to CFSP 
Applying Europeanisation as described above raises several methodological problems, 
which are pinpointed in this section. The distinction between dependent and independent 
variable is difficult to make and hence causality is also difficult to detect. Additionally, it 
suggests the generated result as an outcome -a Europeanised entity. Nonetheless, it 
would be difficult to define such results: the EU-generated input - viewed as modifying 
the national level - is also seen as being conceived at the same national level. In such a 
circular process, what is a result and what is a cause? Member states influence the EU 
level, causing new structures and policies to emerge. At the same time they are involved 
in the adaptational process to the changes taking place at the EU level, to which they will 
again respond. There is no ultimate inevitability to the process and it is not one-way. 
Thus, there is a danger that Europeanisation promises more than it can actually deliver 
when applying it to empirical studies. Europeanisation has to be considered as both a 
process and a constantly changing result at European and national levels (Major and 
Pomorska, 2005). For the sake of practical and parsimonious analysis it should be 
possible to separate the dependent and independent variables. By conceptualising the two 
main dimensions of Europeanisation as `downloading' (national change caused by an EU 
impact) and `uploading' (projecting ideas from the national to the EU level and 
emergence of new European structures), one can achieve some clarity. The `crossloading' 
dimension complements the picture of the two-level interactions by adding the processes 
happening between the member states, but outside of the EU institutional framework. 
In the case of CFSP the generated input of Europeanisation is difficult to detect. The 
participation in CFSP rarely requires the adaptation of national legislation, different 
instruments and procedures are available for policy-makers and the decisions are usually 
not regulatory (Smith, 2004a: 58-59). This is less problematic when examining change in 
institutions, than in case of policy-substance. CFSP follows an intergovernmental 
decision-making process. National governments still possess veto powers and there is no 
supranational entity with prerogatives comparable with those held by the European 
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Commission in relation to first pillar policies. Europeanisation is mostly a voluntary 
action, as there are no strong adaptational pressures with exception of the period prior to 
accession, when the EU uses the policy of conditionality. There are no legal binding 
obligations similar to those in the first pillar, thus mechanisms of change will also be less 
formal and focused more on actors, acting as transmission belts between the two levels. 
Finally, the link between domestic change and EU pressures or influence is difficult to 
determine. The researcher is under constant risk of looking for previously defined 
outcomes and overestimating Europeanisation as an explanatory factor. In other words, it 
is a strenuous exercise to `isolate the EU effect' from the other intervening variables and 
avoiding the assumption that "if they do something similar to what Brussels wants, they 
must be doing it because of Brussels" (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 41). The two main 
alternative explanations for change that are usually mentioned in Europeanisation studies 
are globalization and independent domestic factors (Lehmkuhl, 2007: 342). Often, 
Europeanisation may be accompanied by national processes of policy-redefinition 
(Radaelli, 2004: 9) or institutional reforms. National foreign policy is influenced by a 
vast number of internal and exogenous factors, often pressing in different directions. At 
the domestic level these include the internal reforms (such as those related to the 
transformative change in the CEECs, triggered in 1989), change in the political situation 
(such as changes in government, leading parties, and shifts in public opinion), activities 
of pressure groups (such as NGOs or lobbying of industrialists' organisations) or other 
internal political events (such as revolutions or terrorist attacks). On the other hand, there 
are external factors, stemming from the broader international environment. These may be 
related to notions of globalisation, such as the influence exerted by international 
organisations other than EU (such as NATO, OECD or the Council of Europe) or 
international political developments (such as 9/11 or the war in Iraq). Eventually, one has 
to acknowledge that Europeanisation is a process occurring in parallel to the variables 
listed above. Nonetheless, it is a different issue to be examined, whether it can be finally 
classified just as another intervening variable. 
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An added value of applying Europeanisation to CFSP 
In spite of the complex state of the research and conceptualisation of the term, it is argued 
that Europeanisation does not only offer a useful analytical framework, but also brings an 
added value and offers valuable insights into the analysis of CFSP and national foreign 
policies. 
First and foremost, it allows The capturing of on going interactions between the national 
and the EU level to be captured, in contrast with the snap-shot analysis. Europeanisation 
also offers insights into the mechanisms and channels of change and contributes to the 
understanding of "the changing nature of governance and the state by endogenising 
international governance in the models of domestic politics and policy" (Radaelli 2004: 
15). In other words, it brings the national foreign policies back to the studies of CFSP and 
CFSP to the research of national foreign policies. 
Some authors have also recently argued that Europeanisation may serve as a bridge 
between different approaches to the studies of the national foreign policies of the member 
states (Wong, 2006b: 5), such as the `state-centric' and `European-idealist' school. 
Certainly, it is argued here that Europeanisation, while being a useful framework, may 
also be used together with a variety of other theories and does not itself preclude any of 
them. In this sense, this study does not perceive Europeanisation as an opposing 
paradigm to intergovernmentalism - something that is sometimes suggested in the 
literature (Wong, 2005: 147) - but rather as an approach that does not assume "that the 
balance of power between the state and European institutions is being tilted in one 
direction or another" (Radaelli, 2004: 3). From this perspective, the perception of 
Europeanisation is closer to the views of those who argued that it is rather a "set of 
model-building puzzles" (Olsen 2002: 944) or a "phenomena which a range of theoretical 
approaches have sought to explain" (Bulmer, 2007: 47) and a starting point for further 
studies. Such a position allows for embedding Europeanisation with other theoretical 
approaches that may bring more explanatory power to the analytical framework. 
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Finally, an important point has been raised by Radaelli and Pasquier (2007: 41): it seems 
that studies of the EU have generated too many sui generis explanations. EU studies have 
developed somehow in separation from the other mainstreams of political research. Using 
Europeanisation for the study of foreign policy may thus also help to bring it closer to the 
cumulative research of International Relations and Political Science. As it has been 
shown above, the Europeanisation approach has some methodological shortcomings, 
especially when it comes to providing the researcher with explanatory factors. Therefore, 
the chapter now moves on to discuss the possible way to overcome this obstacle by 
identifying three different mechanisms behind change and applying them to this research. 
Three mechanisms of change: conditionality, learning and socialisation 
This study not only aims at identifying changes in the process and substance of foreign 
policy, but also tries to explain how these changes occurred. In doing so, it refers to three 
mechanisms of change: conditionality, learning and socialisation. The Europeanisation 
approach allows for such combinations, as it does not make any presumptions about the 
nature of the process of European integration. The significance of the three mechanisms 
changes with time, as the country in focus transforms from a candidate state to an EU 
member state. Conditionality plays a crucial role prior to the accession, while the other 
two mechanisms are related to change once the country joins the EU. 
National adaptation before accession and conditionality 
Conditionality has been identified in the literature as the main mechanism facilitating 
change in the candidate states. The main differences between the Europeanisation of 
candidate and member states stem from the fact that the candidates take actions necessary 
to adapt their policies and administrations in order to become members. The main logic 
of conditionality, applied by the EU, is based on exerting pressure on the candidate states 
on order that they comply with the entry conditions. The motivation on the candidates' 
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side comes from the perspective of membership. ' 1 There are a number of different types 
of pressures that are exerted on the candidate and then the member states: political; legal; 
time legitimacy and social pressures (e. g. on actors in epistemic communities). 
Conditionality has been included by Holzinger and Knill (2005: 780) into their category 
of `imposition', which they claim takes place when the EU exerts direct pressures on the 
state, using incentives or sanctions. This is valid in the case of all accession negotiation 
areas, including the CFSP. 12 Furthermore, during the negotiations, CFSP is a part of the 
negotiated package, tightly connected to other areas. Only when the candidate state closes 
the negotiations in all of the so-called chapters, is it invited to join the EU. CFSP matters 
are outlined in chapter XXVII of the acquis communautaire. 13 However, almost no 
specific legal adaptation into the national law is necessary as CFSP (the `second pillar') 
does not operate with the same legal instruments (such as directives and regulations) as 
are found in the `first pillar'. Instead, it is equipped with instruments like common 
positions, common strategies, joint actions or EU declarations. Candidate states are 
obliged to adopt the so called aquas politique and to ensure that their national foreign 
policies are in compliance with the positions expressed by the EU member states within 
the framework of CFSP. Various forms of adaptation are needed also for the applicant 
state to be able to execute sanctions and other restrictive measures imposed by the EU. 14 
The policy of conditionality is possible because of a clearly asymmetric relationship 
between the candidates and the EU (Dimitrova, 2002; Grabbe 2003). This situation has 
been observed since 1994 when the accession countries were given the possibility of 
alignment with the official EU documents concerning CFSP. However, this was only 
allowed on a `take-it-or-leave-it' basis. In other words, the candidates had the chance to 
11 As described by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 662): "The dominant logic underpinning EU 
conditionality is a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external 
incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions". 
12 Under membership conditions, the pressures in the foreign policy domain are perceived to be generally 
lower than in other policy areas, where there are legal obligations undertaken by the member states and the 
rulings of the ECJ apply. Once inside the EU, there are also no more external incentives provided. 
'3 Acquis communautaire is the body of the EU legislation that all candidate states have to adopt in their 
national law if they want to join the Union. 
14 In the case of Poland, these were the changes in legislation concerning the introduction and withdrawal 
of economic sanctions. 
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give formal support to the EU position as it was presented to them or refuse doing it 
altogether. There was no formal possibility of conducting any negotiations concerning the 
content of the documents and the candidates were also not included in the drafting 
process. As will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapters, the formal 
meetings within the framework of the structured dialogue, such as the ones of 
Association Committee and Association Council, did not leave much room for interaction 
and were perceived more like a monologue by the applicants (Dunay et al, 1997: 326). 
Such an asymmetrical relationship resulted in a one-way process, directed from top to 
bottom, from the EU to the national level. According to the concept of Europeanisation 
presented earlier, the candidate states prior to achieving the status of active observers 
(when the channels for uploading were opened) were not undergoing full 
Europeanisation. Another important difference to the Europeanisation of the actual 
member states was the presence of strong adaptational pressures resulting from 
conditionality. Nonetheless, one should be careful about predictions that the outcome 
would also be different. Goetz (2001b) claims that `Eastern-style' Europeanisation 
caused greater changes in the CEEC administrations than in the original EU member 
states. This is formulated on the grounds of five factors listed by him as: weaker 
administrative traditions and cores, policy and institutional `voids', greater susceptibility 
of policy-makers to external advice, strong conditionality in EU accession negotiations 
and the short time available for achieving EU compatibility. 
As regards the degree of Europeanisation related to conditionality, different theoretical 
schools would provide different answers. Sociological accounts would be ambivalent 
about the results (as the channels for socialisation were very limited) while, for example, 
rational choice institutionalists would expect stronger outcomes. The perspective of 
forthcoming EU membership was a strong incentive for the administrative reform in the 
candidate states, as they are conditions of the successful fulfilment of all entry 
requirements (Lippert et a!., 2001: 981). 15 The candidates were subjected to strong 
15 Nonetheless, as noted by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 662), other mechanisms of change and 
rule transfer cannot be a priori excluded. The CEEs may perceive the reforms as simply the effective way 
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adaptational and political pressures, 16 however time constraints and set deadlines may 
have also played a role in fostering changes. Strong conditionality left little place for 
national actors to execute their `veto' points (Dimitrova, 2002: 172). According to the 
rational institutionalist logic of domestic change, the low number of veto points is 
considered as a factor facilitating Europeanisation, hence the institutionalisation process 
is expected to be successful in candidate states. Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier (2007: 88) 
assumed that the drive to join the EU, combined with the "high volume and intrusiveness 
of the rules attached" allowed the EU to have an "unprecedented influence" on the 
institutional structures of the candidate states. However, the possibility of changes being 
just a temporal answer to the entry requirements and being easy to undo, must also be 
taken into account. 
Europeanisation through socialisation and learning 
Europeanisation does not provide researchers with many explanatory factors behind 
change. Next to conditionality, the two mechanisms used in this study to explain changes, 
especially once the applicants become observers, are learning and socialisation. The 
study here borrows some concepts used by new institutionalism and in particular its 
sociological branch. As individual diplomats and decision-makers, acting in the 
framework of formal and informal institutions at national and European levels, are the 
focal points of the research, the agency-centered, but institutionally embedded ontology 
of sociological institutionalism, promises much for this study. Like Europeanisation, new 
institutionalism does not engage in the debate on the winners and losers of the integration 
process (Bulmer 1998: 371). Instead, it allows for making a consequential link between 
the three studied areas: polity, politics and policy. With polity as its focal point, new 
institutionalism assumes that institutions will structure politics, to some degree 
determines the decision-making and implementation process, and ultimately exerts an 
to improve the functioning of their administrations and thus implement them independently to the EU 
pressures. The mechanisms may also be those of socialisations of actors, rather than strategic action aiming 
at membership. 
16 Arguably, these pressures are much stronger than those observable in other international organisations 
(Lippert et a!., 2004: 983). 
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impact on policy outcomes (Weaver and Rockmau, 1993: 7-9; Bulmer, 1998). The 
approach can also include both strategic interest calculi with the more normative 
approach of culture and beliefs. 17 
Learning 
Learning is identified here as one of the most important processes behind the 
Europeanisation of national foreign policy. The policymakers themselves have always 
put an emphasis on experience and lesson-drawing, often as a justification of 
effectiveness (Rose, 1991: 5). The concept of learning is usually bounded with the 
individual; even if one talks of `organisational' or `institutional' learning, it implies that 
learning at the individual level was translated into the organisation or institution (see: 
Reynolds, 2005: 3; Levy, 1994). 
Jack Levy defined learning as "a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's 
beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the 
observations and interpretation of experience" (1994: 283). Based on this definition, 
learning is understood as an active process which involves the following stages: 1) 
observation of one's own experience or others' experience; 2) an active interpretation of 
this new information; 3) a change of beliefs (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006a: 3). The 
second stage allows a distinction to be made between learning and simple imitation or 
passive assimilation of new information. 
There are two different types of learning distinguished in the literature: learning from 
others and learning by doing. Both have its positive and negative dimensions (Rose 1993: 
ix). Policy makers learn from others how to do or how not to do things. Similarly, they 
draw lessons from their own behaviour, either successful or failed (learning from 
17 There are different opinions between students of institutionalism regarding the usefulness of embedding 
its different branches. For example, hall and Taylor (1996) advocate the moves towards "more open and 
extensive interchange", while Hay and Wincott (1998) argue that such attempts are not desirable, as 
rational and sociological institutional isms are "based in mutually incompatible premises". 
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mistakes). It is generally believed that people more often learn from failure than from 
success and that the former more often leads to policy change than not (Levy, 1994: 304). 
Learning can take place at the individual and institutional level. Both are studied here, but 
the latter one is crucial for any structural change. However, individual learning precedes 
the institutional learning and sometimes the first one does not lead to the latter. There are 
a number of factors referred to in the literature that may obstruct the institutionalisation 
of lessons learnt. They are of varied nature; like the lack of resources (financial or 
human) or inadequate organisational arrangements, which may prevent learning from 
being institutionalised. Also a high rotation rate of officials may obstruct learning 
processes (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006a: 7). 
Learning from others is a rational (strategic) action, "in which governments rationally 
utilize available experience elsewhere in order to solve domestic problems" (Holzinger 
and Knill, 2005: 783). Nonetheless, this definition refers to the governments, whereas it 
starts at the level of experts in epistemic communities. Only later, when it is 
institutionalised, can one speak of government's learning. Provided with new 
information, individuals reassess their beliefs and they may change either their strategies, 
as they consider the new strategy to be the optimal one to achieve the goals, or adjust 
their own preferences. In the case of the latter they would consider that the new goals will 
better satisfy their basic or fundamental interests. 
The literature also makes a distinction between simple and complex learning (Levy 1994: 
286). The first leads to actors learning new strategies (means), while the latter results in 
change in means but also goals (ends). In this study, simple learning would mean 
changing the strategies of negotiations in Brussels, while complex learning would imply 
a change in policy goals or even national foreign policy interests. The study mostly 
focuses on simple learning, while any changes in core policy objectives remain very 
difficult to observe methodologically. It was observed in the literature (Tetlock in Levy 
1994: 286) that beliefs in foreign policy are hierarchically organised, with the tactical 
beliefs at the bottom and the strategic ones at the top of the decision-making ladder. Here, 
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the focus is set at the level of experts, thus any changes in tactics rather than core beliefs 
will probably be easier to detect. 
In this study, learning on the individual level takes place in a new environment, as the 
Polish national representatives arrive in Brussels. According to some scope conditions 
defined by Checkel (2001a), learning is more likely to occur in such circumstances. This 
research puts emphasis on the lower levels of decision-making, in national ministries and 
the Council of the EU, where the consensus-oriented atmosphere and strong tendency 
towards information-sharing provide good opportunities for the newcomers to learn from 
others. Referring back to the scope conditions defined by Checkel (2001a), learning is 
more likely to occur in such less politiciscd settings. Finally, as mentioned before, the 
crucial phase of learning would occur in this case when the lessons learnt by the 
representatives in Brussels either do or do not become institutionalised at higher levels in 
the national capital. If this phase is lacking, there is a danger that the lessons learnt will 
be lost while an individual official is replaced by someone who had not had a similar 
experience. 
Another important fact for this study is that an organisation that is faced with a challenge 
would normally search in its own past for the lesson to be learnt (Rose, 1993: 62). In the 
case studies of this research, this `organisational past' was rather limited. Apart from the 
substantial lack of tradition in modern foreign policy making, the participation in the EU 
and its CFSP was a complete novelty for the Polish MFA. Therefore, it is expected that a 
lot of lessons would have been drawn either from ethers or from their own mistakes 
(learning by doing). In this respect the study argues, in line with the argument of Levy, 
(1994: 304) that successes or failures of past policies are of crucial importance for the 
learning processes. 
There are several main channels through which learning takes place in the scope of this 
study. It is facilitated by the institutional setting in the Council of the EU and then in the 
institutionalized flow of information between the Permanent Representations in Brussels 
and the MFA in the capitals. Learning can occur at different levels of decision-making in 
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CFSP. This study is mainly concerned with the lower level of experts in the Working 
Groups and with the desk officers in the MFA, but attention is also paid to the 
institutionalized forms of providing feedback by the experts to the higher level decision- 
makers. 
Socialisation 
Socialisation has been identified as another mechanism that is crucial for the 
Europeanisation of national foreign policy. It takes into account the results of repeated 
interactions between the national diplomats within the EU institutions and within the 
CFSP domain. Such frequent contacts lead with time to a change of strategies and 
interests. Socialisation has been often linked with Europeanisation. Still, some scholars 
have warned that it is "neither sufficient nor necessary condition for Europeanisation" 
(Radaelli, 2004: 11), as there might be processes of socialisation not followed by 
Europeanisation and not generating domestic change. Still, there is a growing 
acknowledgement that Europeanisation generates socialisation by increasing the 
interdependence between actors at the domestic and the EU level (Radaelli and Pasquier, 
2007: 43). 
Turning to the socialization literature, this study shares a number of arguments developed 
by the sociological institutionalist school of thought. One is the influence that the 
institutions exert -a `cognitive dimension' of influence on actors (Eiall and Taylor, 1996: 
15). The institutions provide actors with cognitive scripts or patterns of behaviour and 
the latter are thus often perceived as trying to "define and express their identity in 
socially appropriate ways" (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 16). They make conscious decisions, 
even though they are embedded in the dominant institutional values (Peters, 1999 : 29). 
In the literature socialisation has been defined as "a process by which social interaction 
leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting" (Johnston, 2001: 
493). This can lead to an emergence of the "we-feeling" and even a common identity 
(Deutsch, 1957: 5-7). Actors internalise the norms and "take them for granted" and "the 
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benefits of behaviour are calculated in abstract social terms rather than concrete 
consequential terms" (Johnston, 2001: 495). This implies that there is a switch from a 
"logic of consequences" to "logic of appropriateness" (Checke], 2005). 
However, more recent accounts of socialisation 18 already-make a distinction between its 
different types, and some of them do not imply the internalisation of norms. In some 
situations actors would simply follow the rule without reflecting on whether it is `the 
right thing to do'. In this case they would be just playing a role that would be socially 
expected of them (so-called, type I internalisation) and they could either simply imitate 
the behaviour of other group members or apply the rule strategically in order to maximise 
their final rewards (Checkel, 2005). In other cases (type II internalisation) the actors 
would consider the norms as `the right thing to do'. 
Socialisation of elites has been observed since the early days of the CFSP and European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) before it. Initially, the process known as the `co-ordination 
reflex' developed between the national diplomats. Repeated contacts and information 
exchange between the foreign policy makers led in time to a process of socialisation 
(Glarbo, 1999; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Nuttall, 1992,2000; Tonra, 2001, Juncos 
and Pomorska 2006b). According to the Copenhagen Report, approved in 1973, the habit 
of working together had become a reflex of coordination which has profoundly affected 
the relations of the Member States between each other and with third countries" (as 
quoted in Allen and Wallace, 1982: 26). The EPC brought together diplomats "in time 
and space on a regular basis" and as a result "provided completely different terms for 
social integration between both national diplomacies and their individual diplomats" 
(Glarbo, 1999: 640). 
As a result of -the member states' participation in EPC/CFSP, national representatives 
were "exposed to a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding" (Beyers, 2002), what 
some called esprit de corps. Such a club-like atmosphere described in the EPC and CFSP 
literature, still seems to exist nowadays, after the last EU enlargements. Despite often 
1e See a Special Issue of International Organisation, Fall 2005. 
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expressed doubts, whether this esprit dc corps would continue when more actors take a 
seat around the table, there is now evidence that informal cooperation has actually 
increased after the enlargement at different levels of decision-making (see: the Special 
Issue of European Political Economy Review, Spring 2007). 
One of the results of the social interaction between diplomats ('diplomatic 
intersubjectivity') was the emergence of the common code of conducting common 
foreign policy (Glarbo, 1999: 645). National diplomats formed an `epistemic 
community' 19 and were able to use their expertise and institutional position to influence 
not only European politics and decision making, but through that also the foreign 
ministries (Spence, 2002: 33). They may act as `change agents' in relation to their own 
national administration. The process still starts during their stay abroad, but the influence 
is even stronger on their return to the capitals (the so called `contagion' effect; see Page 
and Wouters, 1995: 197). 
There have been studies on officials in Brussels that were based on an understanding of 
Europeanisation as broadly used by anthropologists, as a process of reshaping identities, 
which "relativizes without necessarily supplanting national identities" (Hannsen and 
Wilson, 2000: 17). As shown by a research carried out by Bellier (2000) on Commission 
officials, there is a slow process, of hybridisation taking place, when the `national being' 
becomes a `European being'. The minimal conditions are easily met also by national 
diplomats in the Council. They include the knowledge of a second language, professional 
experience in an international environment and experience of personal contacts with 
other Europeans (Bellier, 2000: 149-150). 
This study builds on this literature. The definition of socialisation is however limited to 
the "adoption of certain rules of behaviour, ways of doing things, stemming from 
interactions with members of the same group" (Juncos and Pomorska 2006b: 3). This 
does not imply adoption of the norms immediately after the actors enter a new 
19 `Epistemic community' is understood here as defined by llaas (1990, quoted in Rose, 1991: 16), as 
"knowledge-based network of individuals with a claim to policy-relevant knowledge based upon common 
professional beliefs and standards of judgement, and common policy concerns". 
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environment. Instead, they start observing the group's behaviour and discover some 
underlying norms, which they later apply to their behaviour. This will be applied to the 
Polish diplomats entering a new environment in the negotiation rooms in the Council of 
the EU and discovering the `rules of the game' in Brussels and we will also examine what 
follows on from this initial encounter. 
In spite of using the concept of socialisation, this study does not enter the discussion on 
the internalisation of norms or identity reconstruction for several reasons. The empirical 
study was not designed specifically to detect any such changes and the time period of the 
study is relatively short, whereas any of the processes touching upon actors' identities are 
usually incremental and long-term. Nonetheless, there are some specific factors in this 
project that would suggest that actors become socialised because of strategic interests, 
such as a high rotation rate of officials (meaning that they do not spend long time within 
one group, but also that they keep in mind the fact that they will eventually come back to 
their capitals), the long-tern nature of negotiations and the officials' embedment into two 
behavioural logics: one in their home ministries in the capital and one in the Council of 
the EU. The nature of socialisation is also related to the following channels of 
socialisation of the Brussels-based national representatives: 
:- the regular meetings in the Council; often one diplomat covers more than one 
group, they meet once (e. g. COTRA20) or twice (e. g. COWEB, COEST21) a week 
the extraordinary meetings of the Working Groups and additional formal social 
events, such as Working Groups' parties or cocktails organised by the Presidency 
) using a specific jargon, often referred to as `Eurospcak' 
.- informal meetings, either bilateral or in a group of so-called `like minded groups 
of states' (sometimes the group meets more often in the same formation); usually they 
take place over lunch 
meetings on private occasions: the members of one aroun also meet on Private 
grounds, the atmosphere in the group is often very friendly, group photos are taken at the 
20 COTRA is an acronym for the Transatlantic Relations Working Group of the Council. 
21 COWER is an acronym for the Western Balkans Working Group and COEST for the Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe Working Group of the Council. 
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end of presidencies, former group members stay in touch, visit each other, inform about 
personal issues even on the special group-mailing lists 
r being a part of a network of formal and informal communication channels; those 
vary from using COREU Terminal System (CORTESY) to frequent contacts via phone 
and mailing lists 
sharing similar situation vis-ä-vis their capitals (often similar problems arise) 
sharing certain informal `codes of conduct', such as the rules on the use of 
CORTESY, not opening issues closed at the level of the Working Groups at a higher 
political forum 
sharing common interests in producing results and working towards reaching the 
compromise; it is common that at the end of a long meeting the pressure to reach 
agreement from the group and the presidency is high, so not to pass the unsolved problem 
to a higher political level 
The so-called coordination reflex, observed in the literature, means that diplomats share a 
lot of information before decisions are taken through formal and informal channels. 
Strategies are often discussed prior to a meeting amongst the `like-minded groups of 
states' and positions coordinated between diplomats in Brussels and their counter-parts in 
the capitals. The tendency to work out consensus, rather than refer to a fonnal vote, also 
results in a high density of contacts between diplomats, who strive to get a broad 
agreement to `keep everyone on-board' (Juncos and Pomorska 2006b). 
Conclusions: two phases of change in foreign policy 
Building upon the analytical insights from this chapter, this section offers a model that 
will be used in order to observe and explain changes in Polish foreign policy. It seems 
that Europeanisation changes substantially with time. Hence, it would be difficult to 
follow and analyse it without setting any benchmarks and dividing it into distinctive 
periods. Based on the mechanism and type of change, as well as the `direction' of the 
Europeanisation process (uploading or downloading), two phases are distinguished. 
Crossloading takes place in both periods, even though in phase two contacts are already 
conducted through the EU institutions. Also, the channels and adaptational pressures are 
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different within each of the phases. The new member state is first a subject to a sole 
adaptation and the full process of Europeanisation is only initiated when the socialisation 
of elites starts. Initially, the downloading process takes place to a great extent via the 
formal channels, whereas later informal channels also play an important role. The model 
is designed to capture the correlation and interdependence of institutional and policy- 
related Europeanisation. Those two have more often than not been researched separately. 
Phase I 
National Adaptation 
In the case of Poland Phase I begins after Poland becomes an EU associated state 
(February 1994) and it ends when Poland achieves the status of an active observer (April 
2003). It encompasses over 10 yeas although most of the changes are observed only 
towards the end of the period. The type of change observed is mainly organizational and 
systemic. Phase I is characterised mainly by one-way directionality of change: top- 
bottom or, in other words, national adaptation (downloading). Even though, as explained 
in the previous chapter, it is conceptualised by some academics as Europeanisation, here 
it is seen as only one of its dimensions. In the case of a new member state, it can be 
considered as the first stage of Europeanisation, which is defined as a circular process 
accompanied by cross-loading. There is hardly any socialisation taking place and very 
little learning. The channels through which the change is introduced are mainly formal, as 
with the requirements and obligations necessary to close the negotiation chapters and thus 
allow for later participation in European foreign policy making. 
During this phase, when the applicant state (Poland) starts the negotiations, the EU uses 
the principle of conditionality. The applicant undertakes certain formal obligations in 
relation to the CFSP. In order to become an associated state, it has to introduce some 
basic changes in its institutional arrangements. Any non-compliance could undermine the 
whole negotiation project and jeopardise the future accession, hence, the political and 
time pressures are very strong. The impact of the EU is very direct and the process of 
change is of a coercive nature. 
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The first administrative changes involve, for example, appointing the official responsible 
for CFSP, following the institutional arrangements of structural dialogue, such as 
attending the meetings of (Associated) European Correspondents, installation of the ACN 
and establishing initial decision-making mechanisms when making decisions of 
alignment to EU positions. The European Commission has published regular reports 
regarding the state of preparations for membership, including the section on CFSP/ESDP. 
They set a road map for membership and pinpointed the necessary institutional 
arrangements. The applicants did not yet act "within the EU policy cycle, unlike the 
member state administrations" but "interacted with the EU system at different levels to 
different degrees" (Lippert et al., 2001: 984). In addition, the greater scope of the 
adjustments prior to the actual 2004 enlargement, in contrast to earlier ones, resulted 
from the swift institutionalisation of CFSP and the changes within the EU itself. 
The progress in adaptation to CFSP is closely monitored by the European Commission, 
as in the other accession negotiation chapters. The assessments of compliance were 
produced every year in the Regular and Monitoring Reports. 22 Interestingly, the 
negotiations over the CFSP chapter in most cases proceeded smoothly and were quickly 
concluded, as in the case of earlier enlargements. Usually, the candidates would 
emphasise that their foreign policies were in line with the CFSP and fully accept the 
CFSP strategic goals in their negotiating positions. In this respect, the process does not 
resemble the classic hard-bargaining negotiations that take place in other policy areas, 
like agriculture or the environment. No transition periods are usually granted to any of 
the applicants, nor do they ask for them. However, it seems natural that all candidates 
attempt to minimise any potential `misfit' in the foreign policy area, between the 
domestic and EU level. 
With regard to policy substance, the initial adjustments are made in Phase I. However, 
even formally some divergence still exists. The applicant state has the right not to align 
22 The reports and other documents concerning the enlargement negotiations can be accessed on-line via the 
Europa portal (http: //www. europa. eu. int). The 2003 Regular Reports: 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/comni/enlargement/report_2003/index. htm (07.07.04) 
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with EU positions, if it is not in its national interest, whereas such a situation would 
already be impossible in most of Phase II. In most of the cases, foreign policy is formally 
in line with the CFSP, even though refusal to sign up to the EU statements occurs 
occasionally. No possibilities to negotiate are given (`take-it-or-leave-it'), so there is no 
place for any bottom-up processes. There is no (or very rare) socialization and little 
cross-loading (with the exception of some bilateral arrangements between government 
ministries regarding the exchange of officials). 
On the other hand, from the beginning of the structured dialogue, the applicant states in 
the last round of enlargement were given the chance to align with some of the CFSP 
declarations agreed on by the existing fifteen EU member states as well as to adhere and 
demarches, and participate in joint actions. 'In light of their general compliance with the 
CFSP, it might seem surprising that occasionally the candidates refused to sign the EU 
declarations. Some initial empirical studies point to procedural reasons, nonetheless, 
some cases of national foreign policy or the more generally understood national interest 
are also apparent and will be discussed further later in this study. It remains to be 
considered, therefore, whether the fonnal closing of the CFSP chapter, usually prompt 
and unproblematic, is only a strategy, designed to facilitate the rapid fulfilment of the 
entry criteria. 
Phase II 
The Europeanisation of national foreign policy 
Phase II starts when the candidate state acquires the status of an active observer (April 
2003 in the case of Poland) and continues after formal EU accession. The dominating 
type of change is process-related, regulative and cultural (the initial phase), even though 
the organisational change still progresses with various institutional improvements. Phase 
II, in addition to a degree of domestic adaptation, is characterised by `bottom-up' 
Europeanisation, as well as the process of cross-loading. The channels of change are both 
formal and informal. A crucial development takes place amongst the elites, who begin to 
socialise and learn at the EU level. Another pivotal change takes place in the cultural 
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dimension and is related to the change of perception of the EU in the `us' and `them' 
paradigm. 
During this phase, the applicant / member state becomes fully involved in the making of 
CFSP. As socialisation and learning processes start at the level of individuals, fecdback is 
given back to the capital and institutional arrangements are improved. The beginning of 
this phase is characterised by officials and elected politicians learning by their own 
mistakes. The important factor is that only the officials sent to Brussels undergo the 
process of socialization - soon the first misunderstandings appear in relation to their 
colleagues from the capitals. Socialization occurs first at the level of experts. Hence, on 
one hand we can speak of Brusselisation (a substantial physical shift of diplomats from 
national capitals to Brussels) and on the other, the impact the process has on the 
behaviour and perceptions of some diplomats. Europeanisation in this phase is no longer 
a necessary requirement, as most of the required institutional arrangements are (or rather 
should be) already under way. Therefore, changes are now more voluntary in nature and 
adaptational pressures are less strong than before the accession. 
No formal divergence from the official EU line is possible after joining the EU, as the 
new member state is involved in negotiations within the Council of the EU. In parallel to 
the elite socialization, there is a learning process taking place and first attempts to use the 
CFSP as a channel to project national foreign policy goals. The new member state is 
given a chance to negotiate within the Council, which means that the possibilities for a 
bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation arise. Measuring that impact still remains one of 
the methodological challenges. 
Figure 3. Two-phase model of change 
Phase I Phase II 
direction of change top-bottom bottom-up and top-bottom 
main mechanisms of change conditionality learning and socialisation 
channels of change mainly formal formal and informal 
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This chapter presented the analytical framework for the thesis and proposed a two-phase 
model of change, leading from Adaptation to Europeanisation of national foreign 
policies. Three mechanisms were also identified as facilitating change: conditionality, 
learning and socialisation. Before this framework is applied to the four substantive 
chapters dealing with the impact on the procedures and substance of Polish foreign policy 
of Poland's involvement with and participation in the EU's CFSP, the historical context 
of Polish foreign policy is presented in the next chapter. This allows for a better 
understanding of the tradition of Polish foreign policy-making on the one hand and 
explains the 'baggage' of the communist period that Poland was left with after 1989 on 
the other. This contextual background is also helpful with the analysis that follows the 
notions of continuity and change in Polish foreign policy just before and after Poland 
joined the EU. 
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CHAPTER 2 
'TIIE RETURN TO EUROPE': REDEFINING POLISH FOREIGN 
POLICY AFTER 1989 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide some historical context for the analysis of 
Polish foreign policy in relation to participation in the EU's CFSP which follows. 
Tradition, history and collective memory, all play an important role in Poland's 
understanding of foreign policy. It has often been argued that Polish foreign policy is in 
particular heavily conditioned by national history (for more see: Sanford, 2003). This 
chapter presents some prevailing trends and paradigms that will later be examined against 
the background of Polish participation in the EU's CFSP. Bearing in mind that the 
concept of Europeanisation is a circular process, such a brief outline makes it possible to 
determine the foreign policy `baggage' that Poland brought to the EU. This allows, in 
turn, for a better understanding of the `uploading' efforts undertaken by the Polish 
decision-makers in their attempt to influence European foreign policy. The chapter also 
touches upon the question of national identity and foreign policy, as the latter is an area 
very closely associated with national sovereignty. EU membership provoked questions in 
Poland about whether there was a shift in transcending newly regained sovereignty and 
independence in foreign policy making `from Moscow to Brussels'. 
The chapter begins with an outline of the tradition of making Polish foreign policy before 
1989. It has to be noted that for decades after World War II, Poland and its foreign policy 
remained under Soviet dominance. This involved adhering to the ideological interests of 
the Soviet bloc and becoming involved in special relations with other communist states. 
Only with the end of the `Cold War' did the country regain national and foreign policy 
independence. The transformative change of 1989 put in motion the grand avalanche of 
changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) and played an important 
part in the broad process that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, bringing the rivalry 
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of the two superpowers to an end and with it the Cold War. The chapter is then organised 
around the three main areas of Polish foreign policy after 1989: `normalising' relations 
with the Eastern neighbours and sustaining an effective policy towards the region, 
escaping the 'grey zone' of security by joining NATO and finalising the transformative 
change by entering the EU. Additionally, Polish-German and Polish-Russian bilateral 
relations are touched upon, as well as the problems of regional cooperation in Central 
Eastern Europe. 
The choice of these issues was conditioned by the belief that they form a crucial part of 
the input that Poland -brings to the EU. Some of the policy lines, like the approach 
towards Belarus, Ukraine, Russia or attitudes towards NATO, are likely to cause complex 
negotiations, maybe even hinder cooperation, with other EU member states within the 
CFSP consensus building process. The events presented also constitute a background for 
the case studies conducted in the course of this research. 
The tradition of foreign policy making in Poland before 1989 
As Juliusz Mieroszewski (1970: 328) pointed out in the 60's: "Poland has 1000 years of 
history, but it does not have a yesterday to which it is possible to refer". Indeed, since the 
end of the XVIII century, the Polish state did not fonnally exist on the map of Europe, 
partitioned between the three neighbouring states of Russia, Prussia and the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. Poland only gained its independence after the First World War, in 
November 1918, as a result of lucky external circumstances, or, as some called it, "a 
fluke" (Davies, 2005: 290). As noticed by Biskupski (2000: 37), it was "not restored, but 
reinvented, and, as a result, fit ill into the role it had previously played in the European 
structure". This period of Polish history is often remembered today in relation to the plan 
of US President Wilson, who made the independence of Poland and its right to sea access 
one of his famous "Fourteen Points" in January 1918 (Davies, 2005: 286; Biskupski, 
2000: 49). It is often argued in Polish historical accounts that the fight to retain national 
identity was crucial in the Polish concept of the "nation without the state" (Lastawski, 
2001: 35). As one of the characteristics of this national identity, that might be important 
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at a later stage of analysis, the authors usually refer to przedmurze chrzescijanstwa, 
which can be roughly translated as a defensive wall of Christianity against the East and 
the "Asian barbarism" (Lastawski, 2001: 38). 
Due to the partitions of Poland, which lasted for 123 years, the first opportunity to gain 
experience in modem and independent foreign policy making was during the 1920s and 
30s. The foreign policy pursued by the government still remains a matter of controversy 
among Polish historians and political scientists, mostly because of the events that 
followed in 1939. Notwithstanding these divisions, there seems to be broad agreement 
that even if the Poles decided to steer their diplomatic efforts in different directions, they 
did not manage to prevent the unfolding events and the fall of the Polish state (Kuzniar 
and Szczepanik, 2002: 16). In other words, there is an overwhelming perception that the 
fate of Poland was once again determined by unfavourable external conditions and the 
Second Republic was "destined for destruction" (Davies, 2005: 321). 23 
After gaining independence and securing her borders, Poland had to conduct a foreign 
policy in defence of the status quo. Generally, the decision makers decided to base their 
policy on the principle of non-alignment. Polish diplomacy in the inter-war period, 
conducted since 1926 mainly by J6zef Pilsudski, and after his death continued by the 
foreign minister J6zef Beck (from 1932 till 1939), was characterised by a number of 
underlying principles (Kaminski and Zacharias, 1998: 276-281). The first was that of 
balancing between the neighbouring powerful states and not entering into cooperation 
with any of them. However, all attempts to construct a system of regional alliances with 
the Baltic States resulted in failure, mostly because of negative Polish-Lithuanian 
relations (Biskupski, 2000: 89). Beck's idea of building a block called "Third Europe", 
began with cooperation between Poland and Hungary designed to counter that between 
Gennany and Russia, but this started too late to have any impact on evolving events 
(Biskupski, 2000: 89). Seeking alliances with the Western allies, especially Great Britain, 
23 As Biskupski (2000: 87) puts it: "Two elements of the geopolitical situation were baleful realities: In the 
west, Germany was unreconciled to the loss of its territory to reborn Poland and was hostilely disposed 
toward Warsaw; in the East, the Soviet Union regarded Poland as a barrier to the spread of communism in 
Europe. " 
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and obtaining British security guarantees was another objective of the policy. This was 
despite the fact that the image of France and Great Britain had already been damaged 
when they failed to provide help to Poland in its struggle with the Red Army in 1919- 
1920. 
Preventing the Soviet Union from becoming a dominant power in Central and Eastern 
Europe was a factor that would be ever-present in Polish foreign policy from that time. 
For this reason, Polish politicians strictly avoided entering into any cooperation with 
Moscow and Berlin (Kaminski and Zacharias, 1998: 279), and "the Doctrine of the Two 
Enemies" was continued until 1939 (Davies, 2005: 311). Despite the suspicions of the 
West, Polish diplomats "resisted the advances of Goering and Ribbentrop no less than 
those of Litvinov and Molotov" (Davies, 2005: 318). 
The efforts of Polish diplomacy did not manage to prevent the next partition of the state 
between Germany and the Soviets. In 1939, the Nazi regime voiced claims to Gdansk and 
`the Polish Corridor'. Beck's refusal to accept them led directly to the attack on Polish 
independence. In July 1939, a `Non-Aggression Pact' between Germany and the USSR 
was signed with a secret protocol on the partition of Poland and the Baltic states. The 
notion of the `corridor' and the Ribentropp-Molotov Pact has since became a powerful 
metaphor and a sensitive issue for the Poles - one that would be frequently referred to by 
Polish officials concerned about recent German-Russian negotiations conducted behind 
Poland's back. 
During the Second World War, the Polish government existed in exile, first created in 
France and then transferred in 1940 to London and recognised by the Western states 
(Davies, 2005: 361). It also conducted diplomatic relations with third-parties, even with 
the USSR from July 1941. However, it was excluded from any negotiations over the 
future of Poland that took place at the three grand conferences in Teheran, Yalta and 
Potsdam. When it came to deciding the post-war order, "(f)or both Washington and 
London policy regarding Poland was fundamentally based on ruthless Realpolitik and 
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comported ill with grand declarations of fighting a war for democracy and decency" 
(Biskupski, 2000: 119). 
Formally, Poland regained its independence in June 1945. However, Russian troops were 
still present on Polish territory, the new authorities were the protege of the USSR and 
Poland was cast into the Soviet zone of dominance. Polish foreign policy after the war 
was based on the rejection of the principles of the Second Republic: that Poland could 
survive as an independent country, without accepting a subordinate status; and that the 
Western allies would provide help in defending Polish national interests (Biskupski, 
2000: 132). This was done in order to emphasise the need for accepting the protectorate 
of the Soviet Union (Sanford, 2003: 189). 
Before long, the countries of the communist bloc signed a number of cooperation 
agreements, such as the one setting up the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, containing guarantees of help and security 
and setting up `special' economic relations. The Treaty signed with the USSR in 1948, 
gave the latter a key position in determining Polish foreign and security policy 
(Rachwald, 1995: 129). The doctrinal rules imposed a `socialist internationalism', or a 
socialist entity, in foreign policy. Thereby, to different extents at different times, they 
turned out to be defining for Polish foreign policy (Modzelewski, 1999: 36). As described 
by Kuzniar and Szczepanik (2002: 21), after 1945, Poland experienced "a systemic cut 
off from the norms, values and standards of European civilisation". One of the priorities 
of the security policy of Poland was the protection of the socialist system and, after 1956, 
the communists claimed that Poland could not exist without a socialist system (Zieba, 
1985: 43). The Warsaw Treaty Organisation quickly became a tool of Soviet dominance 
over the bloc, ready to intervene at any signs of disobedience. This was later codified as 
the `Brezhnev doctrine'. 
After the end of the war, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stood in need not only of 
resources, but also of skilled diplomats and experts. The situation worsened, after the 
Soviet dominance was reinforced in 1948. The `clearing action' in the Polish Foreign 
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Service was proclaimed in 1949 and lasted till 1956 (Kukulka, 2000: 119-123). The key 
positions were filled with people loyal to the communist party and there was no place for 
any non-compliance with its guidelines. The rejection of the `Marshall Plan' in 1947, 
initially welcomed with interest by the Polish government, but abandoned under the 
pressure of the USSR, serves as an example of Poland following Soviet, rather than 
national interests. Poland also had to follow the Soviet stance on international events e. g. 
condemning `Israel Zionist imperialism' after the Six Day War in the Middle East in 
1967 or participating in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Castle and 
Taras, 2002: 34). 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to perceive Poland's dependence on the USSR in a 
static way, as its forms and strength evolved over time (Kupiecki and Szezcpanik, 1995: 
43). Soviet supervision of Polish foreign policy weakened in the late 50's as some 
initiatives on the international scene came from the Polish government, such as the 
Rapacki Plan24. Some historians viewed it as a step towards European unity and strategic 
Polish-German cooperation (Biskupski, 2000: 147). During the mid-60's, the situation 
allowed for Polish church representatives to write the "Letter of the Polish Bishops" 
addressed to their German counterparts on 18 November 1965. It not only forgave the 
Genpans, but also asked for forgiveness and called for improving relations between the 
two nations (for more see: Davies 2005: 444-445). Eventually, the Treaty with the 
Federal Republic of Germany was signed in 1970 and the German Chancellor Willy 
Brandt knelt in front of the Memorial to the Victims of Nazi Oppression. At the same 
time, the Western Polish frontier was finally recognised (Davies, 2005: 445). This was 
considered as an obvious success of Polish diplomacy, an initiative conducted 
independently from the USSR. 
24 The plan was presented by Adam Rapacki, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the 2"d October 
1957 to the General Assembly of the United Nations and proposed a creation of a non-nuclear zone in 
Central Europe. It was to encompass Poland, Czechoslovakia and both German States. The proposal 
included the creation of control systems with representatives from NATO and WTO (Gajda, 1974: 160; 
Davies, 2005: 441). The idea was, however, rejected by the United States. In 1967, Poland came back to 
this concept, introducing the `Gomulka Plan' to freeze the nuclear situation in Central Europe. 
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The 70s were already marked by a more active role for Poland on the international scene, 
especially in the field of European cooperation. Polish diplomacy became involved in the 
newly initiated (1972-1973) Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
(Kuiniar and Szczepanik, 2002: 18). The Polish government was particularly interested 
in improving its relations with the neighbouring German Federal Republic (FDR) 
(Modzelewski, 1999: 18) and with France. In the field of wider diplomacy, a lot of 
attention and support was given to third world developing countries, often perceived by 
the communist bloc as allies on the `anti-imperialist front"(Gajda, 1974: 254). However, 
Davis has argued forcefully that, "(i)n the long run [... ] by far the most important 
development of the decade lay in the reorientation of Poland's international relations" 
(Davies, 2005: 516). 
Building a democratic state - the beginning of an independent foreign policy 
Only after the changes in 1989 did Poland regain full sovereignty both nationally and 
internationally. After the resolutions of the `Round Table' and the semi-free elections, 
Central and Eastern Europe saw the first post-Communist Prime Minister, when Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki took office in Poland in September 1989. Even though the communist party 
was given the posts of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Internal Affairs in the 
newly established government, it did not succeed in gaining control over the MFA. The 
credit for this belonged to Mazowiecki himself, who considered this sphere of policy to 
be of major importance, "an instrument to rebuild independence and Poland's image as 
an independent state" (Vinton, 1995: 31). Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski was 
appointed as Foreign Minister by General Wojcicch Jaruzelski, who took the newly 
created post of President. Skubiszewski, coining from the academic community rather 
than the political environment, remained in office until 1993 under four consecutive 
Prime Ministers. This turned out to be one of the elements guaranteeing continuity of 
Polish foreign policy in that period, otherwise characterised by the frequent shifts of 
governments. 
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Notwithstanding the general consensus among the political elites on the main foreign 
policy lines in the following years, some tensions emerged between the government and 
the President over the control of the MFA. According to the agreements of the `Round 
Table' that were later written into the 'Little Constitution' of 1992, the President 
conducted general supervision of foreign policy, while the government was responsible 
for its implementation. This overlap of prerogatives became evident especially during the 
presidency term of Lech Walesa and subsequently after the era of Skubiszewski. 25 
The initial context for forming a new Polish foreign policy was characterised by a deep 
political, economic and social crisis. There were simply not enough skilled staff and 
means available to the MFA (Kuiniar and Szczepanik, 2002). There were also plenty of 
practical, organisational and technical problems to be solved. A symbolic example is 
reported by Davies (2005: 516). A minister responsible for contacts with NATO in 1990, 
soon discovered that the telephone line in his office was only linked via a fixed circuit to 
Moscow. Hence, wanting to contact any Polish diplomat in Brussels, he had to make use 
of a telephone booth on the street. Apart from such practical challenges, there was also 
strong pressure to replace the officials that served in the diplomatic service under the 
communist regime. They were considered inappropriate representatives of the 
democratically elected government. A major administrative reform was needed and this 
task was delegated to Professor Jerzy Makarczyk. It is estimated that in the period 
between 1989 and 1993,350 of the 698 MFA employees were made redundant, including 
90% of Poland's ambassadors and general consuls (Vinton, 1995: 47). In the search for 
new representatives of Poland abroad, the MFA reached out to well-known academics, 
journalists and political activists. Some of these new appointments were criticised later, 
as not all of the new diplomats had the necessary experience, knowledge and expertise 
concerning their new tasks. 
Meanwhile, the training of the new officials required time and the MFA lacked the 
resources to employ specialists. In 1994, the starting salary was lower than the average 
23 Skubiszewski gained trust and confidence of president Walgsa, thanks to which the MFA could function 
without any major disruptions (Bartoszewski in Komar, 2006: 262). 
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industrial wage and set at $181 per month (Vinton, 1995: 48). A number of new 
departments were created: the Department of European Institutions, the Department of 
North and South America, the Department of Europe and the Department of Africa, Asia, 
Australia and Oceania. At the end of 1991, the ministry administrated 78 embassies, 32 
consulates general, a mission, 7 representations, an office of interests, 4 centres of 
information and Polish culture and 7 Polish institutes (Szczepanik, 2002: 433). 
In his Sejm expose in 1990, Skubiszewski outlined the main priorities of Polish foreign 
policy. The main task of the government was to restore the full independence of the state 
and provide it with security. This goal was to be achieved through "institutionalising 
Poland's role as an international actor" (Sanford, 2003: 182) and hence the involvement in 
the CSCE framework, later with the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe 
(CoE)26 Interestingly, NATO was not mentioned at all among the organisations that 
Poland was aspiring to join. Another urgent goal, defined in the expose, was to redefine 
the relations with Poland's powerful neighbours, the USSR and Germany, and to create a 
strong regional co-operation network (Skubiszcwski 1990e). This was in accordance with 
the three pillars of modern Polish foreign policy, formulated by Jerzy Giedroyc: 
supporting an independent Ukraine, normalising relations with Germany and obtaining 
guarantees for Poland's borders (Prizel, 1998: 103). Some academics wrote in favour of 
Europeanisation, arguing that the "Westernisation of Poland is the only way to provide 
Poland with security, chances for economic development and worthiness and as a 
consequence the protection of valuable elements of national identity" (Kuzniar, 1992: 
59). The self-perception among Polish political elites for centuries, proven false by the 
developments of World War II and its aftermath, was the conviction, that Poland was a 
great military and cultural power (Prizel, 1998: 69,103). It had to be dismissed in a 
process of new foreign policy planning, together with the traditional `heroic 
26 Poland launched its attempts to join Western organisations in 1989, by taking part as a special guest, in 
the works of the Council of Europe (CoE) and later joining the organisation in 1991. The following year, a 
Permanent Representation was established in Strasbourg. Poland has been an active participant of the 
Council, advocating wide participation for all the countries fulfilling the basic requirements (Lot-Nowak, 
1999: 58). 
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individualism', in order to rationally and pragmatically adapt to the changes in the 
international environment (Bielers, 1992: 91). 
The newly chosen Western oriented foreign policy was subjected to a test early in 1991, 
when the Soviets proposed the relaunch of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid 
(COMECON). The Poles found themselves in a difficult position, risking a confrontation 
with Moscow, but still refused the offer (Davies, 2005: 510). In the meantime, the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation was going through the ultimate phase of its existence. 
Polish diplomacy initially proposed transforming it from the military-political 
organisation into a `military-defence' and later a `consultative-defence' alliance and 
introducing more democratic rules to its functioning (Tabor, 1992: 151). Eventually, the 
organisation survived till mid-1991, but was treated as a temporary defence alliance that 
had lost its ideological fundaments. Finally, the decision regarding the prompt dissolution 
of the Pact was taken at the ministerial meeting in Budapest in February 1991. Its last 
meeting took place on the 1 S` of July 1991 in Prague. 
Initially, Poland, like most other post-communist states, especially those that were 
neighbouring Czechoslovakia, advocated the idea of building a completely new system of 
European security that would incorporate most European states. In this respect, the CSCE 
was perceived as its possible base. In January 1990, the Polish Prime Minister introduced 
the idea of establishing the Council for European Cooperation, a permanent body of 
CSCE. Its major task would be to assess substantial European problems, in the fields of 
politics, military, economic, humanitarian and environmental cooperation. During this 
initiative for transforming the CSCE, Poland saw a step towards the creation of a pan- 
European Confederation, an idea that was presented earlier by the French president 
Francois Mitterrand. 
Polish contacts with NATO were officially initiated when Skubiszewski visited the 
Alliance's Headquarters in Brussels in March 1990 and the Secretary General, Manfred 
Wörner, paid a visit in September, of the same year. Poland had by then clearly expressed 
an interest in NATO's presence in the region (Kupiecki, 2002). The issue of possible 
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future enlargement, however, was not yet officially raised. NATO showed its willingness 
to cooperate by extending a symbolic `hand of friendship' to its former adversaries. It 
was only after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and unification of Germany in 1990, 
that the presidents of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary formally declared the 
willingness of their countries to join the alliance. In response, the same year, the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established. 
Until 1970, European integration was considered by the communist Polish governments 
as a form of capitalism "inspired by American imperialism and worthy of ideological 
condemnation" (Kulakowski, 1997), or "a temporary creation of capitalist states hostile 
to the socialist countries and the Soviet Union, a creation doomed to collapse through the 
growth of internal contradictions" (Romiszewska, 1992: 63). These views were softened 
with time and official contacts with the Communities started in 1988. After the changes 
of 1989, Poland clearly expressed its interest in joining the EC. Contrary to NATO, the 
EC were mentioned in the first priority point by minister Skubiszewski in his first expose 
in 1990, when he said: "we will expand our links with European organizations and 
groupings, especially with the European Communities and Council of Europe" 
(Skubiszewski, 1990e). Importantly, there was a broad consensus among the politicians 
from various party-backgrounds concerning this issue. 
Establishing closer relations with the EC was perceived as the best guarantee that 
totalitarian rule would never happen again in Poland. The democratic reforms, initiated in 
1989, had to be irreversible. That is why, in May 1990, the Polish government formally 
applied for an Association Agreement with the EC. Listening to the speeches of the 
European leaders the Poles hoped that they would be able to join soon. As one of the 
former foreign ministers admitted later, this attitude proved to be highly naive 
(Olechowski, 1995). Nevertheless, financial assistance for Poland was provided in the 
framework of the EU's PHARE programme, created in 1989.27 
27 MARE was the main financial instrument of the EC's pre-accession strategy towards Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
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Skubiszewski's Early Ostpolitik 
One of the major challenges for Polish foreign policy in the 1990s was to redefine the 
relations with the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki (1990) expressed this as follows: 
"we have opened a new chapter in Polish-Soviet relations. They are no longer 
determined by ideology and relations between the communist parties. They have 
become normal relations between states and their governments, guided by the will 
of their people and the raison d'etat" 
The most pressing issue was the presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory, but the 
Polish government reacted much slowly than its Southern neighbours on this matter. It 
had the idea of using the Soviet troops, as well as the existence of the Warsaw Pact, as an 
argument in the border dispute with Germany. Thus, the government formally confirmed 
its good relations with the USSR and used it as the guarantee of its Western border 
(Millard, 1996; Terry, 2000). When a campaign aimed at the withdrawal of troops was 
initiated, it already proved complicated, as the Soviet Union (and later Russia), still 
considered its Eastern neighbours as subject to its own influence. On top of that, the 
USSR had already encountered problems with providing housing to a large number of 
soldiers returning from other states. In September 1990, the Polish government proposed 
the commencement of negotiations leading to the withdrawal of Soviet soldiers by the 
end of 1991 (Skubiszewski, 1990a). Eventually, both sides agreed that the combat forces 
would be withdrawn from Poland by November 1992 and the remaining ones by the end 
of 1993. 
At the same time, Poland negotiated a new treaty with the USSR, bringing the talks to an 
end in December 1991. The negotiations were substantially prolonged by the fact that the 
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Soviets proposed a clause based on the so called `Kvitsinsky Doctrine'. 28 It stated that 
neither side could join any military organisations directed against the other. This was 
strongly rejected by the Polish side. As the talks were finalised when the USSR was 
already falling apart, the proposed clause would never enter into force. In this situation, 
the negotiations started from the beginning over the new treaty with Russia. 
While repeatedly emphasising that Poland belonged to Western Europe, Polish 
authorities wanted to intensify its relations with her Eastern neighbours. They advocated 
the idea of closer relations between Russia and Western Europe, perceiving them both as 
a potential counterbalance to the unifying German states. Minister Skubiszewski declared 
the "total openness of Poland to the East" (Skubiszewski, 1990c). The idea of Poland 
acting as a `bridge' between Western and Eastern Europe was present in the public 
debate, but specifically avoided by the government. In this respect, the minister 
introduced his famous `dual-track' policy towards Poland's Eastern neighbours. It 
recognised the Soviet republics as autonomous and equal partners, but at the same time 
formally respected the, still existing, centre in Moscow. In 1991, as admitted by the 
minister, the relations with some of the Soviet republics were virtually the same as with 
other sovereign states (Skubiszewski, 1991). The Polish government saw the guarantee of 
the security of Poland's eastern flank by linking two issues: the independence of its 
Eastern neighbours and democracy (Skubiszewski, 1992). Additionally, relations with the 
`West' were dependent on how well Poland managed its relations with its Eastern 
partners. It was believed that Poland could prove its credibility by establishing proper 
relations with the East and by engaging in the discourse of democracy. 
The new `dual track' policy, however, proved to be difficult to put into practice. An 
example of the challenges may be found in the Lithuanian case. When Lithuania 
proclaimed its independence, it received a wann welcome from Poland. However, during 
the subsequent blockade of the country by the Soviets, the Poles offered only symbolic 
support. After the assault on Lithuanian state television in January 1991, permission was 
28 Yuli A. Kvitsinsky was at that time the Minster of Foreign Affairs and is thought to be an author of the 
referred clause (Prizel 1995: 102). 
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given to open the Information Bureau of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Warsaw. However, fearing the reaction of Moscow, Poland did not offer any diplomatic 
support to Vilnius, even though Lithuania requested it and expected it to be granted 
(Burant, 1993: 400). Relations with Lithuania were further complicated by the existence 
of a strong Polish minority in that country and the Polish government's claims that it was 
mistreated. 
The `dual-track' policy also turned out to be a disappointment for Ukraine. Pursuing its 
goal of gaining independence, it perceived Poland as its `gate' to Europe. The 
declarations by Ukrainian politicians, regarding their hopes for a crucial partnership with 
Poland, received only a lukewarm response from Warsaw. In Poland, an independent 
Ukraine was seen as a guarantee that Russia would not come back to its imperial politics. 
However, at the same time, strong support of an independent state could seriously 
endanger Poland's political and economic relations with Russia who, still perceived to be 
a major player in the region. 
The Eastern policy of Skubiszewski was further criticised for being too passive towards 
Russia. Some observers denounced his `dual-track' policy as not satisfying to any of the 
involved sides (Michta, 1999: 46). Moscow perceived it as interfering in its internal 
affairs and the states struggling for independence didn't see it as sufficient support for 
their efforts (Stadtmüller, 2001). Others saw it as a prerequisite, a kind of clearing of the 
decks, before launching the active Eastern policy that followed (Kuzniar, 1994). The 
situation behind the border was very unstable and to some extent unpredictable. There 
was no guarantee that Russia would not seek to regain its influences by hard means. Such 
fears were only confirmed by the putsch of-August 1991 and expressed by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski in his article in Foreign Affairs, where he wrote: 
"Even a cursory glance at a map suggests the main thrust of any Soviet effort to 
redress the geopolitical situation is likely to be directed to Poland. From the 
Soviet point of view, the restoration of some degree of control over Poland would 
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greatly reduce the momentum of the centrifugal forces now at work in Lithuania, 
Byelorussia and the Ukraine" (Brzezinski,, 1991: 12). 
The German border problem 
Another major goal of Polish foreign policy at the time was to normalise the relationship 
with Germany. The Oder-Neisse frontier dispute was still not formally solved. Germany 
continued to recognise the border of 1937 and not the one established during the Potsdam 
conference. The communist government of Poland had signed a treaty with the Federal 
Republic of Gennany in 1970 and the border was then acknowledged by the latter, which 
declared that it would not use military force to impose change. Still, the question of a 
final settlement was postponed until later and the status of the frontier remained 
provisional. The treatment of the German minority in Poland, concentrated in the region 
of Silesia, was yet another divisive aspect of the Polish-German relations, next to the 
issue of the Germans expelled from the territories that became Polish after World War II. 
These differences notwithstanding, there were significant interests that unified the two 
neighbours. Germany required Polish acceptance on its road to unification. Poland, 
seeking security guarantees and aspiring to join Western organisations, had to establish 
good relations with its Western neighbour (Michalowski, 2002). Therefore, prompt 
solutions to the divisive issues were sought by both partners. The border problem was 
raised by Skubiszewski in July 1990, at the ministerial conference in Paris 
(Skubiszewski, 1990d). The Treaty on the Confirmation of the Border was signed shortly 
afterwards, in November 1990. Both sides agreed that the border, specified in the Treaty 
between Poland and the Democratic Republic of Germany (1950) and the Treaty of 1970, 
was final. The two sides also concluded that they did not have any territorial claims 
towards each other and would not raise any in the future. As Andrew Michta observed 
(1999: 43), these agreements "marked the first step in overcoming the historical burden 
of the Polish security dilemma". 
58 
From that time onwards, Germany was perceived in Poland as a key player and the major 
ally in the process of the Polish `return' to Western European structures, such as the EU. 
Concerned about the security guarantees in the East, Germany also became a strong 
supporter of Polish NATO accession. It has also become Poland's major economic 
partner. In fact, Poland soon became one of the seven countries, the only one among the 
CEECs, to meet with German officials annually at the highest political level (Feldman, 
1999: 354). In 1995, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, 
was invited to give a speech at the joint meeting of the two chambers of German 
Parliament. The significance of the event was marked by the fact that he was to be the 
only foreigner to take the floor. He spoke for an hour, watched live on television by 20 
million Germans and widely commented upon in the European press (Bartoszewski in 
Komar, 2006: 264). The speech by a fonner prisoner of Auschwitz focused on the 
necessity to build the common future by the two sovereign nations, based upon the values 
that were once violated by the Germans under Hitler's rule (Ibid. ). This showed a positive 
change in Polish-German relations that took place shortly after 1989 and can be counted 
as one success of Polish foreign policy. 
Regional cooperation 
Seeking new security guarantees and stability in the neighbourhood, Poland strongly 
supported the idea of creating new regional forms of cooperation. The so called `new 
regionalism' aimed at creating new frameworks for relations between the countries that 
were formerly divided by the `Iron Curtain' and could not conduct their independent 
foreign policies. Polish politicians believed that the states aspiring to join NATO and the 
EC would have a stronger voice in negotiations if they acted together. In this respect, 
Poland, contrary to its partners, like the Czech Republic and Hungary, did not express its 
ambition of joining the EC as the first and privileged state. The task of establishing the 
fundamentals for regional cooperation was not easy, as the historical relations between 
the states in Central Europe were complex and did not feature close cooperation. 
Growing nationalistic forces, minority problems and competition for establishing 
economic relations with the West, were only a few of the most serious obstacles. Some 
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observers feared that Eastern Europe seemed "to be doomed to remain a fragmented 
region where the countries refuse to see their common interest, regardless of geographic 
proximity" (Dunay, 1994: 121). 
The idea of launching regional integration in Central Europe was, with the dissolution of 
the old system, encouraged by the West, which was afraid of the possibility that the 
region would become `Balkanised'. First, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Italy 
initiated the Danube-Adria Group (which was later changed in 1990 to the Pentagonale 
and in 1991 to the Hexagonale, after the Polish accession and the Central European 
Initiative (CEI) in 1992). A major role was played by the Prime Minister of Italy, Gianni 
de Michelis, who wanted to counterbalance the German presence in Central Europe 
(Reisch, 1993: 31). Poland was willing to join as well, but because of the negative 
position of Czechoslovakia (which joined in 1990) its application was initially rejected. 
This changed in 1991, due to events in the USSR and the weakening of the international 
position of the Czech and Slovak Federations by nationalist movements (Hyde-Price, 
1996: 112). The cooperation within CEI has been taking place mainly in the fields of 
culture, transport, communications and education. From the beginnings of CEI's 
existence the national minority issues constituted a major problem dividing its members. 
As it did not concern Poland to a great extent, it supported the idea of economic 
cooperation and free regional trade, rather than focus on theoretical solutions for minority 
issues (Reisch, 1993: 35). 
However, it was the Visegrad Triangle29 that turned out to be of much greater importance 
for Poland than the other regional organisations. The presidents of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed the founding declaration in Visegrad in February 
1991. It soon became a forum for the three countries to cooperate and coordinate their 
relations with the East and efforts to join the Western structures. The organisation was 
mentioned in almost all exposes concerning Polish foreign policy (Gajewski, 2002). The 
main aims were to restore the participating states' independence, democracy and 
freedom, and to eliminate all remaining aspects of the totalitarian system, construct 
29 After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia the organisation changed its name to the Visegrad Group. 
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parliamentary democracy, create a modern free market economy and become fully 
involved in the European political and economic system. 30 Initially, it received a very 
cold reaction from the USSR, which saw it as an unfriendly coalition. Some observers 
saw the organisation as "a caucus of like minded Central European reform elites with 
somewhat tenuous control over the political, economic, and security resources of their 
respective states rather than a `real' summit meeting of fully empowered national leaders 
of unquestionably stable political systems" (Tokes, 1991: 103). 
The participating countries signed a series of bilateral agreements on security and 
military cooperation. However, they were never developed, as the signatories preferred to 
concentrate their efforts in this field on NATO. They wanted to avoid giving an 
impression of creating a military alliance, which could be perceived as a threat to the 
countries in the region, remaining outside Visegrad cooperation, and push them into 
forming a counter bloc (Dunay, 1994: 137). One of the achievements of the Visegrad 
Triangle was undoubtedly the creation of the Central European Free Trade Area 
(CEFTA) in 1992. This organisation was meant to facilitate the economic integration of 
its members with the EU. 31 
Nonetheless, the cooperation of the Group faced numerous difficulties and the break-up 
of Czechoslovakia considerably slowed down its activities (Gajewski, 2002). Its raison 
d'etre was questioned after the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992 
announced individual processing of EU applications (Szczepaniak, 1999: 230). As a 
result, Poland was more interested in tightening cooperation than the other participants. 32 
The government of the Czech Republic with Vaclav Klaus in the office of prime minister 
from June 1992, saw its priorities as integrating with NATO and the EU, but not 
necessarily within the Visegrad Group. Therefore, it opted for the "country-by-country 
approach" to EU enlargement (Steves, 2001: 349). Other states also feared possible 
30 Declaration of the Republic of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and the Republic of 
I lungary on the Cooperation in Pursuit of European Integration, 15 February 1991, Visegrad, Zbior 
Dokumentow, http: //www. zbiordokumentow. pl/1991/1/18. html 
31 Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria joined later. 
32 Walcsa particularly insisted on institutionalisation of the cooperation, as some claimed, opposing the 
views of Skubiszewski (Vaduchova, 1993: 41). 
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Polish dominance and, until the signing of the border Treaty with Germany, 
unwillingness of becoming involved in the Polish-German relationship (Zigba, 1992: 99). 
Despite numerous attempts undertaken by the Poles which were aimed at the further 
institutionalisation of the Visegrad Group, it remained a relatively loose forum for 
coordination due to the objections of its partners. 
Another effort of Poland that aimed to establish stronger regional links was to cooperate 
with the states situated at, or not far from, the Baltic Sea. As a result of the conference in 
1990, with eight countries participating, a Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was 
created two years later. Its activities focused on the environmental issues and trade. 
Polish interests lay primarily in establishing ties, especially economic ones, with the 
wealthy Scandinavian states. It was also an attempt to build cooperation in the axis of 
South-North, instead of the historically divisive East-West border. 
The new policy towards Poland's Eastern neighbours after 1991 
Relations with Moscow and with the newly independent Eastern neighbours raised a lot 
of controversies in Poland. Whereas some politicians claimed that better relations 
between Poland with the East would strengthen its position with the West, others 
considered such statements to be unrealistic (Kupiecki and Szczcpanik 1995: 75; Kuzniar 
and Szczepanik, 2002: 24), potentially undermining Poland's Western-oriented foreign 
policy. The notion of `balance of powers' in the region came into play again; the active 
Eastern policy was strongly connected to the Polish-Genpan relationship and the 
principle of balanced engagement with both east and west (Barcz, 1992: 72). However, 
the geopolitical situation changed in Poland's favour in 1991, after the dissolution of the 
USSR. Apart from Kaliningrad, it did not share any other border with Russia. A natural 
`buffer zone' emerged between the two states, consisting of the former Soviet republics 
behind the Eastern border. The policy towards these new neighbours was a major 
challenge for the new Polish government and had to be carefully planned and 
implemented. 
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Despite this evident necessity, the years that followed were marked mainly by Polish 
aspirations to join NATO and the EU, whereas Eastern policy was not conducted with 
any great enthusiasm. There were two main strands to the Polish approach to the East and 
neither of them prevailed soon enough. The first one called for a `realist' approach and 
for establishing good relations with Russia. The proponents of this idea called for a 
cautious policy towards the East, and for treating it as a `bloc'. They argued that the 
existence of such a single entity, which was bound to be more stable, was advantageous 
for Poland. Hence, they advocated separating interests from morality and rejected treating 
values (such as supporting independence of the newly proclaimed independent states) as 
a decisive component of state security guarantees (Bielen, 1992: 93-94). The second 
option, on the contrary, emphasised establishing good relations with the neighbouring 
countries rather than with Russia (Calka, 1998). 
A Treaty with Russia was signed in May 1992, but the relations were still being 
negatively influenced by Poland's aspiration to join NATO. This caused strong 
opposition among Russian politicians, who spoke of the serious security threat that an 
enlarged NATO would pose for Russia. Relations with neighbouring Lithuania, Ukraine 
and Belarus were complicated by the issue of `minorities', mainly the (mis)treatment of 
the Poles residing in these countries. The history of Poland and its neighbours was often 
marked by conflicts or by Polish dominance. What is in Poland still remembered with 
pride, like the Commonwealth with Lithuania, is considered as Polish oppression in 
Lithuania itself. In January 1992 Poland finally signed a declaration on friendly relations 
and good neighbourhood with Lithuania and in March it launched diplomatic relations 
with the Republic of Belarus. The treaties with Latvia and Estonia were signed in July the 
same year. In December, Poland was the first country to formally recognise the 
independence of Ukraine and in May 1993 both countries signed a treaty of good- 
neighbourliness, friendly relations and cooperation. 
Ukraine has also played a crucial role in Polish foreign policy, being the subject of a 
jealously guarded influence by Russia. As observed by Prizel (1995: 114), any alliance 
between post-communist Poland and Ukraine would include the population of more than 
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80 million, with nuclear power that would most likely be perceived as a potential threat 
by its neighbours. The Polish Minister Hanna Suchocka announced, in August 1993, a 
`strategic partnership' with Ukraine as one of the priorities of Polish foreign policy 
(Menkiszak and Piotrowski, 2002: 221). At the same time, on various occasions, Russia 
expressed its discontent with Polish involvement in the case of Ukraine, something which 
was to continue for years to come, especially after the Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, 
up to 1994-1995 Polish policy towards Ukraine was predominantly characterised by 
formal declarations, lacking any real substance (Wolczuk, 2001). 
The next substantial change in Polish policy towards the East took place in 1994. The 
`dual track' approach, facing criticism outlined above, was no longer considered as 
appropriate. A change of Minster of Foreign Affairs brought Andrzej Olechowski to the 
office and ended the `Skubiszewski era'. At the outset of his term, Olcchowski expressed 
a wish to "open a new chapter in the Eastern policy of Poland" (Olcchowski 1994b). This 
new approach was officially outlined in the presentation of Polish foreign policy in 1994, 
in a speech delivered to the Sejm (Olechowski, 1994a). The core of the policy consisted 
of three aims. The first was to build up good relations with the states of special 
significance for Poland: first of all with Russia and Ukraine, but also with Belarus, the 
Baltic States, Kazakhstan and Moldova. The second aim concerned creating political and 
military stabilisation in the region with Poland as a `stability exporter'. Finally, the third 
task was to take advantage of the recent economic changes. The last task was tightly 
connected to security challenges, defined by the government as the possibility of Russia 
exercising economic pressure in order to rebuild its political position in the region (Calka, 
1995). In spite of disbanding the CMEA in 1991, the states of Central Europe remained 
economically dependent on Russia; it served as a market for their goods and provided 
them with natural resources, especially with gas and oil (Bowker, 1995: 78). 
Another problem requiring an urgent solution was the issue of Kaliningrad. The future of 
the military base was uncertain from the end of the Cold War. As noted by Zajqczkowski 
(2000), after the changes on 1991, the enclave has not managed to replace the old one 
with a new identity. There were proposals to transform it into a zone of economic 
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prosperity that would fulfil the function of a Russian bridge to the EU. After EU 
enlargement, the territory would be encircled by new EU members. However, the 
development of the region did not move in this direction. This explains why Polish 
officials were interested in cooperation with Kaliningrad on a regional basis and within 
the Northern Dimension of the EU. The situation was complicated further with the 
introduction of visas for Russian citizens due to the forthcoming Polish accession to the 
EU. Russian officials proposed establishing an exterritorial corridor through Polish 
territory, between Russia and Kaliningrad. This was a rather unfortunate proposal, 
considering the Polish historical experience, described at the outset of this chapter. The 
Poles had denied Hitler such a transit corridor before World War II and since then the 
phrase korytarz (corridor) has carried a very negative meaning in international politics. 
Hence, the idea was strongly opposed by the Polish government and finally also 
abandoned by the Russians. 
By way of conclusion, the general consensus on foreign policy was sometimes breached 
by voices criticising the new approach. With the change of policy, Polish-Russian official 
relations deteriorated and were even temporarily frozen. Since 1995, the issue of NATO 
enlargement was excluded from bilateral Polish-Russian relations. Some improvements 
in contacts with Moscow were only noted in 2001. It became apparent from the above 
that 1991 proved a very significant year for Polish foreign policy. CMEA was disbanded 
and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. Poland became a member of the Council of Europe and 
signed the Association Agreements with the European Communities. It managed to 
conduct a reorientation of its foreign policy and stated the main goals to achieve in the 
years ahead. Despite major disagreements when it came to internal affairs and reforms 
after 1989, foreign policy remained above those quarrels. Even if occasionally the course 
of the government was questioned, Poland proved itself as a stable and reliable partner on 
the international scene as it pursued its `return to the West'. 
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Escape from the `grey zone' - the Polish road to NATO: 1989 -1999 
After the changes of 1989, Poland and its neighbours, still members of the Warsaw Pact, 
found themselves in a `grey zone' of security, or what some called the `security vacuum'. 
The old system was collapsing, yet there was no clear idea what would replace it and so 
security guarantees were needed -for the newly gained sovereignty. In spite of the 
recurrent government changes in the young Polish democracy, the issues of security and 
foreign policy were usually not dragged into the political games and a broad, cross-party 
consensus was maintained (Latawski, 1994: 48). 
In the early 1990s, different ideas on security guarantees circulated on the Polish political 
scene. The acceptance of some kind of neutrality - linked to historical experience - was 
broached. Henry Kissinger, who visited Poland in June 1990, suggested transforming 
Polish territory into a neutral zone (Los-Nowak, 1999: 60). Zbigniew Brzezinski also 
claimed that the best security system would be provided by an Austrian-style neutrality 
for the Visegrad countries (Solomon, 1998). However, because of Poland's geopolitical 
location, the government opposed the idea of creating any kind of buffer or neutral zones. 
According to minister Skubiszewski, they could too easily become the subject of rivalry 
between the `super-powers'. Instead, the government opted for the creation of the all- 
European security system, built around the CSCE (Skubiszewski, 1990b). Similar 
proposals came from the other CEECs. As mentioned before, the Polish Prime Minister 
even proposed creating the Council for European Cooperation within the CSCE, but the 
idea did not gain enough support from the other states. It became clear, especially after its 
inability to solve the Yugoslavian conflict that CSCE was not able to fulfil the role that 
the Polish government imagined. In this situation, the organisation began to be perceived 
by the Polish MFA as a device for involving Russia in the continent's security questions 
(Skubiszewski, 1992). This was of special importance after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1992, and when its former republics gained independence. 33 
33 These changes brought new security challenges for Poland and the same year inter-state agreements with 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were signed. 
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The role of NATO was initially seen as an organisation within the CSCE framework, 
which should not compete, but rather co-operate with the latter. NATO itself was at first 
reluctant to undertake any talks on possible membership for the former communist states. 
It was neither prepared nor willing to take any responsibility for security in the region, 
especially considering the strong opposition coming from Russia. The latter perceived 
any possibility of tying its former satellite states with the West as attempts to weaken its 
own position. Many observers from Western Europe opposed any involvement of NATO 
in possible conflicts in the CEECs and questioned whether "NATO would be capable of 
distinguishing between the good and the bad guys" (Valki, 1994: 116). Eventually, in 
1990, after the summit in London, NATO offered the post-communist states a symbolic 
hand of friendship and proposed establishing diplomatic contacts between the Alliance 
and these states. 34 Nevertheless, the proposal fell short of any prospect of membership. 
Poland began recognising NATO as the main guarantor of European security after 1991. 
Consequently, joining the Alliance became one of the priorities of its foreign policy. On 
the one hand, it became clear that the CSCE would not transform itself into an 
organisation able to provide European security and on the other hand, Poland saw the 
guarantee of its `hard security' predominantly in the presence of American troops in 
Europe. In the official discourse, Polish officials emphasised that the enlargement of 
NATO was never intended against any state, and relations with the countries outside of 
the Alliance should remain friendly (Dutkiewicz and Lodzinski, 1998: 96). The response 
came from NATO in 1991, after the meeting in Copenhagen, which produced a statement 
on `Partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe'. Contrary to Polish 
expectations, it contained neither security guarantees for the region nor any decisions 
concerning possible enlargement. In 1992, Poland officially declared that full 
membership of NATO was its strategic goal. The reaction of the Alliance remained 
reserved, taking into account Russian opposition. This proved a disappointing and 
34 NATO official web page; NATO publications; URL: http: //www. nato. int/docu/handbook/200I/ 
hb020103. htm 12.02.04) 
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disillusioning experience for the Poles. What NATO proposed instead in 1992 was 
cooperation within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 
In this situation, some confusion was caused by the proposal of the Polish president Lech 
Walesa to create the so called 'NATO-bis'. It was supposed to involve all Visegrad 
countries, some former Soviet republics, Romania and Bulgaria and was meant to serve 
as a kind of transitional step before joining NATO. Later, the presidential security adviser 
admitted that it was just "an idea and not a project existing in real life" (Latawski, 1994: 
48). The new concept remained very vague and the government distanced itself from it, 
denying any detailed knowledge in this matter (Kupiecki, 2002). 
Generally, in 1993 the approach of the Western European states and the US to Central 
Europe was determined by American policy, based on talking to Russia and only Russia 
(Kuzniar, 1994). The same year, the Russian president Boris Ycltsin sent a letter to the 
UK, France, Germany and United States, warning that any attempts to enlarge NATO 
would be seen by Russia as a threat to its security. Instead, he opted for `cross 
guarantees' to Central Europe, provided by both NATO and Russia. The Polish 
government officially denied conducting any policy leading to the isolation of Russia and 
claimed that once admitted to NATO it would contribute to the improvement of relations 
between the Alliance and Russia. Fron the Polish perspective, Western appeasement 
would only strengthen "chauvinistic and nationalistic forces" in Russia (Skubiszcwski, 
1993). 
In 1993, Russia redefined its position towards NATO and the European security 
structures. Previously, Boris Yeltsin had expressed interest in Russian participation in 
NATO, later the hypothetical participation was rejected, alongside the idea of the whole 
organisation serving as a guarantor of European security (Stadtmüller, 2001). However, 
the same year brought a surprising statement by the Russian president visiting Poland. 
During an informal dinner, pressed by President Walgsa, he claimed that Polish accession 
to NATO would not be in opposition to Russian interests. After a. great effort on the part 
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of Polish diplomats to formalise this statement, it was put into an official document. 35 
This was possible thanks to Yeltsin, who, despite the strong reaction of accompanying 
officials, did not want to withdraw or water down his earlier claim. 
This revolutionary remark was soon `undone' by the Russian ministry, but the Polish 
diplomats took advantage of the spoken words. In September, the Polish President sent an 
official letter to the NATO Secretary General, in which he called for Poland to be 
admitted to the organisation. He argued that it would "remove that invisible barrier which 
still keeps Europe divided into two parts - states which enjoy fully ensured and 
guaranteed security, and states which do not" (Walesa 1993). A few days later, Manfred 
Wörner spoke in favor of opening "more concrete perspectives for countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe which want to join NATO and which we may consider eligible for 
future membership" (Solomon, 1998: 25). 
The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) caused some 
disappointment in Poland, as it did not offer any concrete security guarantees to the 
region. Some politicians warned that leaving the country in the `grey area of uncertainty' 
may revive Russian `imperial tendencies' (Weydenthal dc, 1994). It soon became clear 
that the process of accession would take a long time, so the Poles pressed for a clear 
declaration from NATO on the question of enlargement. At the beginning of 1994, on the 
initiative of the United States, NATO invited Central European Countries to participate in 
a programme called the Partnership for Peace (PfP). From the very beginning, the Poles 
wanted to treat it only as a step leading to full membership, even though in the view of 
some NATO member states it was not formally linked to enlargement and was in fact 
initially considered as an alternative to enlargement. 
3s The Declaration of both Presidents contained the famous passage: "The Presidents discussed the issue of 
Poland's intention to accede to NATO. President Lech Walesa explained Poland's well-known position on 
this issue, which was received with understanding by President Boris Yeltsin. In perspective, a decision of 
this kind by sovereign Poland aiming at all-European integration is not contrary to the interests of other 
States, including also Russia. ' ("Joint Polish-Russian Declaration", Warsaw, 25 August 1993, Zbiör 
Dokumentbw, http: //www. zbiordokumentow. pV1993/3/7. html) 
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There was also a great deal of disappointment regarding the proposal amongst the 
supporters of NATO enlargement. The Polish immigrants' circles in the US started a 
protest campaign, initiated by Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, who called the PfP a "new Yalta" 
(Lis, 1999: 65). Together with Zbigniew Brzezinski, they began a powerful campaign in 
support of full NATO membership for Poland (Bartoszewski in Komar, 2006: 261). 
Allegedly, less than half of Polish soldiers considered the initiative as the optimal 
solution to the challenges of European security at the time of the creation of PfP 
(Jarmuszko, 1999: 38). They perceived it as mainly serving American and Western 
European interests and not those of the Central European countries. 36 Even more 
disillusioning was the fact that Russia was also invited to the programme. Still, the Polish 
government was aware that "as regards NATO, we still cannot count on spectacular 
results, unless some dramatic and for us threatening events were to occur in Russia. For 
today, our task is to uphold debate on the subject - something we have managed to do" 
(Olechowski, 1994a). During the meeting with Bill Clinton in Prague in January 1994, 
Lech Walesa spoke about the "hesitation of the West" and accused the PiP of sustaining 
inequalities between the `partners' and called the programme "too small [a] step" 
(Walgsa 1994). 
Nevertheless, Poland became an active participant in the PIP and signed its first 
Individual Partnership Program (IPP) in June 1995. Overall, it contributed to shifting the 
political relations between Poland and NATO to a higher level. In such circumstances, 
the Poles started another lobbying campaign, especially in the US, aiming at enlargement. 
The long awaited announcement finally came in 1996, when President Clinton and his 
Secretary of State spoke of the necessity to make a breakthrough in the process of NATO 
enlargement. In July, the Senate passed the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act. Under 
American pressure, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to the 
accession talks at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997. The expected date of their 
accession . was 
foreseen as the 50`h anniversary of the Alliance. Before the end of 1997, 
the Protocols of Accession were signed. The negotiations went on, while the politicians 
emphasised that there could not be any form of second class membership for the 
36 With time, however, the perceptions of the programme became much more positive. 
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newcomers (Pastusiak, 1998). The battle between the opponents and supporters of 
enlargement was especially vital in the US, where prominent voices were asking "why 
die for Gdansk? " (Layne, 1998: 61). 
On the 27 November 1997, Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek received a letter from the 
NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, in which NATO countries recognised Poland as 
ready to join the Alliance. This meant the end of negotiations and readiness to sign the 
Accession Treaty. Eventually, Poland became a member of NATO, as planned, in April 
1999. Jerzy Buzek expressed the view shared nationwide: "we returned to the community 
to which we always belonged -a community in which our culture, values and policy are 
rooted" (Buzek, 1999). The Polish vision of NATO has always been one of an 
organisation that would engage in a dialogue with non-members and be open for further 
enlargement. In his speech at the NATO anniversary in Washington, President 
Kwasniewski emphasised that the door of the Alliance must remain open (Kwasniewski, 
1999). 
`Return to Europe' - association and access negotiations with the EU 
Mazowiecki argued that "People often speak about Poland's comeback to Europe. Poland 
had been present spiritually in Europe, but not politically"37 (Mazowiecki, 2003: 73). 
This section of the chapter shows how integration became institutionalised until Poland 
became a member of the EU. 
The EU Association Agreements were signed in December 1991. On the insistence of 
Poland, the final text incorporated a clause, stating that "Poland's final objective is 
membership in the Communities and in the opinion of the Parties the association will 
help Poland to attain this goal" (Europe Agreement, 1994). However, there was no hint of 
any concrete steps facilitating enlargement, or any possible dates. Due to the delay in the 
ratification process in most of the member states, it only came into force in 1994, and not, 
37 As translated by the author from the oryginal in Polish: M6wi sic bardzo czcsto o powrocie Polski 
do 
Europy. Polska byla duchowo w Europie, nie byla w niej politycznie. " 
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as expected, a year earlier. The Agreements established the institutions of Association: 
the Council (consisting of the representatives of the Polish government, the Commission 
and the Council of Ministers), the Committee (operational body, consisting of 
representatives of the Polish government and the Council of Ministers) and the 
Parliamentary Committee. 
The critics pointed out that the Agreements focused only on one of the four freedoms 
promoted by the EU - trade (Millard 1999: 207). Another serious reason for 
disappointment was the fact that the barriers for agricultural goods, textiles and steel, all 
being crucial products that the post communist states sought access for in the EU market, 
were not removed (Hyde-Price, 1996: 199). With the signing of the Agreements, a 
political dialogue was established between the EU and Poland and it was acknowledged 
that it "will contribute to the strengthening of security and stability in Europe" (Art. 2). 
However, in Poland, this was perceived as a very general statement, while the 
government was already expressing a clear will to join the cooperation within the CFSP 
(Kolodziejczyk, 1998: 80). 
The economic and political criteria for membership were spelt out by the Copenhagen 
European Council in 1993, creating a framework for future enlargement and setting the 
goalposts for any potential members. Subsequently, in March/April 1994, Hungary and 
Poland submitted their application for membership of the EU. The first calendar of 
accession was presented by the European Commission only at the end of 1995. 
Throughout the whole process, a gap existed between the Polish expectations and the 
answers it was given by the EU. The Commission's officials were mentioning 2002, as 
the date of the possible enlargement, which seemed very far away to the Poles. Nor did 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Amsterdam in 1996 introduce any necessary 
changes in the EU itself, which would prepare it for enlargement. In July 1997, the 
Commission presented Agenda 2000, a document that addressed the issue of enlargement 
and the necessary preparations for it including financial adjustments within the EU. 
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In order to prepare for the negotiations, the government introduced an administrative 
reform in 1996. The Committee for European Integration (CEI) was created and given the 
responsibility for the process of Polish integration into the EU. As support, the 
government established the Office of the Committee for European Integration (OCEI) 
with a Secretary, Danuta Hübner. To reassure the continuity of the negotiation process 
and Polish politics towards the EU, the National Strategy of Integration (NSI) was 
published in January 1997. It outlined the institutional arrangements for cooperation with 
the EU and set the goal of obtaining as few transitional periods as possible. The same 
year, the prompt integration with the EU was mentioned by the Foreign Minister Dariusz 
Rosati within Polish foreign policy priorities. 
Polish relations with the EU suffered some disruption in 1997. After the formation of a 
government by the centre-right parties, the Office of the Head of European Integration 
Committee was led by Ryszard Czarnecki, who was not an enthusiastic supporter of 
integration. Subsequently, after the tension in government over the control of PAARE 
funds, he was removed from office a year later. The official entry negotiations started in 
March 1998. Jan Kulakowski, the former Polish ambassador to the EU, was nominated as 
the chief negotiator. There seemed to be no problems in harmonising Polish foreign 
policy with the CFSP. In the speech inaugurating the negotiations Minister Bronislaw 
Geremek (1998) claimed: "Poland's participation in the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, will enhance the EU policy towards its Eastern neighbours, contributing to the 
development of open and partner-like relations with countries remaining outside the 
enlarged Union". 
In the field of security priorities, next to joining NATO, Poland was also aspiring to 
membership in the Western European Union (WEU). This presented Polish politicians 
with the dilemma of choosing between the EU and the US - WEU and NATO. This 
explains why they frequently emphasized that Poland treated WEU and NATO as 
complementary organisations and not as alternatives. In May 1993, Poland gained the 
status of an associated partner in the WEU. For some time many politicians believed that 
Poland would join the WEU first and that that would foster NATO membership. Some 
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scholars saw the two processes, NATO and EU enlargement, as bound by an incremental 
linkage. This was explained by the fact that "significant moves in EU enlargement 
process had a kind of knock-on effect on NATO - particularly American - policy" 
(Smith, 1999: 54). 
During the negotiations, Poland remained critical of EU efforts to strengthen cooperation 
in the security field. Before the European Council meeting in Helsinki, in 1999, it asked 
for full participation in decision-making on any possible military operations and called 
for discussion of such decisions with NATO. At the same time, the Polish government 
declared that EU efforts would only be effective when coordinated with Washington 
(Zieba, 2001). This caused some irritation among EU Member States' politicians, 
especially the French President, who called Poland "an American Trojan Horse in 
Europe, building its independent military capabilities" (Zieba, 2001: 202). 
In 2000, Commission officials stated that Poland might be among the countries joining 
the EU in 2004 (Parzymies, 2002). Meanwhile, the Polish government set a goal of being 
completely prepared for accession by 2003. At the same time, it expressed readiness and 
a wish to participate in all decisions concerning the future institutional framework of the 
EU (Kulakowski, 2001). However, Poland was not invited to join these negotiations in 
Nice, but it welcomed the outcomes, especially those giving it a strong voting position in 
future European institutions. The conclusions of the European Council stated that the EU 
would be ready for enlargement by 2003, so that the new member states could take part 
in the European Parliament elections in 2004. The fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria 
by Poland was announced by the Commission in October 2002. It also stated the country 
should fulfil the remaining criteria and be ready for membership by 2004. After closing 
the negotiations, Poland signed the Accession Treaty in Athens in April 2003 and finally 
joined the EU on the Ist of May 2004. 
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Conclusion 
It is clear that Poland has experienced overwhelming changes over the past 100 years. 
More recently, while it went through numerous transformations, with recurrent 
government crisis and economic ups and downs, its partners were also undergoing rapid 
changes as well. Significantly, a brief glimpse at the map from 1989 reminds us, that all 
Poland's neighbours would also change: the two German states unified, Czechoslovakia 
divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while to the East the former Soviet 
Republics gained independence as Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Belarus. At 
the same time, Poland discovered that its old alliances were destroyed and it was largely 
on its own (Weydenthal, 1993). Furthermore, the EU itself went through a significant 
number of reforms such as the Treaty of Maastricht and the enlargement of 1995. It soon 
became clear that Poland was to join an organisation quite different from the one it 
desired to join after 1989. 
The goal of joining the EU, formulated very early in the 1990s, formed a significant part 
of the subsequent conduct of foreign policy. In order to achieve it, the country had to 
fulfil a number of requirements, which fostered democratic change. Nevertheless, other 
exogenous sources of change must be acknowledged, as shown in the current chapter. It 
became evident, that isolating the `EU effect' would not be a simple task. As discussed 
here, the EU was only one of the organisations Poland aimed to join after 1989. The other 
ones, such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co- 
operation in Europe (OSCE), also played an important role in foreign policy changes. 38 
Another issue emerging from this chapter, is a certain `baggage' that Poland carried over 
from its historical experiences and the recent communist period. It has shown important 
paradigms of Polish policy towards its Eastern neighbours. The relationship with the 
Soviet Union and later Russia has been characterised for centuries by mistrust and a 
desire to counter-balance the power of the latter in the region. In the inter-war period this 
was pursued by avoiding close cooperation with the Soviets, while simultaneously 
7e Thus, some authors preferred in the past to refer to the process of `Westernisation', rather than 
`Europeanisation'. 
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attempting to strike a balance between the Soviet Union and Germany as well as entering 
into alliances with countries on the Western flank of the Soviet Union (like Romania and 
the Baltic States). After the Second World War, foreign policy was dependent on the 
USSR, but the paradigm was still present in the thinking of the independent, influential 
emigre circles, such as the Parisian "Kultura". Shortly after 1989, the search for balance 
in the region returned with the dual-track policy of minister Skubiszewski. As will be 
shown in the following chapters, the strategic notion of `leaving the EU door open to the 
East', supporting the Western orientation in Ukraine (e. g. during the Orange Revolution) 
and advocating its potential EU membership was also motivated to some extent by the 
determination to counter-balance Russia. The idea of creating an independent Eastern 
Dimension for the EU, discussed later in the thesis, also seems to be directly related to 
the historical legacy of Poland's relationship with Russia and the Soviet Union and the 
perceptions of security in the region. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, this `eastern' aspect of Polish foreign policy was the 
most complex and sensitive. Problems were caused by the (mis)treatment of minorities, 
historical conflict over issues such as the murder of Polish army officers by the Red 
Army in places like Katyn and the Polish-Ukrainian fighting at the end of the Second 
World War. Therefore, Poland entered the EU with a clear ambition to shape the Union's 
policy towards the East, emphasising its experience and knowledge concerning the 
former Soviet states. 
The chapter has also touched upon Polish-American relations. The special role played by 
President Wilson and the US was noted with regard to Poland regaining independence 
after the First World War. This and other factors contributed to a broad perception in 
Poland that relations with the US were both special and strategic. This was strengthened 
by American pressure to open the doors of NATO for Poland, while EU membership 
remained uncertain. This factor in Polish foreign policy, sometimes called Poland's 
instinctive Atlanticism (Zaborowski and Longhurst, 2003), would become another 
important element in the story of Poland's integration into the EU's CFSP which is 
discussed in the next four chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TILE EUROPEANISATION OF TILE POLISH MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyses the changes in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), related to Poland's membership of the EU and its participation in the CFSP. 
First, a few additions are made to the analytical framework presented in chapter one in 
order to better explain institutional changes. Later, the chapter proceeds with a brief 
outline of the main actors and institutional settings of the CFSP and of Polish national 
policy. The analysis of the Europeanisation of Polish MFA begins with a section referring 
to the coordination of European policy, in which the MFA is an active participant. The 
chapter then moves on to discuss the main changes in offices and procedures inside the 
MFA, as well as the differences in socialisation and learning experienced by Polish 
officials both in Brussels and in Warsaw. 
Referring to. the Europeanisation approach, downloading, or institutional adaptation is 
considered here as changes to the Polish administrative machine that are result of the EU 
entry negotiations and of the developments at the EU level in the CFSP domain. 
Uploading is a slightly more problematic dimension in the case of administrative change, 
especially when it comes to trying to measure the outcome. It should be treated as 
changes at the EU level that result from the successful projection of national (Polish) 
preferences. However considering the relatively recent date of Poland's accession, it is 
probably too soon to anticipate new members like Poland having a significant impact on 
EU procedures. 
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Europeanisation and the changing role of foreign ministries 
The general analytical framework and some theoretical insights into the study were 
considered in chapter one. However, to enhance the clarity of this chapter, this section 
will add a few points that are important for understanding change in the foreign ministry 
of an EU member state. As asserted by Olsen (2002: 16), the impact of European 
institutions on member state institutions and the ability to penetrate them "is not perfect, 
universal or constant" and is modified by specific, domestic conditions (e. g. Wessels and 
Rometsch, 1996; Wessels et al, 2003; Kassim, 2005). Hocking (2002: 274) lists several 
features affecting the adaptational process of national MFAs, such as their traditional role 
and status in foreign policy-making, or specific national norms in the domestic 
bureaucratic culture. Having said that, a common feature is the fact that the foreign 
ministries are not characterised as having a "high degree of adaptive capacity" (Hocking 
and Spence, 2002: 5). 
The role and significance of the foreign ministries of the EU member states have 
undoubtedly altered because of their participation in European foreign policy making. At 
the same time, the processes of globalisation and regionalisation have also exerted an 
impact on their organisation and work. Hence, one of the methodological challenges 
related to applying the Europeanisation approach is the danger of overestimating its 
influence as an "all-explaining factor" (Major and Pomorska, 2005: 2). Several critics 
have expressed the suspicion that Europcanisation might just be "a cause or a symptom of 
a wider phenomenon" (e. g. Stavridis, 2003: 14). Some changes in the foreign policy 
process may certainly be attributed to the more general aspects relating to the changing 
nature of foreign policy (Hill, 2003), alterations in the number of actors in foreign policy 
in general and their functions. Arguably, foreign ministries have gained strong 
competitors in the field, internally within government, but also `outsiders', such as 
companies or other Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This has been mainly 
attributed to the two following factors: 1) internal changes within the state, such as 
"horizontal decentralisation of foreign relations" and 2) international developments of 
"complex interdependence" (Hill, 2003: 82). 
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Nevertheless, some changes in the EU member state foreign ministries can be directly 
linked to participation in CFSP, such the establishment of new posts or of new 
coordinating mechanisms. Also the negotiation culture and `ways of doing things' in 
Brussels have an impact on national diplomats and permanent representatives. From this 
perspective, any broad changes sparked by globalisation are complemented by the 
changes caused by participating in a stiff generis system of foreign policy making within 
the EU. Unlike negotiations within other multilateral organisations (such as NATO or the 
UN), the CFSP affects the whole of national foreign policy: through its wide geographical 
and issue-related spectrum. It affects member states' bilateral relations with other 
member states and third countries, but also participation in international organisations, 
where the EU attempts to coordinate its positions and speak with one voice (for example 
in the WTO). 
This changing role of the MFAs can be observed in the example of the functioning of the 
Polish Permanent Representation to the EU. It formally remains part of the MFA, being 
headed by a diplomat from this ministry and being accountable to the MFA. Nonetheless, 
a large proportion of the staff are seconded from Polish domestic ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture or Treasury. In this sense, in spite of being commonly known as a 
`small MFA', the Permanent Representation is no longer to be viewed as the "extension 
of the foreign ministry", but rather as an "extended arm of the national capital" (Spence, 
2002: 22). 
Relating adaptation in the area of foreign policy to the impact of the EU in general, it 
should be noted that EU membership meant especially tough challenges for the MFAs 
and national foreign policies, compared to other ministries and policy areas. This is 
because, in most cases, EU membership challenges the core and traditional functions of 
the MFA. Hence, the diplomats often face the dilemma of either adjusting to the new 
system or losing their position and influence within the domestic decision-making 
proccsscs. 
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Stemming from the different perceptions of the diplomatic arena, MFAs are currently 
perceived to be acting in two ways (Hocking, 2002). The first view emphasises the 
traditional role of the `gatekeeper'. In this case, the MFA attempts to maintain a leading 
role in the formulation of national positions and actions in the international arena by 
preserving its high position in the national foreign policy hierarchy. The other image of 
the foreign ministry is one of the `boundary-spanner', when it uses the strategy of 
cooperation with other actors and acts as a mediator between them. Usually, in attempts 
to regain their status, the EU MFAs were forced to abandon the `gatekeeper' role and 
engage in the `boundary-spanning' role, as in the case of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), as explained by Allen and Oliver (2004). The 
Europeanisation of the FCO has mostly manifested itself in the altered structure and 
management of those FCO desks dealing with the other EU member states and in the 
growing importance of the UK Permanent Representation to the EU. This chapter will 
examine the pressures exerted on the Polish MFA and its responses, presenting some 
empirical evidence for a possible comparative analysis with the other EU member states. 
Typology of institutional change 
In order to categorise changes observed in the MFA, the following typology was adopted 
from the literature, mostly from Bulmer and Burch (2000). These include: 
" Systemic change: concerning constitutional amendments and fundamental 
changes to the state's structures (in this case the changes would relate to the foreign 
policy area, e. g. regarding the requirements of participation in the CFSP) 
0 Organisational change: change in networks and offices 
" Process-related change: relating to the `ways-of-doing things', such as 
distribution of information or concluding national positions 
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0 Cultural change: regarding norms and values within all previous dimensions 
This taxonomy will be used throughout the text, but the chapter has not been structured 
according to the type of changes observed. In the concluding part, this division is brought 
back into focus and findings in each dimension are summarised. It is acknowledged that 
there is no clear-cut division between these different types of change and some of them 
may overlap. Notably, cultural change is the most problematic one, difficult to measure 
and at the same time occurring via incremental processes. 
Institutional context 1: The CFSP of the European Union 
The main difficulty in conducting research related to the CFSP is that it constitutes a 
`moving target'. The changes in its institutional setting have gained speed in recent years, 
initiated by the establishment of the CFSP as the second EU pillar by the Treaty of 
Maastricht, signed in 1991. Some important innovations were introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997), which incorporated the Petersberg Tasks39 and established the post of 
high Representative for the CFSP. The Treaty of Nice (2001) opened the possibilities for 
enhanced cooperation within the CFSP, except in issues related to defence. The 
cooperation in the latter area gained its momentum during the St. Malo Summit of 
December 1998, with the subsequent Summits in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki 
(December 1999) and Feira (June 2000) providing some substance to what is now called 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Hence, the process of Polish adaptation 
to CFSP is characterised by the 'moving goalposts', as the EU was undergoing dynamic 
changes. 
The CFSP is characterised by its own distinctive decision-making process. Even though it 
remains in the same single institutional framework as the first and the third pillar policies, 
the role and responsibilities of the institutional actors and member states differ 
significantly from the communitarian pillar. CFSP is mainly transgovernmental in nature 
39 Petersberg Tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and combat-forces in crisis 
management, including peace-making. 
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with a vast number of issues to which unanimity applies and member states retain their 
veto power. Qualified majority voting (QMV) is very limited and usually applies only to 
implementation of the policies that were earlier agreed upon by unanimity. 
The provisions related to the CFSP are included in Title V of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). It states that the members states should support the Union's external and 
security policies "actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" 
(Art. 11.2). At the same time they shall refrain from any action, which is "contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations" (Art. 11.2). The Treaty lists five objectives of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy: 
1) safeguarding the common values, interests, independence and integrity of the EU, 
in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter 
2) strengthening the Union's security 
3) preserving peace and strengthening international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter 
4) promoting international cooperation 
5) developing and consolidating democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms (Art. 11.1) 
The main body responsible for defining the principles and drawing the general guidelines 
of European Foreign Policy is the European Council. It consists of the Heads of States 
or Governments, meeting at least twice a year. It decides unanimously on the common 
strategies of the Union. The most important decision-making body in the area of CFSP is 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), meeting at least once 
per month. It is composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states and implements 
common strategies, adopting joint actions and common positions by QMV. 40 Twice a 
40 QMV, however, does not apply to the issues with military implications. Also, any member state may 
object to taking decisions by QMV on grounds of important national reasons (see also Smith, 2003: 44). 
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year Foreign Ministers also meet on an infonnal basis during the weekend. Such 
gatherings are known as Gymnich formula. 
Within the Council, a predominant role belongs to the Secretary General, who also holds 
the post of the EU High Representative for the CFSP, whose position was created by 
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). He/she assists the Council in the process of 
implementation in the CFSP area. The Council Presidency has a role of representing the 
Union to the external world, with tasks such as peace brokering or upgrading the Union's 
relations with third countries (Art, 18 TEU; Nugent, 2003: 426). The office of the 
presidency rotates every six months. The main responsibilities are to ensure the 
coherence, assert Union positions and take responsibility for implementing CFSP 
decisions. It also represents the Union in the international organisations and at 
international conferences (Art. 18 TEU; Reiderman, 2004: 64-65). 
The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) meets once a week in 
order to prepare the meetings of the Council. It works in two formations. The so-called 
COREPER II41 comprises the National Ambassadors to the EU and deals with external 
relations. Its meeting are prepared by a group of so-called Antici. The responsibility of 
preparing the CFSP related issues for the Council belongs to the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC or COPS), which is composed of national representatives on a senior 
ambassadorial level. As decided by the Nice Treaty, it took over the responsibilities of 
the Political Committee as the main CFSP `support committee' (Nugent, 2004: 427). 42 
The PSC is assisted by a group called Nicolaidis. It normally meets twice a week and 
discusses issues related to the substance and political analysis of foreign policy of the 
Union, while COREPER II looks into the financial, institutional and third pillar 
implications of the EU's external activities. 
The daily business of CFSP and the relations between the member states are managed by 
the European Correspondents in the Commission and each of the member states. They 
41 COREPER I is composed of Deputy Ambassadors and deals with the first pillar issues. 
42 The Political Committee has not yet been dissolved, although it was anticipated. 
83 
hold meetings on a monthly basis and communicate daily via the CORTESY (COREU 
Terminal System), which allows for sending encoded messages between the member 
states' capitals, the Commission and the Council. Finally, the CFSP/ESDP working 
groups manage various foreign policy issues, often on a technical level. 43 Currently, 
about 10% of all working groups (36 individual groups) deal with external relations 
(Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 171). There are organised geographically or 
thematically and bring together junior diplomats based in Brussels in the Permanent 
Representations to the EU. 44 
The Commission plays a less central role in CFSP issues than when it comes to the first 
pillar policies. According to the Treaty it is fully associated with the CFSP and maintains 
its representatives at all levels of discussions. It also shares with the member states a right 
of initiative. 45 The role of the European Parliament (EP) is very limited in the second 
pillar. The Presidency should consult the EP on the "main aspects and the basic choices" 
of the CFSP and ensure that the Parliament's views are "duly taken into consideration" 
(Art. 21 TEU). The EP may also ask questions and make recommendations to the 
Council. Once a year it holds a debate on the implementation progress of the CFSP. 
Finally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) does not have prerogatives in the area of 
CFSP. 
The setting presented above gives a snap-shot of CFSP actors and institutional settings. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned before, it is a dynamic structure. A Convention on the Future 
of Europe held in 2003 in Brussels proposed an EU Constitution, including a number of 
changes with far-reaching consequences for the CFSP. The most essential ones were the 
creation of the ('double-hatted') EU Foreign Minister and European External Action 
43 The empirical research for this study was conducted by the author when attending the meetings of the 
following Council working groups: COWEB (Western Balkans), COTRA (transatlantic relations) and 
COEST (Eastern Europe). 
44 f lowever, Working Groups occasionally also meet in the so-called 'capital formation' and then member 
states are represented by the officials that come from the capital. 
45 For a recent account on the role of the Commission in CFSP see for example: Duke, 2006. 
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Service (EEAS)46. The situation became complicated when two member states, France 
and the Netherlands, rejected the Constitutional Treaty in national referenda. An 
agreement was struck among the heads of state and government in 2007 that parts of the 
text would be ratified in a new Reform Treaty. These include the creation of a High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, who would chair the 
Foreign Affairs Council and at the same time become a Vice-President of the European 
Commission. Notwithstanding the question of the problems with ratification, the example 
reflects the earlier argument of `moving goalposts' for candidate states who have to 
negotiate a novel system, and changes within it, as they happen. 
Institutional context 2: Polish foreign policy 
The institutional setting of Polish foreign policy was a subject of transfonnative change 
aller 1989. This has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, which also touched 
upon the lack of tradition in the making of modern foreign policy. This section focuses 
primarily on the recent and current institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, it is 
acknowledged that the structure remains dynamic and due to undergo further reforms. 
The main actors involved in contemporary Polish foreign policy are named in the state's 
Constitution. In the period under review, two documents must be taken into account: the 
so-called Small Constitution of 1992 and the current Constitution from 1997. The outline 
below is based on the latter one, but the differences between the two are part of the 
systematic change, also related to EU Membership. In 1997, two articles (art. 90 and 91) 
in Chapter III (Sources of Law) were inserted in the text of the Constitution due to the 
forthcoming EU accession. 47 They relate to the delegation of the competences of the 
state's organs to an international organisation and the issue of international agreements as 
part of domestic legal order. 
46 For more on these two, see the "CFSP Forum" (2004) vol. 2, no. 4 and articles: Sir Brian Crowe, `The 
Significance of the New European Foreign Minister' and Simon Duke, 'The European External Action 
Service: A Diplomatic Service in the Making? ' 
47 The author is grateful to Anneli Albi for clarification of this issue. 
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According to the latest (1997) Constitution (art. 146) the Council of Ministers 
(prowadzi) conducts the foreign policy of Poland. The Prime Minister holds the most 
powerful position within the Council of Ministers, takes part in the meetings with other 
heads of government (Stemplowski, 2004). The main lines of Polish foreign policy are 
outlined first in the expose of the new Prime Minister in front of the Parliament and later 
on an annual basis by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 8 The President is the state's 
formal representative in foreign relations and, as stated in article 133.3, cooperates with 
the Prime Minister and appropriate minister in the field of foreign relations. fie/she 
ratifies international agreements with the approval of the Parliament and formally 
nominates Polish representatives abroad. The two Chambers of the Polish Parliament 
are the Sejm (the Lower Chamber) and the Senat (the Upper Chamber) and they have 
certain prerogatives in the foreign policy area, such as the ratification of international 
agreements or taking the decision to go to war. Both chambers have the European Union 
Committees on Foreign Affairs, which are consulted on the preparation of European 
policy of Poland. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs forms a natural centre of every-day foreign policy 
making. The Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU is formally a part of the 
MFA, and it fulfils the indispensable function of representing the Polish national interest 
in Brussels. It is regarded as one of the most important Polish diplomatic representations 
abroad and is commonly called a `small MFA', as it comprises officials from different 
ministries, who represent Polish views in Brussels. 
Additionally, during the period of Polish association to the EU and in the light of the 
opening of accession negotiations, another institutional arrangement was made in order to 
increase the effectiveness of the national coordination of EU policies. In 1996; the 
Committee for European Integration (KIE) was created. The position of the Head of 
KIE was made equal to that of the foreign minister, both of whom are members of the 
Council of Ministers. This had an impact on their mutual relations (Borkowski, 1998). 
According to Polish law, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was given the task to coordinate 
48 For more, also on the political system and foreign policy, see: Stemplowski, 2001. 
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other state institutions' activities related to foreign affairs with the exception of the 
competencies reserved for KIE. 49 The overall coordination of European policy was 
delegated to the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE). 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Polish MFA has gone through a process of administrative reform in recent years. It 
was given its status in 1997, which was annulled by the new status introduced, in 1998 
and 2001. The number of departments was increased from 22 in 1997, to 38 in 1998 and 
then reduced to 23 in 2001. The Department responsible for coordinating European 
policy and cooperation with the EU, including participation in the CFSP, was created by 
the status of 1997. This was the Department of European Integration, which was changed 
in 2001 into the Department of the European Union and the Accession Negotiations 
(DUEiONA). Once Poland joined the EU in 2004, the name was shortened to the 
Department of the European Union (DUE, Departament Unii Europejskiej). It became 
responsible for relations between Poland and the EU. According to regulations, from 
200450 its main functions are: 
" to take responsibility for preparing the Polish strategy of active membership in the 
EU 
" to analyse the positions of other member states regarding European integration and 
formulate conclusions leading to internal or external actions; it also assists Polish 
representatives in the European Council, GEARC 
" to coordinate the preparations of the Polish representatives to COREPER II and 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
4' Ustawa z dnia 4 wrzegnia 1997 r. o dzialach administracji rz4dowej. (Dz. U. Nr 141, poz. 943, Art. 32.2) 
so Zargdzenie nr I Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych z dnia 23 stycznia 2004 r. w sprawie zmiany regulaminu 
organizacyjnego Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych oraz uchylenia niektdrych zarzgdzeA Ministra Spraw 
Zagranicznych. (Dziennik Urzgdowy MSZ, Nr 1,2004) 
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" to assist the representative of the MFA at the KIE meetings 
" to take responsibility for the Polish position towards the EU enlargement process 
" to coordinate the Polish contribution to the discussion over the institutional reform of 
the EU 
" to assist the process of cooperation between the MFA, Sejm, Senat, NGOs, political 
parties and local government 
" to share responsibility for the introduction into Polish law of the decisions on 
international sanctions 
" to supervise the work of the Polish Representation to the EU and, in co-operation 
with the Department of Europe, supervises Polish diplomatic representations to the EU 
member states and EU Associated states 
9 to analyse and distribute EU documents within the Ministry 
In addition the MFA holds a leading role when it comes to Polish participation in CFSP. 
It coordinates the process of coming to the national position on issues related to CFSP 
and supports the work of the Political Director and the European Correspondent. It also 
analyses the developments of CFSP and EU relations with other international 
organisations and third countries. 
Institutional context 3: Policy coordination towards the EU 
Before Poland gained the status of an active observer, the MFA was not seriously 
challenged in its `gatekeeper' role. But this function was undermined during the 
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accession negotiations which involved a wide range of ministries and was coordinated 
not by the MFA, but by UKIE. The coordination system also involved both chambers of 
Parliament (Sejm and Senat). As a result, one could observe some internal, intra- 
governmental rivalries in the processes of European policy coordination. Formulating 
instructions for the Polish representatives required inter-ministerial cooperation, and thus 
the role of the MFA started shifting in the direction of the `boundary-spanner'. Blurring 
the distinction between the domestic and international environment with regards to the 
EU, further undermined its `gatekeeper' function. Such a development was not welcomed 
by some of the MFA officials and soon the competition with UKIE became a vivid 
illustration of the struggle to retain its role. On the one hand, the necessity to cooperate 
with other institutions was acknowledged, but on the other hand, all foreign policy issues- 
areas were jealously guarded. This section reflects upon the role of the institutions 
involved and their interaction with the MFA. 
In the period preceding accession a special role was fulfilled by the Committee for 
European Integration (KIE) and its Office (UKIE). The KIE was created in 1996 in order 
to coordinate Polish policy regarding the EU, preparations for accession, including the 
adaptation of law and facilitating the administration of EU funds designated for Poland. 
5 
The Committee included the Head of the Committee (member of the Council of 
Ministers), the Secretary of the Committee (designated by the Prime Minister) and 
members (ministers, depending on the issue discussed and no more than three persons 
appointed by the Prime Minister). From the outset, it was the Prime Minister who headed 
the Committee. UKIE was created as a continuum after the previous Office for European 
Integration and Office for Foreign Aid, both created in 1991. It was designed to assist 
KIE in its statutory tasks. 
The prerogatives of those bodies in the area of foreign policy, in practice, were rather 
limited from the beginning. The role of UKIE was more significant in the very beginning 
of the negotiations. It was then one of the three major bodies involved, together with 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Negotiation Team, placed initially in the Prime 
51 Ustawa z dnia 8 sierpnia 1996r. o Komitecie Integracji Europejskiej. (Dz. U. z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996r. ) 
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Minister's Chancellery and later in the MFA. 52 When the team was transferred the MFA, 
part of the staff went to UKIE and part to MFA. Interestingly, at one point, the Secretary 
of KIE was also the Under Secretary of State in the MFA, what some officials called `a 
personal union'. However, UKIE was directly responsible to the Prime Minister. 
The main task of UKIE was ensuring the coherence of all Polish positions, presented in 
different EU bodies, especially the Council meetings. It was the leading coordinating 
instructions for COREPER I. The Deputy Ambassador in the Polish Representation, 
attending COREPER I, is a former Director of Department in UKIE. UKIE is also 
formally responsible for implementing the outcome of negotiations. This included for 
example changes in law or adapting the administration, for example the introduction of a 
special administrative system regarding sanctions. As and when the process is delayed, 
UKIE, occasionally reminds the MFA of this obligation. As claimed by some officials 
involved in the process, UKIE also tried to influence the foreign policy field (e. g. when 
drafting the National Plan of Integration), but apparently unsuccessfully. 53 
In spite of the fact that the role of UKIE was bound to change in 2004, after Poland 
joined the EU, the government decided to keep the existing institutional arrangement and 
to avoid any `drastic' changes. The system of preparing instructions for Polish 
representatives to the EU that was used in the `active observer' period was maintained 
after accession. There were still some overlaps and even informal competition between 
UKIE and the MFA, such as in the case of instructions for COREPER II, mentioned 
above. 
When analysing relations between the UKIE and other ministries, it becomes clear that 
the area of foreign policy is a special case within the coordination mechanism of 
European policies. It has traditionally been a domalne reseri'e of the MFA. Formally, the 
work of all Council bodies has been followed by UKIE. As it prepares the work of the 
European Committee of the Council of Ministers regarding the merit of the Polish 
32 Interview (no. 4) 
53 Interview (no. 2) 
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positions, all documents pass through its offices. UKIE is formally responsible for the 
meetings of all the Working Groups and is a coordinating institution in each case, so the 
MFA does not formally coordinate the Working Groups under COREPER II, but is a 
leading ministry. Therefore, it was claimed by UKIE officials that they should be at least 
consulted regarding the instructions. However, it was reported in the interviews 
conducted in UKIE that the MFA was reluctant to involve any third party in the 
development of its instructions. 54 Hence, cooperation with the MFA has been difficult at 
times. The process of preparing instructions for COREPER II and its working groups is 
shown in annex 4 at the end of the thesis. UKIE officials argued that in the context of 
European policy making, foreign policy should be treated equally to all other policy 
fields. 55 
Another body, created in order to facilitate Polish-EU relations was the European 
Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM). It started its activities in April 2004, just 
before the EU accession. It holds its meetings twice a week, on Tuesdays and Thursdays. 
It has rights of the Council of Ministers in the field of European issues and thus its 
decisions, with some small exceptions, do not have to be further adopted by the Council 
of Ministers. In practice, it is a revival of the Preparatory Team of KIE, the so-called 
`small KIE', that functioned prior to the accession. The Foreign Minister became the first 
chair of KERM, and the secretary of KIE became his deputy. Later, this body was chaired 
by the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, KIE remained for the time being, coexistant with 
KERM, as the changes in the structure would require changes in the law. As the Prime 
Minister heads the KIE, it was argued that a more flexible body, like KERM, would be 
better prepared to meet more often and prepare the instructions for Polish representatives 
in COREPER's. 56 
54 Interview (no. 12) 
55 Interview (no. 12). Also, concerning GAERC, UKIE has been a leading institution regarding all points, 
except the external relations, which belongs to the MFA. This is another example of blurred 
responsibilities. 
56 An interview by the Polish Press Agency (PAP) with Minister Jaroslaw Pietras, Secretary of State in 
UKIE, 10 May, 2004; 
(http: //www2. ukie. gov. pVWWW. news. nsf/O/CCDOD84A79AA3C7DCI 256E90002DOCA6? Open; 
05.10.2004) 
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The changes in the overall coordination mechanisms after the accession have been rather 
-slow and aimed at adapting the existing institutional settings, rather than creating a whole 
new system. This can be observed in the example of UKIE. Its Secretary expressed the 
view that all changes should be introduced gradually, when there is a direct need of them 
and when Poland has already gained some experience from membership of the EU. 
Therefore, UKIE adapted few new roles after the accession. Similarly, KIE became an 
almost obsolete formation (meeting approximately twice a year), considering the creation 
of KERM and the fact that the European issues were raised during the meeting of the 
Council of Ministers, instead of KIE. Nonetheless, dissolving KIE would mean that 
UKIE would also have to change/be dissolved, which would be a very sensitive political 
decision to take. 57 
The Europeanisation of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Fron the very beginning, when CFSP first started influencing a large number of 
ministerial departments, it met a certain level of resistance, if not opposition, on the part 
of the MFA officials. As one diplomat recalls: 
"When the CFSP came into the MFA and began to appear on the agenda of 
different departments and the one of the minister, from the very beginning it faced 
great mental barriers. This process is still taking place. (... ) Initially, it was a kind 
of opposition reflex towards European policy, resulting from some kind of 
57 The cross-cutting and overlapping competences of different institutional bodies involved are a source of 
constant criticism and a reason for a planned long-due reform. The origins of such a design seem to be 
technical (searching for a way to deal with a very complex exercise of entry negotiations and managing the 
compliance with the conditions), rather than political. At the time when UKIE was created in 1996, the 
president as well as the government were left-oriented and related to the SLD (Democratic Left Alliance). 
Also the idea to concentrate the power by the core executive and the Prime Minister can be explained by 
the need of an effective overall coordination and outlook on the conduct of the negotiations, but also the 
need for swift transposition of the acquis communitare, including the possibility to provide the incentives 
to the ministries for timely transposition (for more on this see: Zubek, 2005). The political changes in 
Poland, related to parliamentary elections in 1997 (won by the right-wing AWS) and in 2001 (won by the 
left-wing SLD) did not affect the design of the system per se. It was rather personal decisions on for 
example chairs of KIE that were decisive to whether this body was able to fully exercise its authority. 
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national pride. CFSP was treated as something alien with which Brussels was 
confronting our policy and attempting to exert influence on it". 58 
The younger generation was reported to have been generally more pro-European and 
open for change than older officials59. This may be considered as a paradox, bearing in 
mind the fact that joining the EU remained the priority of Polish foreign policy since the 
collapse of communism in 1989.60 
As the Polish Permanent Representative to the EU pointed out, EU requirements 
produced a "cultural shock" in Polish public administration, particularly in the following 
three areas: the decision-making process, the professionalism and the stability of the civil 
service, and the need for a high standard of technical and information systems (Grela, 
2003: 43). There was also an `us-them' paradigm which shaped thinking about the EU, 
which was another challenge faced by those seeking change (Nowina-Konopka, 2003: 
31). Some also pointed to the shortcomings of Polish institutions that created foreign 
policy. These included rivalry, doubling up of functions, faulty cooperation, lack of any 
analysis of failures (Stemplowski, 2001: 18), and reluctance to share information with 
others. Needless to say, change was not smooth. 
Changes in procedures and offices 
The initial process (phase I) of the institutional adaptation to CFSP started when Poland 
signed the Association Agreements in 1994 and lasted until April 2003, when it gained 
the status of an active observer to the EU. The speed of change increased with the 
approaching deadlines of some unavoidable adjustments. The EU applied the policy of 
conditionality to Poland, as it did with all the other candidates. The main logic behind it 
was "a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides 
external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions" 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 662). In practice, there were few opportunities 
sa Interview (no. 2) 
"This may be related to the process of recruitment to DUE, described later. 
60 Interview (no. 2) 
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for socialisation. The meetings were held occasionally and usually their aim was to 
negotiate the terms of the Polish accession to the EU. Therefore, the main mechanism 
behind change was conditionality, whereas the type of change observed was mainly 
organisational and regulative. It involved the creation of new posts, introducing new 
coordination mechanisms and some technical improvements. 
Structural dialogue - first experience with CFSP 
The first changes observable in the Polish administration are related to the structural and 
political dialogue and the subsequent negotiations. The decision to start a structured 
relationship between the EU and the EECs was taken during the Copenhagen Summit in 
June 1993 (for more see: Dunay et al, 1997: 319). As part of the dialogue, meetings were 
held at the level of Ministers, Political Directors and European Correspondents with the 
Associated European Correspondents (AECos). General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) would invite the Foreign Ministers of Associated States to its 
meetings and the agenda was prepared by the Presidency. Similarly, the Political 
Committee arranged meetings with the Political Directors. Within the Polish Ministry the 
role of Political Director as understood in the EU did not exist. Hence, the MFA's 
officials were repeatedly faced with a dilemma regarding who should attend the 
meetings. The delegates were usually chosen according to the agenda and the so-called 
coordinating director was delegated to the forum. 61 
During the summer of 1994, the AECos from CEECs were nominated (Dungy et al, 1997: 
325), including a Polish diplomat. Their meetings with their EU counterparts would take 
place at least twice during each Presidency. The agenda was sent out in advance, so there 
was time to prepare instructions. A former Polish AEC, who attended these gatherings, 
recalls that the difference between the EU insiders and the candidates was very apparent, 
even though the Presidency was making an effort to bridge this gap. The original 15 EC 
member state officials knew each other in most cases also privately. According to the 
61 Interview (no. 22) 
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diplomat, they also did not seem very interested in engaging in any, real discussion and 
the formula of the political dialogue simply "did not work". 62 
The Polish representatives were also invited once during the term of each Presidency to 
participate in the meetings of the Working Groups. However, usually the EU was 
represented solely by the Troika with the officials from the Secretariat General of the 
Council and the Commission (Dunay et al, 1997: 326). In practice, most of these 
meetings, especially at the beginning of the structural dialogue, were merely "presenting 
monologues on both sides without actually reacting to each other's positions" (Dunay et 
al, 1997: 326). Hence, the Polish side was not very satisfied with the meetings held in the 
framework of the structural dialogue within the Association Committee and Association 
Council. Apparently, the time was very limited and some Polish delegates were 
wondering "whether their reports and statements (... ) have been taken into consideration 
or even looked at again" (Czubinski 2000b: 12). 
One of the consequences of the political dialogue was that the candidates were given 
more possibilities to align with some of the CFSP declarations that had been agreed 
earlier by the EU-15. Initially, there was no possibility to participate generally in 
common positions, which in 1997 was only allowed on a case-by-case basis (Dunay et al, 
1997: 332). Formally, such possibilities were given to the associated states earlier, when 
the Europe Agreements came into force in 1994, together with the beginning of the 
structured dialogue. The EU, nonetheless, did not always give the CEECs the chance to 
participate in the above mentioned mechanisms. 
In practical terms, the political dialogue meant that the ACN (Associated Countries 
Network), a system of electronic communication with the Council of the EU, was set up 
in the MFA in 1999. Through this system, the Council Secretariat General sent questions 
to the Accession States about whether they wished to align with a certain EU 
positions/declarations/actions. The frequency varied from a few daily to just one question 
every couple of days. The query was followed by consultations, initially just within the 
62 Interview (no. 22) 
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MFA, but later also with other ministries or government agencies in order to confirm 
whether Poland would align or not. 
The time given for alignment was usually very limited. It appears that at first not all the 
details of the declarations were communicated to Warsaw, just the topic and the intention 
of issuing it (Czubinski, 2000a). Once it had been agreed upon by the EU 15, Poland 
would receive the final text, however, with little time for a final decision, usually just 24 
hours (Dunay et al, 1997: 333). As a result, some Polish diplomats felt that the EU was 
not treating them seriously, given such a brief time for an answer. The Polish-EU 
relationship was thus perceived by some as highly asymmetrical. A lot of complaints 
appeared, not merely from DUE and the European Correspondent, but from other 
consulted departments. This resulted in continuous conflict between those bodies. 63 
Additionally, only the most important issues for the country received full attention, as 
there was often neither the time nor effective procedures to deal with all of the 
documents. The distribution of documents was, for example, initially done physically by 
officials running around the ministerial building. 64 Nonetheless, the alignment exercise 
served mainly to force the Accession States to adjust their coordination systems to work 
at short notice. 
The accession negotiations 
The accession negotiations were officially opened on 31 March 1998. The institutional 
preparations started in Poland a little bit earlier. On 4 February 1998, Jan Kulakowki, the 
former Polish Ambassador to the EC, was nominated as the Secretary of State in the 
Prime Minister's Chancellery. His main task was to prepare and lead the negotiation 
exercise. On 24 March 1998, his office was officially named the Government 
Plenipotentiary for Polish Accession Negotiations (Pelnomocnik Rzddu do spraw 
negocjacji o czlonkostwo Rzeczpospolitej w Unii Europejskiej), also commonly known as 
63 Interview (no. 2) 
64 Interview (no. 10) 
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the Chief Negotiator. Three days later, the Negotiation Team was officially established. 65 
It was composed of the Representative and ministers or deputy ministers from several 
ministries, including the MFA, the Polish Permanent Representative to the EU, the Head 
of the Government Centre for Strategic Studies, the government representative on family 
issues, the representative of the Head of the Office for the protection of Competition and 
Consumers (Urzqd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentöw) and the Secretary. Officially it 
was placed in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, but assistance also came from UKIE 
and MFA (Pietras, 1999). 
Due to the internal political situation and competition, the negotiations with the EU were 
led and coordinated by the Representatives of the Government and characterised by the 
plurality of institutions involved. The main actors were: the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Minister, the Head of UKIE and the Chief Negotiator (Zaborowski 2004: 151). The 
institutional setting was rather cumbersome as a result. Formally, the political leadership 
was held by the Prime Minister, who was also then the Head of KIE (Committee for 
European Integration). The Minister of Foreign Affairs acted as the Head of the Polish 
delegation to the accession negotiations and the Deputy Head function was fulfilled by 
the Chief Negotiator. In practice, this led to an unclear division of responsibilities as well 
as -a degree of overlap between the Head of UKIE and the Chief Negotiator. At a later 
stage, political disparities appeared between the Head of UKIE and the Foreign Minister. 
The opening of negotiations was closely followed by a screening phase, where 
compatibility of national law with EU law was checked. This was also done for the CFSP 
chapter and finalised before the end of 1998. Polish officials received the political acquis, 
including common positions and joint actions and had to formulate a Polish stance on the 
issues that implied some internal legal changes. This had to be done for example in the 
case of the ban on flights over Serbia or the adoption of sanctions. Generally, however, 
screening in the area of CFSP was conducted without any major obstacles and CFSP 
65 Rozporz4dzenie Rady Ministröw z dnia 24 marca 1998 r. w sprawie ustanowienia Pelnomocnika Rzgdu 
do Spraw Negocjacji o Czlonkostwo Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej, `Dziennik Ustaw RP', 
Warsaw 26 March 1998; Zarzadzenie Prezesa Rady Ministröw z dnia 27 marca 1998 r. w sprawie Zespolu 
Negocjacyjnego w Sprawie negocjacji o Czlonkostwo rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej, 
Kancelaria Rady Ministröw, P-121-19-98. 
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issues were among the first opening statements (negotiation positions) presented by the 
Polish Negotiation Team in June 1998. They were later accepted by the government in 
August 1998.66 Subsequently, it became a basis for negotiation round opened with the EU 
in November of the same year. 
As recalled by one of the officials involved, the negotiation was "not a typical one", 
being largely uncontroversial and different to the ones conducted in relation to. other 
chapters. 67 Any legal issues were already dealt with during the earlier screening phase. 
Poland was about to join NATO and hence it stressed the complementarity of its own 
foreign policy with that of NATO and the EU. It also continued to "emphasise the 
common values and aims" it shared with the EU member states. 68 Apparently, the 
discussion did not go into much detail. Poland did not request any transition periods in 
the area of CFSP and it was subsequently categorised to be among the areas that needed 
further clarifications. The chapter was not closed during the subsequent negotiation 
rounds and Poland expressed its discontent regarding this fact, during the IGC in 
Luxemburg on 22 June 1999 and later in December the same year. 69 Finally, the 
negotiations on the CFSP chapter were provisionally closed on 6 April 2000. 
As part of the preparations for EU accession, in May 1999, the Polish government 
accepted the National Program of Preparations for EU Membership. 70 In the very short 
part devoted to CFSP, the authors emphasised the necessity to ensure the effective 
working of these bodies in the MFA - those who dealt directly with the Council, Polish 
Permanent Representation to the EU and other member states. Therefore, the Program 
recommended that the number of experts dealing with the CFSP issues in the ministry 
should be increased, sophisticated computer equipment should be introduced, as well as 
66 "Poland's negotiation position in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy" in: Poland's Position 
Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union, Warsaw: Chancellery of the Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Poland and Government Plenipotentiary for Poland's Accession Negotiations to 
the European Union, June 2000 
67 Interview (no. 22) 
68 As one involved Polish diplomat claimed, "it was hard to expect the states that were about to join NATO 
would have a different vision on the EU foreign policy. " Interview no. 22. 
69 http: //www. polonya. org. tr/negotiations. htm 31.09.05 
70 Narodowy Program Przygolowania do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej, Warsaw, 4 May 1999 
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extended staff training. The parliamentary comments to the document indicated that the 
changes in the MFA were to be introduced by the end of 1999.71 
A Secretariat of the EU-Poland Association Council was established in the Polish 
Permanent Representation to the EU in 2000. Its main function was to prepare the 
sessions of the Association Council. At the same time, the position of Liaison Officer 
responsible for the CFSP issues was established and in practice filled by the Director of 
the Political Department. At that time, there were 5 officials employed in the Political 
Department, 72 among the 29 officials in total, divided into 6 departments. 73 In June 2001, 
the position of the Representative to the PSC was created and in March 2001, a Polish 
representative to the EU Military Committee and the Liaison Officer to the EU Military 
Staff was established. 74 
As the negotiations were coming to an end, the negotiation team was replaced by the 
Department of the European Union (DUE). The new department was to introduce the 
CFSP into the work of the whole of the MFA. As a few DUE officials recall, they soon 
became one of the least liked teams in the whole institution. 75 Their internal position 
within the MFA meant that they remained in direct contact not only with experts, but also 
with the directors from whom they continuously demanded contributions. This was a 
novelty in a highly hierarchical institutional design. Hence, intra-departmental tensions 
76 quickly emerged, as some in the MFA considered DUE as becoming too powerful. 
The situation was complicated further by the fact that the department consisted of 
relatively young officials, 77 which left some of their older colleagues feeling 
71 Opinie na temat Narodowego Programu Przygotowania Polski do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej, 
Druk Sejmowy nr 1194, http: //biurose. sejm. gov. pl/teksty/r-161. htm 
72 Regulamin Organizacyjny Przedstawicielstwa RP przy Wspölnotach Europejskich w Brukseli, Brussels, 
11.09.2000 
73 Those were: Political Department, Economic-Trade Department, Agriculture Department, Social Policy 
Department, Science and Environment Protection Department, Administrative Department 
74 Regulamin Organizacyjny Przedstawicielstwa RP przy Wspölnotach Europejskich w Brukseli 
7S Interviews (no. 2,6,7) 
76 Interview (no. 7) 
77 Interview (no. 4,7,10) 
99 
uncomfortable. 78 As one of the younger diplomats said: "the generation gap seems to be 
impossible to close". 79 Not only were the higher-ranking officials rushed by younger 
diplomats, but they had to start considering the EU as an important factor, influencing the 
whole of national foreign policy. There were several reasons why the average age of 
DUE officials was, and still is, lower than in other departments. 80 Firstly, the work 
required a constant willingness to learn and to adapt working habits to the realities of 
European foreign policy-making. Young officials do not usually have deep-rooted habits 
that might be difficult to change afterwards. Secondly, the job required long and 
unpredictable working hours, especially during the negotiations and active observer 
period, when the system of coordination was first put into practice. Younger officials 
were also familiar with the internet and new technological solutions, applicable to their 
work. In effect, younger candidates were preferred by the DUE. 1 8 
In November 2002, the rules of cooperation between the Council, COREPER and the 
Accession States in the transition period82 were accepted. Until signing the Accession 
Treaty, Poland was included in the information procedure and received the documents 
from the European Commission, the Council Presidency (infonnation regarding draft 
legislation and documents in the CFSP area, JHA and the Treaty on the EU) and the 
Council Secretariat General (documents of COREPER, the Council and Working 
Groups' meetings). Poland was also involved in the consultation procedure that was 
applied in case the documents classified as common orientations or common guidelines. 83 
78 Interviews (no. 2,6) 
79 Interview (no. 6) 
so Interview (no. 9) 
B1 Interview (no. 9) 
82 The transition period is understood as a period of time between the formal closure of negotiations and the 
moment the Accession Treaty comes into force. 
83 System koordynacji polityki europejskiej w okresie poprzedzajgcym czlonkostwo Polski w UE, Dokument 
przyjgty 28 lutego 2003 r. przez Zespol Przygotowawczy Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej praz przez Radc 
Ministröw 4 marca 2003 r. 
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Becoming an active observer 
After the signing of the Treaty of Accession on the 16 April 2003, Poland obtained the 
status of an active observer. This was arguably the turning point in the process of the 
Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy, having more significance for day-to-day 
practices than the formal accession on the 1st of May the following year. 
Becoming an active observer meant that Poland was allowed to take part in the meetings 
related to the CFSP and the ESDP, such as the ones in the Council Working Groups, 
COREPER II, PSC or GAERC. The process of elite socialisation began here and 
facilitated change at the national level. Brussels also became an important source of 
information concerning the way the policy was made in the EU on the one hand, and on 
international affairs throughout the world on the other. 84 Participation in the meetings that 
dealt with a wide range of issues meant that the officials "had to deal with the problems 
that otherwise we might never have been interested in". 85 Still, initially the Polish 
representatives rarely spoke, unless the matters concerned vital Polish national interests. 86 
As a reflection of the situation in the MFA, they were often not given any instructions 
and even if they took the floor, their impression was that "unfortunately no-one really 
took it seriously into account". 87 As one of the representatives recalls, he started asking 
questions of his counterparts on his own initiative and the answers were later put in a 
report and fed back to the capital. 88 
" 
Frequent participation in the Working Groups did not take place before the summer of 
2003, when the Permanent Representation's personnel tripled. The majority of the 
newcomers, those to be involved in CFSP-related work, came from the MFA. Even the 
officials involved in the ESDP came from the MFA's Department of Security Policy, 
rather than from the Ministry of National Defence. The Representation was given its 
84 Interview (no. 1) 
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16 Like preparing the draft of the Transatlantic Declaration in December 2003. 
87 Interview (no. 1) 
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current name in April 2004.89 The current participation of its officials in the CFSP is 
shown in annex 2. 
As one diplomat claims, after consultations with other Permanent Representations of the 
old member states, individuals were quickly made aware of the necessity to engage more 
staff in Brussels as well as in Warsaw. 90 The capital did not know the particular needs of 
the Representation, thus the Permanent Representative and the PSC Ambassador placed a 
request for additional personnel that was almost immediately met. The majority of staff 
gained experience in the MFA during the negotiation phase. In December 2004, the 
Departments of External Relations and ESDP were established. 91 Since then, the 
Representation has had two sections involved in CFSP duties: the External Relations 
Section and the ESDP Section. They have been organised along geographical lines and in 
a few cases according to dossier issues. The first one consists of seven officials, the latter 
of six. In total, there were 17 Departments within the Representation. This also resulted 
in staff problems in the MFA itself, since it was now faced with the outflow of more 
experienced officials to Brussels. 
In 2003, the Polish Representation to the EU adapted the rhythm of its day-to-day 
practices to the work of the EU. A number of preparatory meetings were introduced. The 
Permanent Representative, his/her deputy and the Representative to the PSC meet at least 
twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays. Every Monday at 9: 30 there are meetings 
gathering the Permanent Representative, his/her Deputy, Antici, Representative to the 
PSC, Martens, Nicolaidis, the Law Counsellor, a Press Officer and Heads of Departments 
and Units. The preparatory meetings for the COREPER II, take place every Tuesday at 6 
o'clock p. m. and for the COREPER I and PSC usually every Tuesday and Thursday. 92 
89 Before, it was known as the Polish Representation to the European Communities based in Brussels. 
Decyzja nr 14 Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych z dnia 29 kwietnia 2004 rw sprawie przeksztalcenia 
Przedstawicielstwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiejprzy Wspolnotach Europejskich, z siedziba w Brukseli w Stale 
Przedstawicielstwo Rzeczpospolitej Polskiejprzy Unit Europejskiej (Dziennik Urzgdowy Ministra Spraw 
Zagranicznych nr 4,2004) 
9° Interview (no. 3) 
91 Wewngtrzny Regulämin Stalego Przedstawicielstwa RP przy EU w Brukseli, 8 December 2004 
92 Zarzvdzenie nr 4/2003, State Przedstawicielstwo RP przy UE, Brussels 
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The Head of Representation, the Permanent Representative to the EU would take part in 
the meetings of COREPER II. He would be assisted in this task by a member of the 
Antici group, who is responsible for the organisational matters of COREPER II. There is 
also a position of Deputy Antici in the Polish Representation, filled by a junior diplomat. 
His/her responsibilities in this function remain rather unclear with the exception of the 
fact that he/she sits in COREPER II, if either the Ambassador or the Antiei could not be 
present. In the Political and Security Committee (PSC) Poland is represented by another 
Ambassador, assisted in this task by so-called Nicolaidis. The deputy Representative to 
PSC is the Head of the External Relations Section of the Permanent Representation. 
The MFA was also affected from the very first day of the active observer period, when it 
gained full access to the COREU Terminal System (CORTESY). 16 April 2003 is still 
remembered by the diplomats as the most memorable day with regard to Polish 
participation in the CFSP. Some of them experienced true `shock' in Warsaw, as the 
number of incoming COREU's amounted to a hundred. 93 Prior to this they had only 
received the official positions with the corresponding question of whether they wished to 
align or not. That day some of them understood what "child's play it was before to assign 
all CFSP related issues to just one person". 94 When Poland became an active observer 
there were already three officials dealing solely with the CFSP dossier and more dealing 
with relations with the EU. They recollected "an incredible speed of action" and 
generally describe this phase as a difficult time, when they were overburdened with 
work. 95 An example might be the fact that hundreds of COREU's had to be printed out 
(no safe electronic network was available) and distributed in hard copy to other interested 
institutions. This took precious time and caused delays, sometimes of up to two days. 96 
As a result, the answers would reach DUE when it was too late to send any response to 
Brussels. In sum, electronic mailing systems were introduced to officials that had never 
used them before, indeed, the Polish administration was not used to the electronic 
07 Interviews (no. 2,10) 
94 Interview (no. 2) 
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exchange of documents as such. 97 As one diplomat put it, "CFSP made people learn how 
to use Microsoft Outlook". 98 
Another problem concerned the lack of staff, experts and finances. This lack meant that 
Polish representatives were not able to attend all Working Group meetings. 99 It was 
mostly the staff from the Polish Permanent Representation and DUE that were interested 
in attending the meetings, but territorial and functional departments only later 
acknowledged the necessity of including the EU in everyday work. Also, DUE itself 
faced a problem of a lack of experts, as most of the staff that gained experience during 
the negotiations had left for the Permanent Representation in Brussels or the other EU 
institutions. This meant that there was a lack of experts that could understand and would 
be able to explain the decision-making system in the EU, and misunderstandings 
followed between DUE and other departments. For example, as recalled by one official 
involved, it took time before other departments understood that the same points appeared 
on the agenda of the Working Groups and later on the one of COREPER, and it was not a 
mistake on the part of DUE because responses were required in both fora. )°° 
Another change within the ministry, similar to what happened in the Representation, was 
adjusting to the rhythm of work of the EU. 101 This meant following the meetings of the 
various EU bodies, preparing instructions and coordinating Polish positions. Such a 
situation intensified after joining the EU in 2004. In the initial phase of preparing 
instructions, it was mostly the territorial or functional departments of the MFA that were 
responsible for this task. However, there were cases where for months nothing was done 
on their part. In this case, DUE decided to conduct the preparations, even though nothing 
was changed in the formal regulation of this matter. There was therefore an urgent need 
to clearly describe the division of tasks between DUE and the other departments. 
Meanwhile, either accidentally or by design, DUE was interfering with the 
responsibilities of other departments, which caused the latter to raise objections. 
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An interesting innovation in staff recruitment to the Polish diplomatic service was 
introduced in 2002-2003. The MFA opened the Diplomatic Academy, whose graduates 
were later employed in the MFA. The first ones started working in 2003 and a large 
number dealt with EU matters. Apart from the theoretical knowledge gained in the 
Academy, they also gained experience doing internships in various Polish representations 
abroad, including the Permanent Representation to the EU. As one of them recalls, it 
proved a valuable experience for the future work in DUE, ' 02 especially when preparing 
instructions and understanding the `way-of-doing-things' in Brussels. A proposal has 
been put on the table to introduce at least two-week stages for officials, to be carried out 
in the Permanent Representation in Brussels, as well as training on EU related issues for 
all diplomats leaving to take a post in any of the Embassies. This is a result of a rising 
awareness that the CFSP was a vital part of Polish foreign policy as a whole and thus all 
diplomats should gain some basic understanding of it. 
An interesting aspect of the outflow of people to Brussels was emphasised by one of the 
officials in the MFA, who claimed that the ministry was at risk of losing new and talented 
people who had learnt the new rules and principles in Brussels. Then they would usually 
notice the shortcomings of the organisation they worked for at home and most probably 
leave to work for the European institutions. 103 
Alignment with EUforeign policy 
In the observer period, Poland was often asked by the EU-15 to align with its declarations 
on foreign policy. An official directly responsible for coordinating the process of 
alignment with the EU policies in the MFA was the European Correspondent. Her/his 
position differed greatly from the position of his/her counterparts in the member states. It 
was limited to passing the question sent by the Secretariat General of the Council to the 
MFA (initially by fax), to the leading and cooperating departments. He/she would then be 
102 Interview (no. 6) 
103 Interview (no. 30). 
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responsible for delivering a formal answer to the Council Secretariat. Unlike in the 
member states, he/she did not hold permanent access to the minister and was not assigned 
the task of coordination of the whole CFSP dossier. This was reflected in the fact that the 
Correspondent was initially just at desk officer level whereas later she/he held the 
position of the Department's Deputy Director. 
The personal memories of a former European Correspondent point to the fact that the role 
required constant demands for input from other officials, often under very strict and short 
time constraints. The person in this position would soon become very easily recognisable 
in the ministry. The job required working at various levels, involving other ministries that 
needed to be consulted, obtaining acceptance from the directors of departments and, in 
the case of sensitive political issues (such as embargos, sanctions etc. ), also meeting with 
the minister. As one official recalled, there was not much understanding at that time 
(1998 onwards) on the side of other MFA departments that being a candidate for the EU 
membership, "Poland should do everything to show the EU and its member states that we 
were credible, we cared and we were going in the same direction as them". 104 To improve 
this situation, attempts were made to explain the CFSP to other officials, meetings were 
organised in DUE and several briefings, sent out within the MFA, attempted to clarify the 
importance of CFSP. 
The member states from the EU-15 offered the Polish European Correspondent some 
possibilities of practice-oriented training. For example, she was invited in 2000 to visit 
the FCO in the UK for a week, in the period preceding the General Affairs Council 
(GAC). 105 This was mainly aimed at sharing the experiences of preparations to GAC, and 
generally at getting acquainted with the British coordination mechanisms. 
During the whole of the period preceding Polish EU Membership, Poland refused to align 
with the EU positions a total of 16 times. This number seems insignificant, considering 
the high number of declarations issued by the EU. However, the invitations were sent on 
104 Interview (no. 22) 
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a case-by-case basis and it is a challenging task to trace the logic behind choosing the 
documents that the CEECs were asked to align with. 106 Procedural difficulties 
notwithstanding, the process of alignment gave rise to political debates, often at a high 
political level, involving the minister of foreign affairs or even the Council of Ministers. 
The most important cases were those concerning sanctions against Zimbabwe 
(18.3.2002), the visa-ban list on Belarusian officials (10.7.1998) and sanctions against 
Malaysia (19.7.2002). According to an official involved, even in the cases where Poland 
eventually aligned herself with the EU position, the decision to do so was sometimes 
extensively debated. One of them related to transatlantic relations and involved aligning 
with the EU declaration condemning the death penalty in the US. Poland was just about 
to enter NATO and the minister himself was engaged in deciding how to deal with such a 
politically sensitive issue. 107 Eventually, it was decided that Poland would align with the 
document. 
In the case of Malaysia, as claimed by the official involved108 and other press sources, the 
query regarding alignment arrived in Warsaw at the very moment when Polish 
government officials were paying an official visit to Malaysia. During the stay, a large 
arms contract was to be signed. In such circumstances, Polish decision-makers decided 
not to'align with the EU Presidency Statement on Malaysia, 109 driven by its own national 
interests. The reason for issuing the statement was upholding the verdict against the 
former Prime Minister of Malaysia and EU's concerns regarding the fairness of the trial. 
This particular issue was raised by the EU Presidency in six declarations in the period 
between 1998 and 2003. The CEECs were not invited to align themselves with the initial 
one (2.10 1998) and the third one (14.4.1999). This shows that the process of asking the 
CEECs to align did not follow any straightforward logic and consistency. Nonetheless, of 
other 4 cases, Poland joined 3 times (27.11 1998,10 . 8.2000,7.5.2003) and refused once 
106 As noted by Dunay at al. (1997: 333), the CEEs were for example invited to join the two Declarations 
on the trial of the opposition leader in Nigeria, but left out in relation to the declaration condemning his 
execution. Similarly, they were not asked to join all positions regarding the same issue of a trial and a 
verdict on the former Prime Minister of Malaysia. 
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(19.7.2002). The conclusion is that it was not the policy divergence as much as particular 
interest of the moment that prevented Poland from joining all the statements. 
Also in other cases, it is difficult to understand why Poland, as the only state among the 
CEEC's, took the decision not to join the Presidency Statement regarding violence before 
the elections in the Philippines (4.10.2001). Prior to that declaration and afterwards, it did 
align itself with statements in a similar tone, e. g. on the execution of Philippine citizens 
(9.2.1999) or moratorium on executions by President Estrada (3.4.2000). The study of the 
calendar of non-alignment suggests that in one or two such cases the alignment was 
caused simply by national holidays, for example held on I and 3 May, when none of 
responsible staff was at work in the MFA. 
In the case of Belarus; which will be discussed in more detail in the chapters to follow, 
Poland viewed its policy differently from the EU-15. On the 10 . 7.1998, it failed to align 
with the objectives of the Common Position issued a day before, introducing restrictive 
measures on Belarusian officials. As recalled by the Polish Associated European 
Correspondent at that time, Poland did not want to risk any unpleasant consequences 
from the Belarusian officials that might affect the large Polish minority there. On the 
other hand, it was believed by the decision makers that alignment would mean the de 
facto isolation of Belarus, which Poland wanted to avoid. Still, a closer look at the 
numerous declarations that were a subject of CEECs alignment regarding Belarus, reveals 
that Poland joined all documents but the one mentioned, calling for democratic changes 
and condemning certain governmental actions. 
A direct result of the political dialogue and alignment procedure was a broadening of the 
territorial interest of the MFA. It was made to consider issues and prepare positions 
regarding the regions that it was not so strongly involved in before, such as Latin 
America. This was later strengthened after joining the EU and with attendance at the 
geographical Council Working Groups. 
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Post-accession: first experiences with EU membership 
EU accession provoked discussion about the future institutional arrangements regarding 
the coordination of Polish positions and working inside the EU more generally. This also 
concerned the future of the MFA. There were different changes proposed, including 
merging the DUE with the Department of Europe. In the end, none of the changes took 
place as a consequence of accession. The organisational structure of the DUE is shown in 
annex 3 at the end of this thesis. However, with time, there was a shift in responsibilities 
from DUE to the territorial and functional departments. Unlike the practice prior to 
accession and just afterwards, the instructions for the relevant Working Groups are now 
formulated in those departments and in many cases their representatives attend the 
meetings in Brussels. Very often, they became the officials responsible for the relations 
with the EU in the relevant departments. 
The major responsibility of the DUE is now to make sure that the instructions are 
coherent with those presented in other EU bodies. If a conflict between ministries 
involved in preparing the instructions arises, it is resolved by the Political Director. The 
coordination of the Polish position lies within the prerogative of the MFA, also for the 
ESDP Department of the Representation to the EU, as the majority of the officials come 
not from Ministry of National Defence, but from the Department of National Security in 
the Foreign Ministry. The Representatives in Brussels, at the level of Council Working 
Groups, remain in contact with their relevant desk officers from the DUE. The desk 
officers are in touch also with the territorial departments, who assist them with their 
knowledge of the region and the Working Group concerns. 
Two years aller accession, the MFA still experienced certain problems with adapting to 
the CFSP. Firstly, there remained technical problems with communication. The MFA still 
did not have a secure system of sending electronic mail. However, the circulation of 
documents was improved by introducing the COORDINATION system. It has also 
become common practice that the MFA received documents from its experts in Brussels 
even earlier than from the system. The representatives had already learnt how and where 
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to get access to such materials. ' 10 The European System of Exchange of Documents - 
Poland (EWDP) was being introduced and was designed to encompass instructions from 
all Working Groups. Nevertheless, it is considered by some as a rather useless tool, not 
making their work any easier. 
It is worth mentioning that some horizontal transfer of knowledge of know-how took 
place. Several older member states, such as the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
France, offered to share their experiences in coordinating European policy and in 
adjusting the Foreign Ministries to working within the Union. Such courses were often 
sponsored by the EU, for example by the PHARE programme. In Poland, UKIE was 
responsible for the training programmes. A couple of officials from the DUE were hosted 
in 2005 by the UK and Austria to assist and learn from the experiences of holding the 
presidency. 
The officials also discovered the importance of informal discussion with other 
representatives prior to the meetings, often within so-called `like-minded groups'. 
Finally, led by the example of other member states, the officials started to consult the 
embassies and missions on the issues discussed in the Working Groups prior to the 
meetings. It turned out to be a very rewarding exercise, as the responses were in most 
cases helpful and accurate. "' The embassies were consulted on certain EU issues relating 
to the countries they are based in. The requests for consultations come from various 
ministries, first to the MFA, which then forwards them to the missions. The diplomats 
posted to various countries in the world have thus become more involved in EU issues. 
Because of that, the MFA began organising special courses on the EU for officials 
leaving for posts abroad. In theory, there are now diplomats responsible for each 
formation of the Council in each mission, so the communication is expected to become 
faster and more efficient. 
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Nonetheless, there were still several problems with observable adjustment. Other member 
states were sometimes surprised with the way the new member states, including Poland, 
supported each other in the meetings, whereas the old member states would do it much 
more rarely and on the issues of high importance. Some also questioned whether 
portraying themselves as a new bloc was indeed profitable and useful. 12 
To a large degree Polish participation in CFSP remained very reactive. The 
representatives in the Working Groups or COREPER II would often take the floor to 
support other initiatives or statements given by other member states. Alternatively, when 
a sensitive issue for Poland arose, such as NATO or visa issues, they would react to 
restate their interests. The cooperation between the Working Groups, COREPER and the 
PSC remained another problematic area. A few diplomats from the older member states 
pointed out that Poland, like many other new member states, has still not practically 
solved this problem. This occasionally led to the breaching of informal procedures and of 
not raising the issues previously discussed and `closed' within the Working Groups at a 
higher level, or even worse, contradicting the statements made by the representatives in 
the WG. 113 Such situations are only accepted in extraordinary circumstances, usually 
concerning vital national interests. 
As several officials from the DUE admit, one of the main challenges for their department 
was convincing their colleagues from the ministry to work in a multilateral, rather than a 
bilateral system. 114 As one of the officials noted, the main problem is now to learn 
"European thinking". 115 An additional challenge was caused by the high rotation of 
ministerial officials throughout the whole MFA; once they learnt the basic rules about 
working within the EU or providing instructions they would usually leave to a post 
abroad or be transferred. ' 16 The administration was slowly accepting the new modes of 
day-to-day work, such as communication via e-mail or informal contacts between 
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experts. The experts themselves were pushed to take greater responsibility, as the 
dynamics of EU work do not leave time for passing every decision through the highest 
ministerial level. Thus, the decision-path was shortened and very often the decisions and 
responsibilities remained at the lower levels. "? 
An interesting change occurred in the perception of the `us and them' paradigmn. The EU 
was no longer an alien organisation. 118 It was no longer acceptable to formulate 
expectations towards the EU to act in a certain way, as Polish officials could now exert 
influence on the EU actions. 119 This change had its aspect also in the verbal dimension 
and in the method of preparing instructions. They started to look more pragmatic and less 
like presentations of their own position with a call for action. It also appears that Polish 
officials and decision-makers tend to perceive CFSP in terms of an opportunity rather 
than as a constraint on the Polish national foreign policy120 -a sea-change from the initial 
phases of Polish integration to the EU. 
Agents of change: the socialisation and learning of Polish diplomats 
After discussing change in the MFA in general, this section of discusses the role of 
individuals in this process. It does so by paying special attention to the learning and 
socialisation to which officials were subjected in the course of participation in the 
processes of European foreign policy making. Because both learning and socialisation 
were more intense in the case of officials sent to Brussels, they are the central focus of 
this section. Conditionality, as a third mechanism of change, caused change only prior to 
the accession. It also does not seem to have any relevance at the individual level (as it 
was related to more systematic institutional change) and therefore is not discussed in this 
section. 
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Polish diplomats became socialised with and by their counterparts from other member 
states and learnt the `rules of the game' in Brussels. This change in status was observed 
by the former Director of the DUE, Pawel ýwieboda (2007), who claimed: 
"When working in the MFA, I was truly convinced that our role was increasing 
with every month. When, during the Italian Presidency, 121 I was invited for the 
first time to attend the meetings of the Political Directors from big member states, 
I was treated as a guest (... ), who just appeared and then we would see what 
happens. However, at end of my five-year period in the office, in many issues we 
were much more convincing than other member states and treated with the same 
respect. " 122 
A direct result of participation in CFSP meetings has been a growing gap between the 
officials posted to Brussels and those based at home in Warsaw. This situation also exists 
in the case of the old member states and is sometimes referred to as national 
representatives `becoming Brusselized' or `going native' and leads to them being known 
in their capitals as `traitors' as far as national interests are concerned (Spence, 2002: 24). 
Interviews have supported this analysis with one of the diplomats interviewed claiming 
that he perceived the whole process of European integration differently between when he 
was based in Warsaw and after he had spent some time in the Permanent 
Representation. 123 
A view expressed by a few Polish diplomats was that officials in Warsaw did not seem to 
fully understand how things were done in Brussels, at which levels, how the documents 
were circulated etc.; thus the Representation often lacked the necessary support from 
Warsaw. 124 Because of the complex decision-making system, those based in Warsaw also 
'Z1 The Italian Presidency took place in the second half of 2003. 
122 The translation from Polish was done by the author. The quotation comes from an interview with Pawel 
twieboda, conducted by weekly "Przeglhd" in 2007. The interviewee then added that unfortunately, all 
these achievements seemed to have been wasted recently. 
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occasionally misunderstood the procedures, which caused some frustration for the 
Brussels-based diplomats. An example of this is the fact that the majority of issues are 
normally resolved at the level of the Working Groups and not discussed further at the 
COREPER II, hence Warsaw should be willing to designate certain negotiations to the 
level of experts or consult the drafting of non-papers or other documents with them, 
instead of just consulting the Ambassador. 125 This rule is apparently still not fully 
acknowledged in Warsaw. 126 
As one official from the MFA admitted, the most difficult learning process concerned the 
informal aspects of negotiations in Brussels, as the formal issues were "relatively easy to 
gasp". 127 The diplomats in Brussels also emphasised that the capital's support in teens of 
pre-negotiation and discussing issues on the agenda with other capitals was sometimes 
missing. 128 Meanwhile, the diplomats posted to Brussels, who experienced the process of 
socialisation, at the same time started to observe their counterparts and learn about how 
the things were `really done' in the EU. As expressed by one of them: 
"(h)ere everything is changing faster, regarding the mentality of the decision- 
makers and diplomats. In Warsaw, it is happening slowly, too slowly... we would 
like them to be on the same orbits as we are, wiser. On the other hand, they are 
getting frustrated, because they can feel that we are further and further away from 
them and hence, the lack of understanding appears". 129 
The rising amounts of e-mail communication sent from the Representation and asking 
territorial departments for contributions were in extreme cases ignored or treated as 
`unnecessary junk mail'. The only department that initially had shown more 
understanding and at the same time also faced trouble when working with the rest of the 
ministry was the DUE. On the other hand, Warsaw was becoming more and more 
dependent on the information that was fed back to it from the national representatives in 
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Brussels. At the beginning, such a form of cooperation and dependence was naturally 
opposed by some of those within the MFA. 130 It took time before some officials in 
Warsaw understood that the EU had to be present throughout the whole of the MFA. 
Nowadays, some diplomats in Warsaw are ready to admit: "(w)e are aware that European 
policy influences the national policy as a whole, so we have to create it together". 131 
One of the most serious challenges for the diplomats both in Brussels and in Warsaw was 
the matter of instructions. Initially, they often arrived late (after the beginning of the 
Council meetings) or not at all. 132 Once they appeared, the diplomats sometimes found 
them impossible to implement, knowing the realities of the Working Groups and the. 
importance of retaining legitimacy and their own credibility by respecting consensus- 
building practices. As one of the diplomats in Brussels expressed it: "It is difficult to 
present an instruction when you know the people around the table and you know what 
they think about it and then you present an instruction that they will certainly not accept, 
they will simply ignore it". 133 
Seeking a solution to this problem, an idea was considered that instructions could be 
drafted by the representatives themselves and later revised and accepted by the capital., 34 
However, this solution was not accepted in the end, as a high burden of additional work 
would be assigned to the representatives, who did not possess Warsaw's resources, such 
as reports from the network of embassies, human resources, or an overview of the general 
strategy of Polish foreign policy. A solution was found through the informal agreement 
between the two that the instructions would not have to be presented in full by the 
representatives, if they found solid grounds to justify their decision to the ministry. One 
of the diplomats assessed the result as follows: "(a)n instruction is not a stiff material, 
that we are to realise from A to Z. This is expected from us in Warsaw and we feel this 
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134 As a matter of fact, in many old member states, national representatives have a great impact on the final 
shape of the instructions they receive. They even admitted that sometimes the tougher negotiations are 
those taking place between Brussels and their capitals. 
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responsibility". 135 Indeed, as observed by diplomats from older member states, relations 
between the member state capital and its representatives in Brussels remained one of the 
biggest challenges of the adaptational process, also after enlargement. 136 
With time, both, the representatives and the desk officers in the DUE were able to learn 
lessons from their own mistakes, which were mostly explained by a lack of experience, 
and thus able to improve the skill with which instructions were drafted. 137 As some of 
them recall, the most common mistakes regarded the degree of technicality and fitting in 
well into the main point of discussions. The diplomats claimed that while initially 
Warsaw was mainly sending in new texts, which would almost certainly be ignored, with 
time they learnt to make corrections and proposals more closely related to the documents 
that were already being discussed. Such interventions had more chance of success. 138 
Overall, the vast majority of interviewees emphasised that the learning process was still 
taking place but there was already a clear improvement in the quality of instructions. 139 
In the Polish Permanent Representation to the EU, the diplomats certainly got to know 
`the rules of the game' better. This could be observed in the way the representatives 
interacted with other member states' diplomats to include the mentioning of the massacre 
in Srcbrenica in the Council Conclusions in June 2005, the passages regarding Ukraine in 
February 2005 or the harassment of the Union of Poles in Belarus in November 2005. It 
seems that the active observer period certainly helped the Poles to learn the rules of the 
game and so, as some diplomats recall, the transition to full participation at Working 
Group level was relatively smooth. 140 The diplomats discovered a certain `code of 
conduct', which also included informal rules of behaviour. These rules were more 
difficult to grasp for the officials from the capital, who did not participate in the 
meetings, or did not do it as often as Brussels-based officials. Consensus building and the 
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136 Interview (no. 13 ) 
137 As one official claimed, it took a year to see that Brussels was not the place to make speeches to anyone, 
but to work out common positions (Interview, no. 5). 138 Interview (no. 1) 
139 Interview (no. 23,24,25) 
140 Interview (no. 17) 
116 
coordination reflex are among the most important behavioural norms. As asserted by one 
Polish representative: 
"This esprit de corps, it really exists. People know each other privately, invite 
each other to meetings (... ) talk on various topics and that leads to the emergence 
of some sort of community, you can call it a community of thinking or common 
perception of some problems (... ) Meanwhile, in the capital it is perceived in a bit 
different manner. "141 
As one of the Polish diplomats observed, adopting the above norms meant that he was 
"perceived in a better light and hence my next ideas arc taken into account, whereas if I 
am perceived as a troublemaker, who spoils the atmosphere and asks for the impossible, 
they are omitted and this is tactics". 142 It was also noted that the capital did not always 
understand the need for respecting such informal rules of behaviour. 143 
The way of presenting instructions improved, not only according to the Polish diplomats, 
but also their colleagues from other member states. They moved from simply reading out 
all instructions to a more interactive phase, even though a few diplomats from the older 
member states suggested that they still lacked some self-confidence, and occasionally that 
the instructions were read-out like a memorandum or filled with information of little 
interest to the rest. 144 It was also pointed out by one diplomat that the instructions seem to 
be still very strict and that they might need more flexibility. 145 This however is an issue 
that characterises several old member states as well and depends on their organisational 
culture and approach to negotiations. 
As stated by one official from an EU institution, who referred to the new member states 
in general and their manner of addressing their colleagues in the Council meetings: "they 
make things softer, they gained some confidence and friendship with the other colleagues 
101 Interview (no. 1) 
142 Interview (no. 23) 
143 Interview (no. 23) 
104 Interview (no. 14,15) 
145 Interview (no. 15) 
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so they feel confident to present things less radically than their capitals might wish, but at 
the end they get more results". 146 Another official, on the other hand claimed that the new 
member states were still in a process of "finding their feet in how you work in the EU" 
and pushed their national interest a bit too aggressively. 147 1 
In this way, national diplomats were able to use their expertise and institutional position 
to influence not only European politics and decision making, but also their foreign 
ministries (Spence, 2002: 33). They see themselves as the `transmission belts' of every 
day business in Brussels to their capitals. The socialisation of the newcomers was also 
observed by the officials in Brussels and some of them emphasised the difficulties. One 
official noted that before coming to Brussels the national representatives were thinking 
only "in terms of national interest", since this is how they were trained to think in the 
MFA. 148 
After enlargement, the number of issues discussed outside of the negotiation rooms 
increased. Therefore, the newcomers had to establish not only formal working contacts, 
but also informal channels for the exchange of information with their counterparts. The 
Poles have joined several informal `like-minded groups' of states and even claim that on 
occasion they provide a link between these groups and the smaller new member states. 
As one of the diplomats has recently put it: "If you don't exchange information, you are 
nobody". 149 At the same time, they acknowledged the importance of maintaining 
legitimacy within the group. From this perspective, adoption of the group's rules was a 
tactical move, a sort of negotiation strategy, employed in order to achieve their goals, 
aimed at strengthening one's position in the group and raising the chances of success in 
the future. 
Such intensified interactions between diplomats contributed to elite socialisation and in 
many cases towards thinking in national and European tcnns. Some diplomats were 
146 Interview (no. 40) 
147 Interview (no. 37) 
148 Interview (no. 44) 
149 Interview (no. 25) 
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initially surprised by the process of socialisation and one, struck by the habit of 
addressing national representatives by the Presidency using their names rather than 
countries, considered it to be the wrong way of doing business in an international 
organisation. 150 Interestingly, the EU was thus perceived as one of many international 
organisations, comparable to NATO or the United Nations, rather than a sari generis 
institution. Therefore, the standard rules of formal proceedings were expected to be 
followed. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the major changes in the organisation and policymaking 
processes in the Polish MFA. It was argued that the transformation started prior to EU 
membership and that the major changes started when Poland obtained the status of active 
observer to the EU in April 2003. It is remarkable that several of the officials involved 
referred to the impact of the CFSP on the MFA as `revolutionary'. In the pre-accession 
phase (phase I), change was mainly caused by conditionality, in comparison with the 
active-observer period and the time after accession (phase II), when learning and 
socialization were important mechanisms facilitating change. The reason for introducing 
changes in phase I, was initially technical adjustment to participation in CFSP. The 
adaptational pressures were stronger than in phase II and the process of foreign policy 
adaptation was strongly connected to the negotiation exercise as a whole. 
Referring back to the taxonomy of changes introduced at the outset of this chapter, the 
conclusions are summarized below. 
Systemic change 
Systemic change related to fundamental changes in an applicant/membcr state's 
structures or constitution. Only a few systemic changes took place in relation to 
'so Interview (no. 21) 
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participation in CFSP as well as more generally to the EU accession. The Constitution 
was not amended, but when the new one was adopted in 1997, two articles were inserted 
because of the forthcoming EU membership. These changes took place quite early in the 
adaptation process. 
Organisational change 
The analysis has shown that this type of change occurs over a long time period and is still 
taking place. Within the MFA, several organisational rearrangements were made. First, 
the department dealing with the EU was created (DUE), and in the beginning was also 
responsible for the negotiation exercise (DUEiONA). At a later stage several sections 
were created within that department and within the CFSP Unit, not to mention a further 
innovation to the ministerial structure. Within territorial departments of the MFA, the 
position of desk officer responsible for the CFSP and EU issues was created. All these 
developments were complimented by a fresh flow of graduates from the Diplomatic 
Academy established in 2002. Some similar organisational changes were introduced in 
the Permanent Representation to the EU, probably even more revolutionary and rapid, as 
it was directly affected by the need to participate in the EU meetings. The two sub- 
sections were created within the external relations sections, responsible for CFSP issues. 
The turning point in organisational structure is marked by Poland gaining the status of 
active observer. The number of staff tripled and internal coordination mechanisms were 
introduced. 
The competences of preparing instructions for the Polish representatives in Brussels 
stayed initially within DUE. This was often an informal arrangement, stemming from the 
difficulties in involving the territorial departments in the process of instruction-making. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence of a clear shift in this area. The role of DUE changed to 
that of coordinator. Similarly, the MFA's function within the coordination of Polish 
European policy shifted from 'gate-keeper' to `boundary-spanner'. 
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Process-related change 
This type of change occurred mostly after Poland became an active observer in the EU 
(phase II) and was related to its participation in the CFSP meetings and socialisation 
processes. A coordination system was established to first manage the negotiations' and 
preparation for membership, and then for preparing Polish positions in the Council. 
Interestingly, a system that was meant to facilitate Poland's EU accession, after an 
intense political debate, was preserved with only slight changes. The cumbersome 
coordination system involved the ministries, Permanent Representation to the EU, Polish 
Embassies, UKIE, as well as both houses of Parliament. Judging from the public 
discourse and information gathered during interviews, it is bound to be a subject of 
further changes in the future. Coordination of Polish EU policy required an increase of 
team-work and information sharing. Both of these processes were rather `painful' and 
revolutionary and still present challenges to the institutions involved. 
On the technical level, several innovations were introduced in order to facilitate intra- 
governmental communication and contacts with the Representation, Embassies and EU 
institutions. The first system used for an information exchange between Poland and the 
EU was ACN and then COURTESY with access to the COREUs. From the start, Poland 
faced the challenge of providing a safe electronic network and it seems the problem is 
still not fully resolved. 
The rhythm of work changed substantially and became strictly dependent on the EU 
working agenda. This includes organising coordination meetings within the MFA and the 
Permanent Representation, a system of preparing instructions and sending back reports 
from Brussels, as well as the visits of MFA officials to Brussels. Several officials 
emphasised that the number of visits to and from the diplomats from EU member states 
to the MFA increased, as well as the number of technical trips to other EU capitals. On 
the other hand, Polish diplomats in Brussels, apart from regular meetings in the Council 
became a part of an informal network and frequently started attending informal meetings 
and gatherings with their counterparts from other member states. 
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There was also a change in the style and aim of presenting instructions by the Polish 
representatives. In the period prior to accession and partly during the active observer 
period, Poland aimed simply at presenting the Polish stance on certain issues. The 
substance of instructions was mainly reactive. More recently, officials have expressed a 
willingness and acknowledged the necessity of formulating proposals for common 
actions, taking into account other member states' positions and finally, switching to more 
active policy-making. 
Cultural change 
As already noted, cultural change is very difficult to detect, especially in such a short 
time after the accession. Still, some preliminary conclusions can be made. The officials 
started reflecting upon `what others think' when formulating the national positions (e. g. 
drafting instructions or when presenting them). There was also an important shift from 
bilateral to multilateral work-styles not only as one of 25 member states, but also within 
the government itself. CFSP became present not only in the DUE, but in the MFA as a 
whole. After accession, the EU was no longer treated as an `alien' institution. As 
discussed in the chapter, this becomes evident from the discourse and mentioning `us' 
instead of `them'. Finally, a generation gap in the MFA seems to be the greatest dividing 
line that appeared in that institution over recent years. It is mostly young diplomats that 
deal with CFSP and DUE is the youngest department within the MFA. This affects the 
work of the ministry. 
The empirical research revealed another interesting aspect of Polish EU membership - 
the growing gap between the officials in Warsaw and those that were sent to Brussels. 
The latter started learning the `rules of the game' in Brussels, which sometimes were 
different to the rules they were used to in the MFA. Hence, national representatives found 
themselves embedded in two organisational environments: one in the ministry and one in 
the Council. As a result, a gap in knowledge appeared which sometimes resulted in 
miscommunication or a different assessment of the best negotiation strategies. 
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Finally, to put the findings in a broader perspective, some problems experienced by 
Poland are shared with other new member states. In relation to this, the old member 
states' representatives most often refer to miscommunication between the capital and the 
representations in Brussels, a relatively long decision-making path, retaining consistency 
between different Council Working Groups or using aggressive rhetoric in the pursuit of 
national goals. Poland was usually named as the new member state with most resources 
at hand, but also the highest ambitions of playing an active role in CFSP. In the case of a 
few smaller states, such as Slovenia or Malta, lack of human resources was a 
considerable problem and these countries were often unable to send representatives to all 
CFSP Working Groups. A lack of foreign policy traditions and institutions was listed as 
yet another obstacle, for example in the case of the Baltic states. 
The challenges to the role of the Polish MFA as a `gatekeeper' of the state's external 
relations is another feature held in common with other member states, resulting from 
global developments rather than the EU integration processes. For some time now, the 
Polish MFA has been managing the challenge by accepting its new role of `boundary 
spanner' and it engages in more interaction with other ministries where EU contact 
officials were established. But even this function was called into question during the 
negotiation period by the creation of UKIE, with the initial aim of coordinating 
negotiations with the EU. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLAND, THE EU AND POLICY TOWARDS TILE EASTERN 
NEIGHBOURS 
Introduction 
After examining the process of Europeanisation on the administrative procedures of the 
Polish MFA, the thesis now moves on to consider the impact on foreign policy substance. 
To achieve this, the following chapters examine the policy of the Poland and the EU 
collectively towards the Union's new Eastern neighbours and whether the adaptational 
changes in the policy-process and administrative settings, analysed in the previous 
chapter, are in any way mirrored in policy substance. Therefore, there are references 
throughout the text to the strategies used by Polish diplomats, the learning and 
socialisation process they undergo and how they use their newly gained knowledge to 
promote their national foreign policy goals at the EU level. 
This chapter is the first of three that analyse policy substance. The two chapters that 
follow this one focus on policy towards Belarus and Ukraine, the states central to Polish 
foreign policy. This chapter is a study in its own right, but at the same time it also 
provides a contextual background for the two chapters that follow it. It was chosen as a 
subject of analysis because of its importance for Poland and the fact that enlargement 
promoted the EU to rethink its policy towards the Eastern neighbours. Polish diplomats 
and decision-makers were very interested in uploading their ideas to the European level, 
especially given that EU policy had often been criticised in Poland and Polish national 
policy diverged from that one pursued by many of the other EU member states. The main 
methodological challenge faced in this chapter is that not only do official EU policy have 
to be taken into account, but so too does the bilateral policies and divergent positions of 
individual EU member states. When examining Polish foreign policy, the self-perception 
of Polish officials should also be differentiated from the perceptions of third parties, such 
as the EU officials and representatives from other EU member states. Also, Polish policy 
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regarding Belarus and Ukraine must be analysed from two different perspectives: from 
that Poland's take on EU policy towards the two states, but also in terms of Poland's 
bilateral relations with the two states, as these two perspectives are not always identical. 
Furthermore, a distinction has to be made between Poland's short, medium and long-term 
policy goals. 
In the first part of the chapter the general policy of the EU towards the East is outlined 
and the chapter proceeds by examining briefly how the idea of a `Wider Europe' 
appeared on the European agenda and was later transformed into the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The chapter proceeds with some remarks on the impact 
that enlargement had on the creation of the EU's policy towards its Eastern neighbours. 
The shifting balance between the member states is explained, as well as the impressions 
that EU officials and the older member states' representatives have of their new 
colleagues. This is to provide a context for the analysis of the role that Poland plays in the 
debate and the policy-making process. Next, the Polish input into the EU debate is 
discussed, beginning with Poland's ambition to create an independent EU Eastern 
Dimension. This section also seeks to identify those factors that influenced Poland's 
position within the EU. As the crucial elements of the policy concerned two of the close 
Eastern neighbours: (Ukraine and Belarus) policies towards these two states are discussed 
in more detail in the later part (chapters 5 and 6) of the thesis. However, some overlaps 
are inevitable, as both states are covered by the ENP (although Belarus is not an active 
participant). 
Another aspect of this study to be noted is the fact that national and European foreign 
policies are undergoing constant changes and mutually affect one another. Polish foreign 
policy had to be formally in agreement with the EU's policy and hence some changes 
were introduced. Informal socialisation and learning processes that altered the `way-of- 
doing-things' also, arguably, contributed to changes in national policy. At the same time, 
Polish diplomats were active at the European level, trying to introduce changes in the 
way that the EU dealt collectively with its Eastern neighbours. Therefore, it would be 
very difficult to isolate the effect one level exerts on the other. Europeanisation in this 
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case is thus understood as a process, even though an attempt to capture changes in policy- 
outputs on both levels is made. 
Implicitly, all three chapters deal with the issue of an anticipated `deadlock' following 
enlargement which was feared especially in relation to policies towards the East. It was 
sometimes anticipated that the new member states would bring many different interests to 
the table, which could either put a halt to the policy or result in a substantial worsening of 
EU-Russia relations. Poland, being the largest of the newcomers, and the one with the 
most clearly defined interest in the East, was often at the centre of such speculation and 
as a result was depicted as a potentially awkward new partner. Nevertheless, it is argued 
here that after the initial intensive process of socialisation and learning, the Poles 
adapted, to a large extent, to both formal and informal procedures and that this was 
reflected in their negotiation strategies with regard to both Ukraine and Belarus. Of 
course, the story is not entirely one of success and there were also setbacks and moments 
that caused irritation for their counterparts and EU officials. 
The EU's European Neighbourhood Policy: common solutions to different 
challenges? 
The importance of the EU's policy towards its neighbours was acknowledged in the 
European Security Strategy (ESS; Council of the EU, 2003), which included security in 
the neighbourhood in three of the Union's stated strategic objectives. It stated that 
"(n)eighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime 
flourished, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose 
problems for Europe" (Council of the EU, 2003). Regarding the East, it was asserted that 
it was not in the EU interest to create new dividing lines through enlargement and hence 
the EU should extend "the benefits of economic and political cooperation (... ) while 
tackling political problems there". Therefore, increased attention was given to efforts of 
creating a coherent policy towards the EU's neighbours. The importance of this issue was 
further confirmed by developments in Uzbekistan in 2003, Georgia in 2004 and Ukraine 
in 2005, which proved that on the Union's doorstep, in the former USSR, there were still 
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very unstable states and that revolutions could take them in very different directions. 
What is more, Belarus, a direct neighbour of the EU, is repeatedly called the last 
dictatorial regime on the European continent by the US administration. 
The (new) Eastern neighbours of the EU became the subject of increased interest for the 
Union in the light of the enlargement that was anticipated for 2004. Beforehand, the 
policies of the EU in the region were mainly focused on the acceding countries. Beyond 
its borders, the EU was predominantly concerned with relations with Russia, leaving 
other parts of the Former Soviet Union largely off the political radar. The prospective of 
an approaching enlargement also prompted a debate on the Union's final borders and the 
final goals of the European integration processes. In this perspective, the initiative 
leading eventually to the development of the ENP, resulted from an attempt to deal with 
the question of defining the EU's borders and confronting the `ghost of enlargement'. As 
clearly stated by Commissioner Verheugen (2003), formerly responsible for 
Enlargement, the ENP was "distinct from the issue of possible further enlargement. It 
concerns countries to which accession is not on the agenda". This was a straightforward 
message that the EU did not perceive these states as potential members regardless, of the 
fact that many of them did in fact have EU aspirations. 
Ultimately, the ENP took a very different form from the initial concept that was brought 
to the table in 2002 at the initiative of the UK and later also actively advocated by 
Sweden. It was concerned with developing relations with the EU's future neighbours, but 
only in the East. The idea was formally noted in the Council Conclusions from 18 
November 2002 (GAERC, 2002), which expressed the EU's particular concern about 
developing stronger ties with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. This preliminary concept 
soon became known as the New Neighbours Initiative (NNI). Its aim was to develop 
stronger relations with the chosen countries that would be based on "shared political and 
economic values" (GAERC, 2002). The policy was to adopt a differentiated approach and 
eventually lead to "democratic and economic reforms, sustainable development and trade, 
thus helping to ensure greater stability and prosperity at and beyond the new borders of 
the Union" (GAERC, 2002). Cross border co-operation, the fight against organised crime 
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and illegal immigration where named as areas were the EU would attempt to cooperate 
with other international actors, such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe. The 
candidate countries were to be consulted in the process of developing further strategies 
towards the region. 
The NNI quickly became the subject of discussion within the Council and between the 
High Representative Javier Solana and the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris 
Patten. At the same time, the Southern states of the EU were expressing concerns as to 
whether the forthcoming enlargement would not diminish EU interest and support for 
their Mediterranean neighbours (Gromadzki et al., 2005: 12). As a result of lobbying 
undertaken by these states, it was proposed that the NNI initiative could even go beyond 
the three Eastern EU neighbours and encompass a notion of `Wider Europe'. As a 
consequence, the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 also included the 
Mediterranean states and Russia in the policy. The number of participating countries was 
further increased in 2004, when Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were also included. 
Eventually, a common framework was created to include states that were very different 
states in terms of culture, history and their political and economic situation. Increasing 
the number of countries from the initial three completely changed the character of the 
policy, not least by including a wide range of different states some of which had EU 
membership aspirations and some of which who did not (Gromadzki et al, 2005: 10). 
The first official document outlining the `Wider Europe' concept in more detail was 
prepared by the Commission in March 2003 and sent to the Council and the European 
Parliament. It clearly stated that the initiative was aimed at strengthening "the framework 
for the Union's relations with the countries that do not currently have the prospective of 
membership of the EU" (European Commission, 2003). Therefore, countries like Turkey, 
Romania, Bulgaria and the Western Balkan states were kept out of the framework. This 
was in line with the view expressed by Commission President Romano Prodi (2002), who 
claimed: "we have to be prepared to offer more than a partnership and less than a 
membership, without precluding the latter", and he also repeatedly referred to the concept 
of sharing "everything but institutions". This reflected the main challenge faced by any 
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attempt to develop a neighbourhood policy - the necessity to deal with the prospects of 
enlargement. The main benefit that the EU offered the participating states instead of 
membership would therefore be "the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market and 
further integration' and liberalization to promote the free movement of - persons, goods, 
services and capital" 151 (Prodi, 2002). 
The concept was developed further and introduced by the Commission in a Strategy 
Paper in May 2004. It subsequently led to yet another change in the name of the 
initiative, which from then became known as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
As argued by a senior official of the Commission, the novelty of the ENP was based on 
its new strategic framework, which was "an example of our foreign policy being more 
than traditional diplomacy" (Landaburu, 2006: 3). The novelty of the new foreign policy 
tool was supposed to lay in its integration of different instruments from various policies, 
such as human rights, judicial reforms, institution-building or crisis management. The 
issue of prospective membership re-appeared again, but the main policy line remained 
unchanged: the neighbourhood policies were directed at countries for which membership' 
was not on the agenda. Even though the discourse was somewhat softened and the notion 
of the ENP being `substitute for enlargement' was no longer mentioned, the Strategy 
Paper clearly stated that the EU "emphasized that it offers a means to reinforce relations 
between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct from the possibilities available to 
European countries under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union" (European 
Commission, 2004a: 3). Thus, some observers immediately raised concerns as to whether 
such a policy would not result in negative unintended effects, such as fostering the re- 
integration of the CIS-area under the umbrella of Russia (Emerson, 2004). 
Today, there are 16 countries included in the ENP policy in total, 152 with three of them, 
Belarus, Libya and Syria, not linked to the EU by any current agreement. Russia, initially 
151 Currently, a lot of phrases used by the former President of the Commission Romano Prodi, such as 
"everything but institutions" or "open-closed doors" are avoided in an attempt to change the discourse over 
the ENP (Interview no. 44, Brussels 2006). In the same manner, there is less talking of "benchmarking" and 
conditionality and more of "joint ownership" (Kelley, 2005). 
152 These are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
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invited to be part of the program, has refused to participate, in spite of the Commission's 
assurances that it was "of course much more than a neighbour" and that the EU-Russia 
strategic relationship would not be abandoned or downgraded in the new framework 
(Verheugen, 2003). Instead, the EU has formed an official Strategic Partnership with 
Russia, based on four `common spaces': economic; freedom, security and justice; 
external security; research and education. The road maps referring to the spaces were 
agreed in May 2005. 
As already noted by some observers, the ENP framework and its mechanisms are firmly 
based on the Commission's experiences of enlargement (Kelley, 2005). One of the 
general principles directly transferred from past experiences with the CEECs. is 
conditional ity'(Ferrero-Waldner, 2006b; Landaburu, 2006: 3). The incentive is however 
different: a progressive economic integration and deepening political co-operation. As 
explained-recently, the strongest incentive, which is a stake in the EU's internal market, 
means that countries will be given the possibility to choose sectors in which they wish to 
gain such access and later introduce necessary reforms in order to be able to benefit from 
the offer (Landaburu 2006: 4). 
The ENP is implemented through so-called Action Plans, in which the EU sets the 
standards ('benchmarks') that should be met by its neighbours. They are cross-pillar, 
which means that the Commission has to coordinate drafting with the Council and the 
CFSP High Representative. The strategy also emphasizes the policy of `joint ownership' 
and the unwillingness of the EU "to impose priorities or conditions on its partners" or 
"ask partners to accept a pre-detennined set of priorities" (European Commission, 
2004a). However, at the same time, the document stresses that the ENP was designed to 
promote commitment to shared values and the Action Plans will "contain a number of 
priorities intended to strengthen the commitment to these values" (European 
Commission, 2004a). Among these values are: strengthening democracy and the rule of 
law, the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organized crime, 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of media and 
expression, the protection of the rights of minorities and of children. 
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The initial text of the Action Plans is drafted first by the Commission, which clearly puts 
it in a privileged position. The Commission emphasizes that Action Plans differ 
according to the needs of different states. This has probably been the effect of learning 
from the experiences of enlargement, that sometimes grouping hinders individual 
progress (Kelley, 2005). Nonetheless, the Commission has been criticized on various 
occasions of applying a standard format to the drafts of Action Plans presented to the 
Council. The review process, based on joint assessments and the regular country reports, 
also resembles the procedures used in relation to the 2004 accession states (Kelley, 
2005). 
Financial resources are made available for the ENP through a European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which was designed, amongst other things, to support 
the implementation of the Action Plans for the period 2007-1013. Initially just called the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), it gained the `Partnership' component 
specifically to accommodate Russia in the scheme, after Russia refused to take part in the 
ENP itself. It is hoped that this new financial instrument will allow for more flexible use 
of funds, and thus address the criticism expressed currently by a few member states 
towards TACIS funding for example. 153 The current Commission proposal amounts to 
nearly E15bn, but needs to be further negotiated with the member states. 154 
There are serious challenges ahead for the ENP. It has been argued that it neither 
sufficiently confronts the ghost of enlargement, nor seriously addresses problems 
affecting neighbouring states nor does it achieve coherence in relations with them (Smith, 
2005: 767). A common framework was created for managing relations with all 
neighbours, grouping countries as different as Ukraine, Morocco and Israel. The ENP has 
also created the outsider-insider cleavage, refusing to give any long term hope regarding 
the European perspective to those states with the ambition of eventually joining the EU. 
Some observers criticized the Action Plans, as "it is hard to see how these action plans 
'53 Interview (no. 33); General Affairs Council Conclusions, Brussels, 7 November 2005 (GAERC, 2005c). 
is4 By comparison, the budget pre-2006 consisted of E5.3bn MEDA and E3.1 bn TACIS with additional EIB 
lending: E2bn for the Mediterranean and E500m for Eastern Europe. 
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provide a real incentive for reform" (Smith, 2005: 764). As argued by the EU officials, 
the negative results of the referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the 
Netherlands raised the importance of the ENP, which is not dealing with the politically 
`hot' issue of membership. 155 However, this apparent strength can be also considered as a 
serious weakness of the policy. The effort of separating politically sensitive issues (high 
politics) from the every-day technical relations (low-politics) proved to be difficult to 
implement in practice. 
General impact of enlargement on the EU's policy towards the East 
One of the substantial changes on the CFSP agenda after enlargement was the growing 
importance of the EU's Eastern neighbours. Prior to April 2004, the Union was not 
primarily concerned with policy towards Eastern Europe, with the notable exception of 
Russia. However, with the forthcoming enlargement, the EU had acknowledged the 
necessity to develop a framework for relations with its future Eastern neighbours. This 
was the case for example when developing the Common Strategy towards the Ukraine in 
1999, which contained a section devoted to EU-Ukraine relations in the context of the 
2004 enlargement (European Council, 1999). The Commission also emphasized the 
concept of `Wider Europe' in the document, and that the "accession of new member 
states will strengthen the Union's interest in enhancing relations with the new 
neighbours" (European Commission, 2003: 3). 
The former Prime Minister of Poland, Marek Belka (2005) claimed that "the Eastern 
neighbourhood of the Union, till recently, had been treated (... ) as a domain of the few 
most important western-European capitals, that were taking care of their special, separate, 
bilateral relations with Russia and hence remaining in the traditions of their diplomacies 
for centuries". This situation has arguably changed with the accession of the new member 
states, 156 who managed to put the issue on the political agenda. Nonetheless, the change 
iss Interview (no. 44) 
156 The new member states referred to in this chapter are generally understood as the so-called EU-8 and do 
not include Malta and Cyprus, which are not primarily interested in Eastern Europe. 
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in attention does not necessarily lead to a change in policy substance. It remains to be 
seen whether the new member states that are clearly succeeding in influencing the EU 
agenda, have also exerted any impact on the actual policy outcome. 
One of the immediate effects of enlargement has been a shift of balance among the 
member states regarding their interests and priorities in Eastern Europe. As one EU 
official observed there are three groups of states when it comes to the East: those that are 
passionate about it, those that have mainly economic interests and those that have none of 
these. 157 The last group includes mainly the states from the South-West, such as Portugal 
or Spain. The bilateral relations of the meinber states with Russia also affect their overall 
policy towards the East. 
As Eastern Europe is an area of special interest for the new member states, most of them 
play an active role (more active than in many other groups) in the discussions of COEST 
- the Council Working Group dealing with Eastern Europe and Central Asia. EU officials 
and diplomats from the older member states generally emphasize that the new member 
states brought to the table experience and knowledge about the region. This is an obvious 
result of their geographical position and historical experiences. At the same time, their 
emotional attitude towards these countries is often also noted. As one representative 
claimed: 
"the new member states for historical reasons have a different feeling towards the 
COEST dossier(... ) I think there is a certain degree of personal engagement, it is 
not just that they read out the papers, there is a real wish to convince the rest that 
this should be the policy choice the EU should be taking". 158 
During informal conversations however, old member states' diplomats often accuse the 
newcomers of being too emotional and unable to leave the past behind, whereas the new 
151 Interview (no. 36) 
158 Interview (no. 34) 
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member states blame the old ones for not having enough knowledge about their Eastern 
neighbours and being unable to see anything in the East except for Moscow. 
In terms of having an impact on policy-substance, there is some evidence of its presence, 
reflected by the perceptions of officials from the old member states and the EU 
institutions. Nonetheless, it is still too early to fully evaluate any such effect. One EU 
official observed that the new member states were already making a contribution when 
they had status of active observers, sometimes not speaking openly in the meeting rooms, 
but addressing the officials in the corridors, showing them that they would like changes 
to be introduced in the future. 159 Another official gave an example of raising the issue of 
Russian speaking minorities in the Baltic States on the EU forum, which would most 
probably never have appeared on the agenda before enlargement. 160 More on this topic 
will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, specifically in relation to Ukraine and Belarus. 
However, it is generally emphasized that this impact could be greater, but more time is 
needed for the newcomers to build trust, socialize and choose the best strategies. This is 
clearly connected to the processes discussed in chapter one. It is a matter of a learning 
process that is still taking place. As one diplomat observed: "they arc just pushing things 
sometimes a bit too far and they should understand that we need to reach a 
compromise. "61 Another diplomat from another old member state claimed in a similar 
manner: 
"(w)e are still in the transition process, the new member states must still learn 
how the system is working to use it more efficiently, less rhetoric and national 
request but more influence, more realism" 162 
which was confirmed by a Commission official: 
159 Interview (no. 40) 
160 Interview (no. 39) 
161 Interview (no. 42) 
162 Interview (no. 41) 
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"I also think that the new member states are still in the process of finding their 
feet in how to work in the EU and I feel that sometimes they push for national 
interest to an extent that they perhaps should not (... ) of course old member states 
also press for their national interest, but maybe not so aggressively". 163 
It has to be noted that such behaviour is probably most visible in this particular policy 
area, as most of the new member states treat it as something vital to their national 
interest. As another EU official claimed, in her view this yet uncompleted adaptation was 
one of the reasons why the new member states were not as effective as they could be in 
promoting their vision of how relations with the East should be built: 
"they have been pushing some concrete issues regarding Russia in a less 
pragmatic way, because they see things in a different perspective (... ) but upon 
joining the EU they thought 'we will say lets go right and everyone will go 
right'... and there is some disappointment that that did not happen. If you 
compare this with Finland which also has a direct border with Russia and tries to 
raise the interest of the EU and engage in partnerships on environment, 
development... (... ) they have a different, more pragmatic approach, for example 
the way they talk to the member states, engaging... so I think there is a learning 
period going on and the new member states will learn that sometimes they should 
present their position in a less radical manner, that they will gain from that. " 64 
The last statement raises an important issue that divides many new and old member 
states: their different perceptions of Russia. The particularly stern attitude towards 
Russia, expressed by some of the newcomers, is sometimes not well-appreciated by other 
member states, even though they express their understanding of the historical 
underpinnings of such behaviour. Nonetheless, thinking of the overall EU interest and the 
problems regarding minorities for example, one EU Official claimed: "... if we are going 
to be emotional we cannot solve it. And this leads to Russia being more aggressive 
163 Interview (no. 37) 
164 Interview (no. 40) 
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towards the EU as a whole". 165 Some expressed the view that, after joining the EU, the 
new member states finally feel "kind of safe and they see that Russia cannot harm them, 
as it cannot be too aggressive towards the EU, it has too much interests with the old 
member states... so they speak up louder! ". 166 On the other hand, one of the national 
representatives expressed his belief that enlargement and the policy of the new member 
states towards Russia changed the balance in the Council, but at the same time, it brought 
together the states with a traditionally pro-Russian stance, such as Italy, Spain, Germany 
and even Belgium. 167 This may be considered as a rather unexpected result of 
enlargement, contrary to more expected polarization of positions and difficulties in 
achieving consensus with so many different interests around the table. 
Before enlargement, Finland was the only country that had experience of Russia as a 
neighbour and tried to promote a firm approach inside the EU. As one Finnish diplomat 
commented on the enlargement: 
"Regarding the policy towards Russia, there was a change. During the EU-15 
Finland tried to remain realistic and after the enlargement the new member states 
joined the critical mass of realism, so the situation is more balanced at the 
moment. The hostility towards Russia did not increase. " 168 
Indeed, the EU noted some successes regarding its relations with Russia, such as signing 
the agreement of four `common spaces' in May 2005. Nonetheless, this does not preclude 
the fact that the discourse used during the meetings has changed and some proposals, that 
never gain enough support to see the light of day are much sterner in their language then 
the eventually agreed statements. 
165 Interview (no. 39) 
166 Interview (no. 39) 
167 Interview (no. 38) 
168 Interview (no. 13) 
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Poland's contribution to the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy 
The policy of the EU towards its Eastern neighbours has always been an area of special 
importance for Polish diplomacy. It was identified as the number one priority for the 
Polish contribution to the Union's external relations by all the MFA officials that were 
interviewed. Nonetheless, Poland's attitude towards the ENP has been characterised by a 
high degree of ambiguity, as it did not reflect the Polish vision of deepening relations 
with Eastern Europe and the strategic goal of potential membership for Ukraine. This 
cautious attitude is present notwithstanding the fact that Poland, even before its formal 
accession to the EU, had been advocating its proposal that the EU should develop a 
common policy towards the 'new' (Eastern) neighbours. This section aims at exploring 
the Polish position towards the ENP and explaining the factors that shaped it. It starts 
with early attempts by Polish politicians and diplomats to promote the idea of an Eastern 
Dimension prior to Poland's accession to the EU. It then continues with the analysis of 
the input to the internal EU debate and negotiations over the Union's relations with the 
East. Finally, some preliminary remarks are made regarding the effectiveness of Polish 
policy `uploading' and the Europeanisation process. 
The current stance that Poland expresses towards the ENP is firmly grounded in the 
traditions of its foreign policy. Relations with her Eastern neighbours were among the top 
priorities of modern Polish foreign policy, as formulated in 1990, aller Poland regained 
its full sovereignty. One of the main challenges to face at that time was redefining 
relations with the states in the post-Soviet space. The policy choices were made in 
accordance with the prior concepts formulated in the 1960s by Juliusz Microszewski and 
Jerzy Giedroyc in Parisian "Kultura", who advocated supporting an independent Ukraine. 
An active policy towards Poland's Eastern neighbours was perceived as interconnected 
with Polish-German relationships and the principle of balanced engagement with the 
West and the East (Barcz, 1992: 72). The Polish political elites soon recognized the fact 
that better relations with Eastern neighbours could mean gaining a stronger position 
within Western Europe (Kupiecki and Szczepanik 1995: 75). 
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After the initial `dual-track' policy, designed as an attempt to maintain a balance between 
Moscow and the newly independent states, a new and more active approach was 
formulated in 1994 (Olechowski, 1994a; 1994b). Its aim was to build up good relations 
with the states of special significance for Poland: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic 
States, Kazakhstan and Moldova. Relations with Ukraine was characterised by a strategic 
partnership of crucial importance, which was later to be reflected in the role of Poland as 
an advocate for Ukraine's closer ties with the EU. This background has to be taken into 
account when considering Polish attitudes towards the ENP. 
The Eastern Dimension: an unfulfilled Polish ambition 
Before EU accession, Poland had already shown that it wanted to be among those states 
that would shape the EU's Eastern policy. This policy attitude was underpinned by a 
general feeling among Polish officials and academics about the need to keep the EU's 
doors open. In 1998, Professor Bronislaw Geremek, in his speech inaugurating Poland's 
EU accession negotiations, called for the creation of an Eastern Dimension. Many 
politicians and scholars have since spoken in favour of Poland taking the initiative in 
creating and developing this idea. The Polish National Security Adviser, Marek Siwiec, 
claimed that the Polish contribution to the EU would only be as a player and not as a 
follower, especially due to its expertise on the former USSR. This could be "the Polish 
speciality in the EU" and the field where Poland had "no competition in Europe", as 
stated by Marek Karp, the director of Centre for Eastern Studies. 169 lie also revealed the 
Polish hopes that, in the future, Warsaw could host a special EU office that would 
support Polish activity towards its Eastern neighbours. Such strong Polish interest in this 
policy can also be explained by her historical experience and the determination to prevent 
"the creation, over our heads, [of a] bridge between Moscow and Brussels". 170 
'69 Polska/Karp: nie mamy w Europie konkurencji, Warszawa 21.02.2003, http: //www. euro. pap. pl/cgi- 
bin/europap. pl? grupa= I &ID=41424 
170 The comment made by Jozef Oleksy during the debate over the Polish Foreign Policy held at the Batory 
Foundation in Warsaw, see: Polska polityka zagraniczna: kontynuacja cry zerwanie?, 2004: 77. 
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It was not long before the Polish government joined the debate as well. It supported the 
idea of creating the Eastern Dimension, which was explained in the MFA non-paper'71 
(MFA, 2003a) and later also in a speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 
2003 during a conference on `The EU Enlargement and the Neighbourhood Policy' 
(Cimoszewicz, 2003), and a day later in Prague. He spoke in favour of the EU having 
"a coherent, comprehensive framework of its Eastern Policy. It should be flexible 
enough to enable individual development of relations with each of the countries 
concerned without prejudicing their final formula. Poland suggests that this 
framework should constitute the Eastern Dimension of the EU" (Cimoszewicz, 
2003). 
Polish officials argued that relations with her Eastern neighbours should be differentiated 
within the framework of an Eastern Dimension, depending not only on values and the 
progress of reforms, but also on the aspirations concerning relations with the EU. This 
was a crucial argument that would allow for adapting a different policy towards the East 
than the one demanded by the Southern states, who did not aspire to joining the Union. 
The government also argued that the assistance instruments should be flexible and even 
in the case of the "disappointing performance of authorities of the countries concerned, it 
is in the interest of the enlarged EU and its Eastern neighbours to keep engaged in co- 
operation at a relevant level and continue its assistance facilitating further reforms" 
(MFA, 2003a). This argument was clearly designed to accommodate Bclarus within the 
assistance programs that would often be of benefit to Poland as well, such as those 
focused on managing the Polish-Belarusian border. The Poles proposed that policy 
should be based on three pillars: an EU one, a member state one and a pillar for non- 
governmental actors. The operational goals should be included in an Action Plan for the 
171 The exact origins of the non-paper are somewhat difficult to trace in the MFA itself. Analysing the 
public discourse, it rather seems plausible that it was a result of the debate held by various policy centres in 
Poland, such as the Centre for International Relations and the Centre for Eastern Studies, both based in 
Warsaw with strong ties to the government. 
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[:, ºstcrn Uimcnsiun and the PoIcs claimed they were already working on the coi crele 
hrulects to he included in such a document (MFA, 2003a). 
Figure 4. The main points ol'the Polish non-paper from 2003: 
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14ll 
Undoubtedly, a blue-print for the Polish attempt to advocate the new EU dimension was 
the Northern Dimension advocated by the Finns since 1997.172 It was mainly aimed at 
developing closer relations with Russia, but also states like Iceland and Norway 
(Browning and Joanniemi, 2003: 466). This initiative was perceived in Poland as very 
successful (Buras and Pomorska, 2006). It was seen not only as a useful tool to manage 
urgent problems in the region, but also a way of `uploading' a national foreign policy 
agenda to the European level. This was perceived, in turn, as a good opportunity to 
upgrade the country's role in the EU. Initially, Poland interpreted the Northern Dimension 
as a potential competitor to Polish ideas but after joining the EU one could observe a 
pragmatic shift in Polish thinking. The Poles soon began to cooperate with the Finns 
regarding their common goal of raising the importance of the region on the EU agenda, as 
well as at the level of concrete regional projects. As declared by minister Cimoszcwicz 
(2003): "the Eastern Dimension would be complementary to the Northern Dimension of 
the EU. I believe that it can use the experience of the Northern Dimension as well as 
other policies of the EU towards adjacent regions". 
The non-paper, as admitted later by some Polish diplomats, was not pragmatic enough, as 
the Poles lacked valuable inside knowledge on how the EU functioned. It was argued by 
some academics that the Polish proposal for an Eastern Dimension, in spite of some 
apparent similarities to the Northern Dimension, would only contribute to re-bordering 
Europe and create a clear division between insiders and outsiders (Browning and 
Joanniemi, 2003). This was due to the fact that the Polish initiative was aimed at the 
Eastern neighbours alone and did not create a common platform between them and the 
EU members or prospective members, most notably Poland itself (Browning and 
Joanniemi, 2003: 471). 
The lobbying action of the Polish authorities in support of the Eastern Dimension resulted 
in failure. The most important ideas were not incorporated into the documents outlining 
the ENP. Hence, after joining the Union, the idea of an independent dimension was soon 
'72 One example is the institutional arrangement of the proposal and the use of an Action Plan. This draws 
from the Action Plan for the Northern Dimension (2000-2003), which was accepted in June 2000. 
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temporarily abandoned by Polish diplomats. As admitted by a national representative 
from an old member state: "I don't know what happened with the concept of `Eastern 
Dimension' once proposed by Poland" 173. This was confirmed in conversations wit 
Polish officials and statements by the politicians. As regards specific points formulated in 
the non-paper, some of them, such as promoting the European perspective for Ukraine 
and Moldova were temporarily `put on the shelf' ntil there would be a realistic 
possibility of achieving such goals. 
Polish attitudes to `Wider Europe' and the ENP 
After enlargement, it became evident that Eastern Europe became a number one priority 
and "the most important strategic challenge for Poland" (Cimoszewicz, 2004a) regarding 
its contribution to EU external relations. Polish diplomats were assigned the goal of 
putting the problems of the region onto the EU agenda, as the Union was criticized for 
being ineffective towards Belarus, unable to solve the Transdnicstrian conflict and of 
not doing enough to decrease the democratic deficit in Ukraine. Taking into account the 
description of the ENP provided in an earlier part of the chapter and the Polish ideas 
relating to the policy towards the Eastern neighbours, it becomes apparent that the two 
differ substantially. Therefore, the Polish attitude towards the Commission's initiative has 
been wary from the very beginning. At the same time, because of the `misfit' between the 
actual ENP and the Poland's vision, this policy area provides an excellent testing ground 
for the `uploading' capabilities of the Poles. As relations between the EU and its Eastern 
neighbours were developed through the ENP framework, it soon became a central 
clement in the lobbying game for the shape of the future policy. The states listed in the 
Polish non-paper (MFA, 2003a) remained the focus of Polish diplomacy in relation to the 
ENP. 
The Poles have continued to emphasise that they possess the necessary expertise which 
they are prepared to share with their EU partners. This was repeated in the Foreign 
Minister's expose in front of Parliament in 2006 (Meller, 2006). The EU officials and 
173 Interview (no. 13) 
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diplomats from older member states generally emphasize that Poland brought experience 
and knowledge about the region to the table. At the same time, the emotional attitude of 
the newcomers towards these countries is also often noted. 
The Polish attitude towards the ENP has been shaped by several factors. Firstly, the ENP 
did not correspond to the ideas presented earlier by Poland as the idea foundation for an 
independent Eastern Dimension. Most notably, it mixed together the states with and 
without membership aspirations, which endangered the long-term strategic goal of Polish 
diplomacy, defined as integrating all Eastern neighbours, especially Ukraine, into the 
European structures. 174 The Poles continuously advocated a differentiated approach that 
would be conditioned by the convergence of the third countries'. values and foreign 
policies with those of the EU. This was used as an argument against a single framework 
for the South and the East. The instruments and incentives used in the ENP were, from 
the beginning, perceived as insufficient to bring about any substantial democratic change. 
A powerful incentive could thus be provided by a European perspective - as one of the 
Polish officials put it: "it worked in our case and is working in the Balkans". 175 Finally, 
Poland found itself at the centre of constant tensions within the EU between the states 
primarily interested in the East and those advocating the Union's engagement in the 
South, both under the ENP framework. 
The initial idea behind the November 2002 NNI initiative, involving just three states, was 
much closer to Polish foreign policy then its successor, the ENP. As reaffirmed by an 
official from the Polish MFA: "the ENP is now far from the ideal that was presented in 
2002". 176 In spite of this, the development of the policy and the initial Action Plans were 
officially welcomed as "the first steps in the right direction". '77 In this respect, Poland 
wished to interpret the ENP as a phase that would eventually bring the Eastern 
neighbours closer to the EU, but which would not stop there but also lead to potential 
membership. This was a very different perception from the initial assumptions behind the 
174 Interview (no. 26) 
175 Interview (no. 26) 
176 Interview (no. 26) 
1n Interview (no. 26) 
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ENP, which was supposed to be a policy that did not tackle the membership perspective 
at all and was even perceived by some as a substitute for enlargement. Such a Polish 
vision was also in stark contrast with the interests of some of the older member states that 
did not wish to discuss any further enlargement to the East. 
The EU's attempt to develop a `circle of friends' on its Eastern borders was warmly 
welcomed by Warsaw. Nevertheless, Poland has been instrumental in putting the 
membership perspective issue high on the ENP agenda. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Stefan Meller (2006) stated in his annual address to the parliament in January 2006: 
"We will seek to ensure that the emerging Eastern Dimension of the Union's 
Neighbourhood Policy draws the countries involved closer to the Union. At the 
same time, they should not be doomed to the role of `eternal partners'. At least 
some of them - the ones with a pro-European orientation and advanced internal 
transformations - should be given the prospect 'of membership, however distant it 
may be". 
The reluctance on the part of the EU to grant some countries involved in the ENP the 
membership perspective (in line with the principle of differentiation) has been a major 
point of concern for the Poles. As one Polish official put it: "the fact that the 
neighbourhood policy does not tackle the integration aspirations of the respective 
countries from outside the EU is its weakness" (Cieszkowski, 2004: 108). While the 
European Commission sets a common goal for the neighbouring regions - the 
development of welfare and a friendly neighbourhood, Polish priorities are much more 
ambitious. 
The problem of potential membership is a direct consequence of the fact that the ENP is 
aimed at the East as well as the South. Hence, it was criticized by the Poles for mixing 
states with and without European aspirations. While Ukraine or Moldova arc, as indicated 
above, clearly perceived by the Poles as potential members of the EU in the distant but 
foreseeable future, this perspective is certainly not granted, and not only by Poland, for 
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countries like Libya or Algeria. Hence, the ENP is not only of limited use for the Polish 
long-term foreign policy goal of promoting Ukrainian EU accession but in political terms 
it could even be a threat to it as it locates Ukraine in the group of countries excluded from 
EU membership (Buras and Pomorska, 2006). 178 
As it will be explained in detail later, Polish diplomats undertook some initiatives aimed 
at granting Ukraine a membership perspective and finally referring to the possible future 
accession. Such efforts were intensified after the Orange Revolution, but failed in the 
light of insufficient support around the EU Council table. Poland has continued its 
unofficial efforts to push for something more than just a repeated acknowledgment of the 
Ukrainian European aspirations. The issue was brought to the table by the Poles again in 
2006, in the context of preparing a new enhanced agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine. 179 
As one Polish diplomat believed, 2006, the year the new PCAs were negotiated with the 
countries involved in the ENP, was a real test for Polish diplomacy. 180 But the Poles have 
criticised the one-framework concept as an ineffective instrument because of the highly 
sensitive issue of prospective membership. They wished to advocate a more privileged 
treatment for the countries in the East, on the grounds that they had already established 
their willingness and ability to align with EU norms and policies. The desirability of 
using one common framework was questioned in the light of the inability to find common 
solutions regarding technical matters on a wide range of issues related to visa facilitation, 
free trade areas, the flow of capital or finally the European perspective. This was in line 
with the differentiated approach that the Poles had argued for and could lead to a revival 
of the independent Eastern Dimension. 
Furthermore, there has been a visible tension between the Polish preference for the 
Eastern Dimension of the ENP and the interests of the Mediterranean countries, focusing 
their activities on the South. Most importantly, Poland has felt uneasy with the 
178 The Ukrainian case will be explored in a greater detail in one of the following sections of the chapter. 
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distribution of the financial means to the East and to the South. While the South- 
Mediterranean countries received £2.4 billion in the period 2000-2003 from the MEDA 
programme, and £41, million from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights, the Eastern partners were given only - respectively - £1.3 billion (TACIS) and 
£19 million (Cieszkowski, 2004,111). In this respect, the ENP was used by the Polish 
diplomats as a platform to shift some funding from the South to the East. This was done 
during the negotiations over the new financial instrument, the ENPI. The Poles, 
supported by the Germans, played an active role in the negotiations over the ENPI and 
the division of funds between the South and the East. During the negotiations in 
COREPER II, there was a clear difference of interests between the French and the Polish 
delegation. The Polish stance was against the proposed geographical financial 
breakdown, advocated by France. It has been reported that the argument was used 
(introduced to the discussion at the level of COREPER by the German delegation) that 
such a solution would go against the principles of the ENP as one framework. 18, Having 
achieved that, it is difficult to find any other practical reasons for the Poles to support the 
ENP in their efforts to bring a new impetus to the relations with the East, as continuing 
them in the current framework simply meant further "stagnation". 182 
During the negotiations over the ENPI, the line taken by Polish diplomacy was based on 
the ideas presented three years earlier in the non-paper. They argued again that 
extraordinary circumstances should be taken into account when distributing funds for 
support of civil society, democratisation, and promotion of respect for human rights. This 
was related to the situation on Belarus. Therefore, the Poles argued for the possibility of 
delivering aid without the co-financing by the beneficiary state. 
The position of the Polish government has been in line with a broad consensus within 
society and among the political parties. There are a number of policy centres and 
foundations, involved in advocating the Polish stance and maintaining the debate in 
Poland, but also in Brussels and the EU member states. The most active ones are the 
1eß (Interview no. 45). 
182 Interview (no. 45) 
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Batory Foundation, the Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM), the Centre for 
International Relations (CSM) and the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw. 
Nonetheless, they are all closely tied to the decision-makers and the government, hence, 
the policies advocated are similar to those we have already identified as the Poland's 
official stance. 
The major points characterising the ENP and the Polish policy have been included in 
figure 5. 
Figure 5. Poland and the ENP (comparison of ideas) 
European Neighbourhood Polish stand towards the 
Policy ENP based on the Eastern 
Dimension and the 
subsequent Polish ideas 
Participating states 16 (South and East) Restricted to Eastern 
neighbours 
Membership Not included (no reference to Granted as soon as the states 
prospective art. 49) are ready as a strong incentive, 
without the EU internal reform 
as a pre-requisite 
Incentives for reform The major one: "a stake in the Economic but also political, 
internal market" including cmbcrship 
Granting the aid Linked to conditionality Advocating a weaker link to 
governments' perfon-nance 
Ukraine Part of the ENP "Loses out" and deserves a 
more privileged treatment; 
optionally exclude it from the 
framework (unofficial), 
reference to art. 49 
Belarus Relations frozen, practically Include in the framework 
excluded from the ENP 
Conclusions: The first examples of policy `uploading': Europeanisation in progress? 
Based on the above, some preliminary conclusions may be drawn regarding the 
promotion of Polish policy goals in the EU. They will be examined in greater detail in the 
next two chapters which focus on Ukraine and Belarus. The Poles began on a quite 
unsuccessful note with the failure to upload the idea of an Eastern Dimension. Their 
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action begun not only before Poland joined the EU, but even before it became an active 
observer. Hence, the diplomats were not really given any chance of participating in the 
internal EU negotiations and were significantly ill informed about the formal and 
informal proceedings. The lobbying action behind the Eastern dimension was to a large 
extent conducted via formal channels. The Polish non-paper was distributed to high-level 
EU officials and national diplomats. There was practically no opportunity to influence the 
EU agenda from the position of an `outsider', so the agenda-setting mechanism of policy 
`uploading' was not used. In addition, the attempt to follow the Finnish example was 
ineffectual. As shown above, the formulation and promotion of the Eastern Dimension, in 
spite of its apparent similarities, missed some of the important elements of the Northern 
Dimension. 
The situation changed once Poland joined the negotiation tables and Polish diplomats 
discovered the rules of the `Brussels' game'. It is worth mentioning that notwithstanding 
the general scepticism towards the ENP, the Poles have not undertaken any substantial 
action in order to undermine or obstruct the policy, for example by using their veto 
power. Arguably, this is related to the Europeanisation processes described in the 
previous chapter. The diplomats in Brussels realised that a negative attitude, without any 
substantial proposals backed by a wide consensus, would be badly perceived and might 
damage Poland's long-term credibility. Therefore, they chose to cooperate with the 
European institutions in order to keep the problems of the region high on the EU agenda 
and at the same time adopted a strategy of `small steps'. According to one external 
observer, this has contributed to an `Easternisation' of the CFSP (Lang, 2005: 1). As one 
diplomat explained, it was better to build-up a positive image of Poland and its 
contribution to external relations. 183 This has been also the recent strategy chosen for 
advocating the membership perspective for Ukraine (see next chapter). 
183 Interview (no. 45) 
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CHAPTER 5 
POLAND, TIIE EU AND POLICY TOWARDS UKRAINE 
Introduction 
Ukraine has been the-most important strategic partner for Poland in the East. For this 
reason, the Poles have been especially active in their dealings with the EU with regard to 
the Ukraine both before and after accession. Before accession, despite agreeing on the 
common strategy on Ukraine in 1999, the member states were not particularly concerned 
with developing stronger relations with that country. After enlargement, Ukraine started 
to appear much more often on the political agenda and the High Representative for the 
CFSP, together with the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania, marked the EU's presence in 
the region during the Orange Revolution. In spite of Polish diplomatic efforts, the 
potential of membership, which became a core of the EU-Ukraine relations, has remained 
a topic explicitly avoided in Brussels and currently kept strictly off the negotiating table. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy in 
the case of Polish and EU relations with Ukraine. First, the chapter provides some 
insights into the policy of the EU towards Ukraine. This will then allow for the 
subsequent analysis of the Polish position on the matter and role that Poland played in 
shaping the policy of the Union. The first section starts with a brief outline of EU- 
Ukraine relations. It focuses on two factors that seem most important at the moment: the 
divergence of interests among the member states and the recurring problem of the gap 
between Ukrainian expectations and what the EU is actually willing to put on the table. A 
more detailed account is then given of the most important Polish initiatives undertaken 
within EU circles to attempt an `upload' of Polish policy objectives. The cases chosen 
include Polish participation in the Orange Revolution and the subsequent advocacy of a 
strong European response to these events. Finally, the chapter moves on to examine the 
role of Poland in more recent developments, such as the decision to grant the Ukraine 
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Market Economy Status (MES) or the initial internal negotiations regarding the future 
New Enhanced Agreement and the Free Trade Area (FTA). On this basis, some 
conclusions are offered regarding the Europeanisation of Polish policy towards the 
Ukraine. 
The policy of the EU towards Ukraine 
The origins of EU-Ukraine political relations go back to 1991, to the time when Ukraine 
gained independence. 184 The first EC declaration on Ukraine was released on 2 
December, calling for constructive relations with the EC and mentioning the democratic 
referendum. The subsequent negotiations on the Agreement on Partnership and 
Cooperation (PCA) between Ukraine and the EU started in March 1993, and in October a 
Commission's Representation in Ukraine was opened. The issue of prospective 
membership became a sensitive focal point of the relations. This resulted in an immediate 
gap between the aspirations expressed by the Ukrainian side and the reluctance on the 
part of the EU to express anything specific about potential membership. Arguably, not 
much has changed with regard to this problem and it still produces tensions between the 
partners. 
Subsequently, the `Wider Europe' concept, discussed in the previous chapter, received a 
mixed response from Ukrainian officials, as it "unnecessarily limited [the EU-Ukraine 
relations] by the cooperation characterizing contacts with countries having no European 
prospects" (Perelyhin 2003: 13). The idea was thus criticized for mixing together the 
states that did not seek EU membership with those that, like Ukraine, expressed such 
aspirations. One of the Ukrainian politicians called it "restricting" rather than "widening" 
Europe (quoted in Kuzio, 2003: 6). The Ukrainians had hoped for a more privileged 
position, taking into account their clearly expressed aspirations to develop closer relations 
with the EU. The lack of a positive message regarding membership led the Ukrainian 
authorities, with President Leonid Kuchma in the lead, to play a somewhat `risky game'. 
184 The parliament of Ukraine declared independence on 24 August 1991. This was later confirmed in a 
national referendum held in December the same year with the result of 90.3% in favour (Kuzio, 2000: 1). 
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On the one hand, they used a strategy of attempting to blackmail the EU by saying that by 
not providing any clear signal on possible membership the EU might force Ukraine to 
turn back towards Russia. On the other hand, they tried to play over the Commission's 
head by discussing the negotiated documents with some individual member states and 
creating confusion at Council meetings and complicating the negotiation procedures. 185 
The most important agreement between the EU and Ukraine, the PCA, was signed in 
June 1994 and came into force, after considerable delay, in March 1998. At the same 
time, the first meetings of the Joint EU-Ukraine Committee took place in 1995, and in 
July the Ukrainians opened their Mission to the EC. The Action Plan on Ukraine was 
adopted by the Council on 6 December 1996 and the first EU-Ukraine Summit186 took 
place in Kiev in September 1997. In June 1998, Ukraine officially announced its 
intentions to become an Associate State to the EU, being the first state from the former 
Soviet Union to express such a wish. This declaration was acknowledged by the EU, 
which welcomed `Ukraine's European aspirations' and `pro-European choice' in the EU 
Common Strategy on Ukraine, adopted during the Helsinki Summit on 11 December 
1999. The strategy also spelled out three main objectives for the long-term partnership: 
emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Ukraine, governed by the rule 
of law and based on a market economy; cooperation between Ukraine and the EU on the 
maintenance of stability and security in Europe and the wider world; an increase in 
economic, political and cultural cooperation and cooperation in the fields of justice and 
home affairs (European Council, 1999). This fell short of Ukrainian expectations, since 
they were hoping for explicit recognition of their European choice and also a possible 
offer of prospective membership (Marples, 2000: 363; Wolczuk, 2004: 6). Furthermore, 
the EU developed a strategy towards Russia, very similar in terns of content, in order to 
emphasise its equal treatment of both countries (Kuzio, 2003: 19). 
185 Interview (no. 44) 
186 Such bilateral meetings take place once a year between the President of Ukraine and the EU Presidency, 
the President of the European Commission and the EU Iligh Representative for CFSP. The institutional 
framework of the EU-Ukraine relations also includes annual Co-operation Councils at the level of ministers 
and Commissioners, Co-operation Committees at the lower level of senior civil servants and the Sub- 
Committees at the level of experts. 
151 
The relations between the EU and Ukraine were disturbed again after 2000, when the so- 
called Gongadze case187 cast a shadow over President Kuchma. To make things even 
worse, in 2002, Ukraine was accused by the US of selling radar equipment to Iraq, which 
prompted the US to suspend its $56m aid. In relation to this development, Javier Solana 
emphasized the need to distinguish between the leadership of Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
people, admitting that "Ukraine is a fundamental country for the stability of Europe and 
we cannot close our eyes on that". 188 
In January 2004, the negotiations over the Ukraine Action Plan started in Kiev, 189 but six 
months later the Commission threatened that if Ukrainian elections were not to meet 
international democratic standards, it could well be removed from the `first wave' of 
seven countries to sign the Action Plans (Kelley, 2005). The talks finished in September, 
but due to the election crisis, the Action Plan was only adopted by GAERC in December 
and published by the Commission that same month. It included a list of `things to do' for 
the next three years, envisaged cooperation with regard to foreign and security policy, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), non-proliferation and disarmament, conflict- 
prevention and crisis-management. It was adopted by both sides on 21 February 2005, 
after the Orange Revolution at ministerial level during the EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council. 
In May 2004, the Commission issued a Strategy Paper outlining the ENP and a Country 
Report on Ukraine. It emphasized that "accession is not currently on the agenda for EU- 
Ukraine relations". 190 This again prompted criticism that the Union, although recognizing 
the European choice of Ukraine, did not "move to the next stage by accepting that 
Ukraine and other countries of the western CIS are eligible under Article 49 of the TEU 
to join the EU" (Kuzio, 2003: 5). In the discourse used by the Commission with regard to 
1871leorhiy Gongadze was a journalist who was killed in September 2000 and his death soon became a 
symbol of the pressure exerted by the Kuchma government on the free media. Some weeks after his death 
tapes were revealed suggesting the involvement of the Ukrainian President himself in the plot to kill the 
journalist (source: Radio Free Europe, http: //www. rferl. org/). 
188 BBC News, "Solana seeks Ukraine as a special case", 30 September 2002, (BBC, 2002). 
189 The Common Strategy was not prolonged for 2005. 
190 "EU-Ukraine relations: from co-operation to integration", Press Release, Delegation of the European 
Commission to Ukraine, Kyiv 25 November 2004. 
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the ENP and the prospect of membership, a new phrase appeared: "we offer a privileged 
form of partnership now, irrespective of the exact nature of future relationship with the 
EU" (Landabaru 2006; Ferrero-Waldner, 2006b). This issue explains the criticism 
coming from the Ukrainians towards the new policy - their country was grouped together 
with countries without any membership aspirations, such as Libya, Syria or Tunisia. 
Meanwhile, the EU was present in Ukraine during the crucial moments of its Orange 
Revolution that took place between November 2004 and January 2005. The events were 
prompted by allegations of fraud, during the elections held in November 2004, on the part 
of Leonid Kuchma, the president in office, and his candidate for the presidency Victor 
Yanukovych. The counter-candidate, Victor Yushchcnko, questioned the validity of the 
elections and called for civil action from the Ukrainian people. This started massive 
demonstrations in support of the `Orange' candidate, in various Ukrainian cities. The EU 
rejected the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections and subsequently 
sent its CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, to accompany the Presidents of Poland 
and Lithuania to assist the mediation between the two sides. As claimed by President 
Kwasniewski (2004), the EU presence was prompted also by the EU-Russia summit, 
taking place in the Hague just before the events in Ukraine. He believed that the EU was 
stunned by the inflexible position of Russia and hence, it was easier for him to convince 
Solana, who was initially reluctant, to become involved in events (also confirmed in: 
Wilson, 2005: 138). 
The role of the two Presidents and the High Representative was mainly to prevent the use 
of force and help to negotiate the process to organise the repeat of the presidential 
elections. The situation became more sensitive, as Russia officially accepted the outcome 
of the elections. Nonetheless, President Putin still sent his representative (Boris Gryzlov, 
the Speaker of the Russian State Duma) to take part in the talks. Overall, the mission 
ended in success, greatly contributing to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, which 
was expressed in the following words: "the EU intervention was effective because it 
occurred in an early stage, because it was unexpected, and because the Poles led a 
consensus that, with America's support, even spanned the Atlantic" (Wilson, 2005: 140). 
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Looking at the EU's response to what had happened in Ukraine, it is difficult to find any 
revolutionary changes after these events at the level of day-to-day relations. Many states 
in the West did not welcome the revolution with "open arms" (Wilson 2005: 190). The 
Action Plan, negotiated with the previous government, was adopted in its unchanged 
form by the EU on 21 February 2005. The same day the EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council took place and the Action Plan was also signed by Ukraine. In addition, the EU 
made a political gesture towards the new Ukrainian government. On the same day, during 
the GAERC meeting, the ministers decided to agree on the Conclusions, which included 
a ten-point plan regarding future relations with Ukraine (GAERC, 2005b). The text was 
based on a joint letter that was sent on 24 January by the High Representative and the 
Commissioner for External Relations and ENP Benita Ferrero - Waldner, addressed to 
Jean Asselborn, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg, who was holding the EU 
Presidency at that time. The GEARC Conclusions more or less repeated the ten points. 
Germany kept its reservation at the level of the Working Group (COEST) and COREPER 
(16 February), regarding visa facilitation and the re-admission agreement. It also 
emphasized that the EU was prepared to move quickly with aspects of the Action Plan, 
but the pace of progress depended on the Ukrainians themselves. From the new elements 
that were offered to Ukraine after the revolution, one may be singled out as particularly 
interesting for the CFSP - the possibility to align with some EU statements. However, 
important as it is for the Ukrainian side, the EU has offered such possibilities to a wide 
range of countries and in practical terms, it cannot be treated as a revolutionary offer. 
In 2005, the Commission listed its priorities towards Ukraine in the ENP framework 
under four categories: political reform (including fair and free elections in March 2006), 
combating corruption and engagement in solving the Transdniestrian conflict, trade and 
economic reform (WTO accession, improving the business climate and ensuring 
macroeconomic stability), justice, freedom and security (launching negotiations on visa 
facilitation and continuing talks on a readmission agreement) and sectoral issues (such as 
cooperation in the area of energy and nuclear safety) (European Commission, 2005: 10). 
At the same time, the Commission prepared a draft assessment of the implementation of 
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the Action Plan which was to be discussed by the Council. An important step forward, 
emphasized in the assessment, was the fact that the Ukrainians allowed for complete 
media freedom, freedom of expression and introduced a 10-point plan for solving the 
Transdniestrian problem. 19' The language used was generally positive, even though there 
were many areas where the Ukraine needed to make much more progress, such as in 
fighting widespread corruption and fulfilling the requirements to join the WTO. This, 
however, requires a political will from the Ukrainian Parliament to adopt the necessary 
legislation. Nonetheless, as an EU official claimed, for example in the field of CFSP, 
there has been definite progress - the Union was discussing with Ukraine the question of 
Belarus, Moldova and Russia, they agreed to international monitoring of the 
Transdniestrian border, and participation in ESDP missions. 192 Agreements were signed 
on crisis management missions and on the exchange of classified information and the EU 
assisted Ukraine in destroying Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) ammunition 
stockpiles (Solana, 2005). 
The structural factors and the institutional setting in which negotiations are conducted by 
the EU also exerted an influence on the final outcome. It is the Presidency, the Council 
Secretariat General and the Commission, who represented the interests of the 25 member 
states, having obtained a mandate from the Council. This usually does not allow for much 
room for manoeuvre during the negotiations. As an EU official claimed: 
"Each time we want to make a concession, we have to come back and go to the 
Council and it is almost as if we represent the interests of Ukraine. (... ) 
Sometimes we are willing to compromise, but at the same time you know you 
have to come back and sell it to each member state and each of them has 
electorate at home where it has to defend it. "193 
This may be interpreted as both a strength or a weakness of the institutional setting. At 
the negotiation tables, an argument that something `won't fly' in Brussels has been used 
191 Interview (no 37) 
192 Interview (no. 40) 
193 Interview (no. 40) 
155 
as an instrument to exert pressure on the negotiating partner. On the other hand, the 
document that is a result of negotiations between 25 member states is not very flexible 
and in this sense the EU is indeed in a different position to that of the Ukrainian 
government, which has more room for flexible changes. Apart from this, it is the EU and 
not the Ukraine, who prepares the first draft, and this puts it in a privileged position. 
The argument recently raised in the academic debate is that nothing less ambitious than 
EU membership can be an efficient tool when dealing with Ukraine (Smith, 2005: 768; 
Wolczuk, 2004,2005; Zagorski, 2004: 94). Similar criticism is directed by some 
academics and diplomats towards the Action Plan, which for the critics "is currently not a 
motivation strong enough to deepen EU-Ukraine relations" (Gromadzki and Suszko, 
2005: 11) and thus "will not serve as a sufficiently firm anchor for Ukrainian reform" 
(Wolczuk, 2005: 4). This is related to some basic underpinnings regarding the rule of 
conditionality, which assume that it will only work if the incentives are viewed by the 
elites of the targeted country as a valuable alternative, one strong enough to make them 
embark on the often risky road of reforms (Kubicek, 2005: 274). The issue of the 
desirability or the nature of incentives and the conditions that should be used by the EU 
in its relations with Ukraine, has become a central point of the debate in Brussels, even if 
it is sometimes explicitly avoided at the formal meetings. 194 
With the future of EU-Ukraine relations in mind, some observers argued that assessing 
the progress that Ukraine makes might be problematic. This is primarily due to ambiguity 
as to who is supposed to be carrying out certain actions envisaged in the plan, uncertainty 
to how such progress should be judged and the lack of a clear timetable (Smith, 2005: 
764-765). As demonstrated by Smith (2005: 765), the plan reflects to a large extent the 
EU's self interest. 195 This issue had been raised before by Ukrainian politicians as an 
194 One of the national representatives said the issue was so sensitive, that he has never sat in a meeting 
where a delegation would explicitly refer to the membership aspirations of Ukraine. I Iowever, certain states 
express their preference for being restrictive and not entering any new commitments (Interview, no. 33). 
195 Nonetheless, the argument that the Action Plan lacks 'joint ownership' because the EU insisted that 
Ukraine concludes readmission agreements and consults the latter on the possibilities for long-haul 
transport capacities is not necessarily reflected in practice. As claimed by two EU officials it was the 
Ukrainian side who insisted on including the reference to the latter in the text and the EU barely managed 
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example of Ukraine's ability to contribute to European security (see: Perelyhin 2003: 16). 
The Ukrainians argued for the short time frame for review of the Action Plan, as they 
hoped for reconsideration regarding their potential EU candidature (Kelly, 2005). 
There seems to be some confusion regarding the incentives used in the policy and their 
purpose, which brings chaos to the discussions. The view expressed by numerous actors 
in Brussels is that the whole debate is based on the wrong assumptions. As one diplomat 
put it: 
"I don't feel comfortable with the basic point of departure of talking about 
incentives to any third countries, as I feel that the rule of law, democracy, the 
respect for human rights is something that any stable Western government should 
work towards irrespective [of] whether they have any incentive. And I don't even 
know if the EU would like to have a member in which the respect for those would 
be dependent on these incentives, every country has to realize the value of them 
for themselves". 1 96 
There are also those states, like Poland, who remember the experiences of the CEECs and 
the success of applying the principle of conditionality, supported by strong `carrots'. 
They argue that the EU could foster domestic changes in Ukraine and the easiest way to 
do this would be to give a clear signal regarding the membership prospect, even on a 
long-tenn basis. A position somewhat in the middle is taken by those, who believe that 
there are also different incentives that the EU might successively employ, such as visa 
facilitation or free trade agreements. An example is set by the main incentive offered in 
the ENP, which is a stake in the internal market. This also seems to be a position closer to 
the technocratic approach of the EU institutions that often stress that the time has come 
for Ukraine to do its `homework' and conduct or necessary reforms. Apart from progress 
in areas such as freedom of media and expression, or in the dialogue relating to foreign 
policy and the commitment to solving the Transdnistrian problem, a lot still has to be 
to `water it down', as the Ukrainians insisted on including a phrase on EU-Ukrainian negotiations of the 
conditions for an agreement (Interviews no. 40 and 44). 196 Interview (no. 33) 
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done concerning issues like fighting corruption, improving the climate for business or 
fulfilling the conditions to join the WTO. 
The different positions outlined above might not, however, be as distant as it may seem. 
As one EU official noted, it all depends on what type of reforms are considered. As 
regards any broad democratic changes, the majority of the EU member states would agree 
that the Ukraine should be willing to introduce them by itself. Having said that, it is a 
different matter how these refonns would be shaped. If the EU wishes to influence them 
in a way that they would bring Ukraine closer to EU laws, standards and norms, then the 
use of incentives is also well argued for. For example, the EU values cooperation with 
Ukraine in the area of external relations, especially regarding its regional dimension or 
would like to foster common positions on international developments, such as those 
recently unfolding in the case of Iran. 197 
Preferences of the member states regarding the prospect of Ukrainian membership of 
the EU 
The EU is not a unitary actor in the area of CFSP and national foreign policies remain 
divergent. Therefore, in order to understand and analyse any policy of the Union towards 
any third country, it is indispensable to have a closer look at the individual member 
states, their priorities and interests. It is a commonly shared view by many Polish 
politicians and scholars alike that relations with Ukraine are often conditioned by the 
member states' bilateral contacts with Russia. This was captured by President 
Kwa§niewski, who said: "Previously there was a dilemma in many countries (... ) 
Moscow or Kiev? And some Western capitals have definitely chosen Moscow, regarding 
Kiev as a sphere of influence, (... ) but of secondary importance" (Kwa§niewski, 2004). 
This was echoed by the former Prime Minister, who claimed that there are some 
European leaders who would say in private: "when we are talking about the Ukrainian 
issues, you have to remember that for Russia, Ukraine is Russia" (Belka, 2005). On the 
other hand, it seems that apart from Poland and Lithuania, "most EU states have no well- 
197 Interview (no. 46) 
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defined historical attitude to Ukraine" (Wilson, 2005: 191). It will be analysed below 
whether the division is indeed so straightforward. There are some clear differences in 
priorities, as well as in short and medium policy goals. This is, however, notwithstanding 
the general consensus on the importance of promoting democracy and stability in the 
country, as a long-term, prevailing aim. As usual, the disagreement lies in the details and 
the means to achieve this goal. 198 
The prospect of membership for Ukraine has recently been kept off the negotiation table, 
after some efforts to promote it in the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution. 
Some member states, including Poland, are very interested in having Ukraine as a 
prospective EU member for several reasons. 199 Firstly, they would like to push the EU 
border further towards the East, as no country wishes to administer an EU external 
border. This is also connected to the geopolitical implications of preferring Ukraine 
inside the EU, rather than as a `buffer state' between the EU and Russia. Secondly, some 
member states, due to their historical experiences, feel more sympathetic to what had 
been happening in Ukraine and believe that prospective membership could provide a 
strong incentive to help the Ukrainians implement the necessary reforms. Among them 
are the new member states that still remember their own experiences with the transition 
after 1989 and the policy of conditionality used by the EU. 200 
There are also states that generally agree with the broad goal of future membership, but 
still "are not ready to push for it' . 201 They include for example some of the Scandinavian 
countries. There are also member states that admit it is almost inevitable that "in 50 years 
Ukraine becomes a member, but it is our job that we don't allow it in now, (... ) we 
cannot sell it to our electorate and it will give us a headache with other neighbours, like 
198 One of the obstacles to a coherent policy towards Ukraine seems to be the conduct of a dual-track policy 
by many member states, which behave differently within the EU to how they behave in bilateral relations 
with Ukraine. Even though the issue of prospective membership is currently kept off the table, as there are 
no chances of achieving unanimity, some EU officials admit that Ukraine still receives encouragement to 
ask for a membership from some member states' politicians. 
199 Interview (no. 40) 
200 Still, even in this case the prospective membership was not promised in the documents, such as the 
Association Agreement. 
201 Interview (no. 40) 
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Georgia, Moldova, Belarus". 202 The Southern member states203 are at the moment the 
most reluctant to discuss any further enlargement directed eastwards. One representative 
expressed his concerns that if Ukraine joined the EU, after the recent enlargement, this 
would further disturb the North-South balance inside the EU. 204 However, in this respect 
the further enlargement to Turkey is considered as a remedy by some. One representative 
expressed his "shock" that the new member states would start pressing for Ukrainian 
membership so soon after they joined the EU themselves. 205 
Poland is perceived as one of the most energetic supporters of closer relations between 
Ukraine and the EU. As some delegates from the old member states admit, together with 
Lithuania, it has played a key role in keeping Ukraine high on the EU agenda, since they 
started participating in CFSP206 Poland usually attempts to cooperate with the `like- 
minded' states, which include its Visegrad partners: Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary, the Scandinavian'and the Baltic States (especially Lithuania), United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Portugal. Sweden, supporting the Union's greater engagement in the Eastern 
region and its democratization, is one of the prospective partners for Poland when 
advocating Ukrainian future EU membership. At the moment, however, Swedish 
diplomats see such a development as a very distant prospect and do not wish to discuss it 
in any detail. 207 Portugal is also sometimes listed as being among the eleven member 
states in favour of developing a stronger relationship with Ukraine, because of its new 
community of workers from that country (Wilson, 2005: 191). Nonetheless, some 
diplomats claimed they did not observe this in practice, during the negotiations in the 
Council, at least not at the level of experts. 208 
There have been Polish - Genpan initiatives undertaken to date, such as a joint Polish- 
German non-paper presented by the two ministers of foreign affairs to their EU 
202 Interview (no. 40) 
203 The Southern States are sometimes referred to as the "Roman Empire" or "Club Med" and include 
France, Italy, Spain, associating Belgium, Portugal and Greece on some matters (Interview, no. 43). 
204 Interview (no. 38) 
205 Interview (no. 16) 
206 Interviews (no. 36,37,38,39,40) 
207 Interview (no. 26) 
209 Interview (no. 45) 
160 
counterparts in October 2004 or the Polish-German cooperation when Javier Solana and 
Benita Ferrero - Waldner spelt out their ten-point plan (which was discussed earlier in the 
chapter, p. 152). Informally, the German diplomats have encouraged the Poles to play a 
more active role in lobbying for the Union's involvement in the East. 209 Nonetheless, 
there are still differences between the two neighbours regarding, for example, visa 
facilitation issues or their relations with Russia. 
Undoubtedly, the negative results of the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France 
and the Netherlands also contributed to an overall reluctance to raise the issue of 
prospective membership for Ukraine. As one EU official directly expressed it, "they 
clearly took the enlargement off the table for the foreseeable future". 210 For example, 
former President of France, Jacques Chirac, already announced that any future 
enlargement of the EU would have to be the subject of a referendum in that country. One 
national representative claimed that the current political stance of many member states 
towards Ukraine is the result of being "super-tired of enlargement". 211 In the light of an 
evident lack of chances to achieve an agreement, the strategies of some newcomers, like 
Poland and Lithuania, indeed changed. They have played an active role in promoting 
Ukraine to Market Economy Status (MES), 212 they advocated the Union's support for 
Ukrainian WTO membership as well as prompt establishment of the Free Trade Area 
(FTA), they added 10 points to the Action Plan after the Orange Revolution and, more 
recently, lobbied in favour of adding new elements to the new enhanced agreement. 
Finally, the role of the EU institutional actors: the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat General (DG E) must be acknowledged, as the institutional settings provide 
them with some substantial powers. 213 The Commission has the privilege of drafting the 
209 Interview (no. 45) 
210 Interview (no. 44) 
211 Interviews (no. 42) 
212 With the reservations regarding this issue coming from Italy, France, Spain and Belgium, a compromise 
was finally agreed and the final text referred to the Commission granting the MES as opposed to the EU as 
such. Apart from the interested new member states, a greater role was also played by the British Presidency 
that pushed to achieve a consensus and closing the matter and the Commission. 
213 In addition, it should be noted that some preliminary empirical evidence points to the general increase of 
the coordinating role played by supranational actors in CFSP after the enlargement. This results, to a large 
extent, from a greater number of actors around the table. 
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agreements (or Action Plans) and to the extent that it has to ask the approval of the 
Council for any new versions, such a drafting right puts it in a stronger position than it is 
usually the case in foreign policy in its traditional meaning. 214 Furthermore, together with 
the Council Secretariat General, it conducts the negotiations with the Ukrainians, bound 
by the mandate granted by the member states. The approach of these actors is 
technocratic, underpinned by the basic belief that via the necessary, often incremental 
changes, Ukraine will inevitably come closer to the EU and fulfil the membership 
criteria. An example of this stance was the position taken by the Commission, after. the 
Orange Revolution. It refused to re-negotiate the Action Plan with the new government, 
on the grounds that the reforms were already there, regardless of which government was 
in charge of implementation. Hence, the Action Plan was signed without any alterations. 
As a rather political gesture, without any crucial changes introduced, the main incentives 
were emphasized in the 10 points spelled out in the text of the GAERC Conclusions in 
February 2005 (GAERC, 2005b). 
The last point to be made with regard to the different policies of the member states is that 
occasionally different views are presented by their representatives on a bilateral basis. 
This is a potential threat to the effectiveness of the EU and has been pointed out as a 
problem - particularly by officials from EU institutions. For example, in the official 
declarations of the new member states, there is a clear advocacy of prompt Ukrainian 
accession. Moreover, the French foreign minister expressed his support for granting 
Ukraine the status of a Free Market Economy at precisely the time that his representative 
in the Council was halting an agreement on this matter. 215 The issue of coherence is 
further complicated by the fact that there are often diverging interests within the member 
states themselves, depending on the ministry involved, for example, the Polish MFA may 
have a different view regarding any possible agreement with Ukraine than the Ministry of 
Agriculture or Internal Affairs. Overall, however, it has been noted by several members 
214 As one representative put it, the fact that the Commission is in charge of drafting the agreement is 
beneficial, since if was it up to the member states, there is a high chance there would be no draft at all 
(Interview, no. 45). 
eis As reported in the interviews this happened when the French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy 
claimed, while visiting Kiev, that Ukraine fulfilled the criteria to receive the MES. Reported in media 
coverage of the visit, for example: http: //www. finanznachrichten. de/nachrichten-2005-11/artikel- 
1981733. asp or http: //www. eubusiness. com/East_Europe/051111145119. lvkeOz9g 
162 
of the COEST Working Group that the consensus on technical matters is progressively 
achieved without major obstacles. 
This section of the chapter introduced the general policy of the EU towards Ukraine and 
outlined the main differences between the member states regarding certain issues in the 
EU-Ukrainian relations. This was necessary in order to place Poland in the picture and 
identify any changes its membership might have caused ('uploading') on the one hand 
and the impact that the EU's policy had on the Polish approach to Ukraine 
('downloading') on the other. This is done in the following section of this chapter. 
Poland and the EU's policy towards Ukraine 
Polish policy towards Ukraine is determined by the fact that the latter is Poland's 
immediate neighbour, thus, as in the case of Belarus, Poland's view of EU-Ukrainian 
relations differs from those of some other member states. Ukraine has always played a 
special role in Polish foreign policy. Its importance was emphasized by politicians and 
scholars, especially in terns of its geopolitical location (sec, for example, Samuel 
Huntington's thesis in "Clash of Civilizations", 1996, or Zbignicw Brzezinski in "The 
Grand Chessboard", 1997). In fact, Polish policy towards Ukraine was predominantly 
built upon these geopolitical assumptions and the perceived necessity to counter-balance 
Russia in the region, or of "repelling neo-imperial tendencies (real or perceived) on the 
other side of its eastern border" (Lang, 2005: 1). This thesis was evident in a recent 
claim by President Aleksander Kwasniewski (2004), who stated, using quite direct 
language, that Russia was re-claiming its geopolitical role in the world, "but why should 
it also re-gain 50 million Ukrainians? ". He also added that this was not only the Polish 
perspective, but that it was also shared by the United States. At the same time, it has been 
pointed out that any potential alliance between post-communist Poland and Ukraine 
would include the population of more than 80 million people (Prizel, 1995: 114). 
The relations between the two neighbours suffered from a lack of dynamics at the 
beginning of the 1990's. Even though the Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka 
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announced in August 1993 that the `strategic partnership' with Ukraine was one of the 
priorities of Polish foreign policy (Menkiszak and Piotrowski, 2002: 221), in practical 
terms trade and economic cooperation lacked clear progress (Pavliuk, 1999: 193). 
Additionally, Poland was at that time seeking NATO membership and trying to improve 
its relations with Moscow. This contributed to a growing distance between the two 
neighbours, as any closer engagement with Kiev could hamper Poland's strategic goals 
(Menkiszak and Piotrowski, 2002: 189-190). Until 1994-1995 Polish policy towards 
Ukraine mainly featured formal declarations, lacking any true substance (Wolczuk, 
2001). 
However, after the stagnation of 1993-1994, relations between the two neighbours gained 
a new impetus in the mid-1990's. Around that time, a `Polish doctrine on Ukraine' 
emerged, which was based on a few underlying elements. Poland recognised Ukraine as a 
key state for stability in Eastern Europe and acknowledged its importance as a transit 
state for gas and oil supplies. Thus, it was to support its NATO and EU accession 
(Herranz and Natorski, 2006: 7). In practical teens, this policy led to successful lobbying 
for Ukraine's membership of the Council of Europe (1995) and participation in the 
Central European Initiative of 1996 (Pavliuk, 1999: 194). At the sane time, on various 
occasions, Russia expressed its discontent with Polish involvement in Ukrainian affairs. 
When the relations between the EU and Ukraine suffered because of the policy pursued 
by Kuchma (especially the Gongadze case in November 2000), Poland still maintained 
good contacts with the Ukrainian regime and attempted to weaken any authoritarian 
actions in the last year of Kuchma'a office. This was in line with the principle that Poland 
needed to retain proper relations with its strategic partner, regardless of which party was 
in power. Thanks to those contacts, the successful mediation of Polish politicians, in 
particular President Aleksander Kwasniewski, was possible during the Orange 
Revolution. Furthermore, the vital role of Polish politicians during the events proved their 
importance to Ukrainian foreign policy (Wilson, 2005: 192; Schneider and Saurcnbach, 
2005: 3). 
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The overall relations between the two neighbours have been captured by a phrase used in 
the Joint Declaration by the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine from 1996 (quoted in 
Pavliuk, 1999: 199): "The existence of an independent Ukraine helps to consolidate 
Polish independence, while the existence of an independent Poland helps to consolidate 
Ukrainian independence". The same document identified the relations between the two 
states as a `strategic partnership'. In March 2005, the Polish MFA offered to provide 
expert assistance to Ukraine, aimed at establishing democratic institutions, by using 
Polish experiences in this field (Rotfeld, 2005). Intense Polish-Ukrainian consultations 
took place regarding international issues, for example joint participation in a Kosovo 
mission216 and sending troops to Iraq (Herranz and Natorski, 2006: 8). 
Polish interests regarding Ukraine in the EU 
Considering Polish policy within the EU with relation to Ukraine, one can see that the 
main ideas were already expressed in the MFA's non-paper from 2003. Nonetheless, in 
the period of three years (2003 - 2006), there was a shill in the positions and strategies 
adopted by the Polish diplomats during the internal negotiations in the Council. In the 
very beginning, starting from the end of the active observer period, Poland was eager to 
speak about the necessity of giving Ukraine prospective tnctnbership. This became 
especially intense after the Orange Revolution in December 2004. As shown in the 
previous chapter, that period was characterised by intensive (institutional) learning and 
socialisation. It is argued here that the failure to `upload' the most important goals in the 
beginning of 2005, despite the positive role that Poland played in the events in Ukraine, 
contributed to changes in Polish strategy. Combined with Polish diplomats discovering 
the rules of consensus and information-sharing during the period that Poland was an 
active observer, it caused a pragmatic shift in the Polish approach. Such change is visible 
when comparing the negotiations over the declaration following the revolution with the 
negotiations over the ten points added to the Action Plan (January 2005) and the 
216 530 Polish soldiers and 260 Ukrainian ones formed a battalion that contributed to the NATO-led mission 
in Kosovo (Pavliuk, 2000: 15). 
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negotiations over signing a New Enhanced Agreement (which began in February 2006). 
These will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Advocating EU membership for Ukraine 
The long-term strategic goal of endorsing Ukrainian EU membership underlines Polish 
policy inside the EU. Support for Ukraine's EU aspirations was indicated in the most 
recent Polish National Security Strategy (MFA, 2003b), which stated that "[i]n 
recognising Ukraine's importance for the European security and supporting it's European 
aspirations, Poland will make its best to fill with real substance the formula of strategic 
partnership with that country". This is closely related to `upgrading' the level of EU- 
Ukraine relations. Even prior to joining the EU Poland, in its non-paper of 2003, had 
been advocating the intensification of the EU-Ukraine dialogue to the level that the EU 
had with Russia. As an official from the Polish MFA claimed: "It is true that Russia 
wished to be treated differently and we have no problems with that. But, we would not 
like to see a country such as Ukraine being treated worse, when it comes, for example, to 
regional or economic policies". 217 The non-paper also identified an important strategic 
goal of Polish foreign policy: facilitation of prospective Ukrainian EU membership and 
for the time being proposed that the existing agreement with Ukraine be upgraded to an 
Association Agreement. As stated by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs: "without 
such a prospect [Ukrainians] would be devoid of perhaps the strongest possible incentive 
to pursue further difficult reforms" (Cimoszewicz, 2003). As will be shown later, this 
goal was first advocated and then `shelved' until the right occasion, which was identified 
as the negotiations over the new enhanced agreement and the PCA in 2006. 
The official Polish position states that Ukraine should be allowed to negotiate its entry to 
the EU "as soon as it is ready to do so. "218 Poland does not consider the condition of the 
Union's capability to accommodate the new member as necessarily, contrary to, for 
example, the position of France. As Polish diplomats argue, such a condition was not 
217 Interview (no. 5) 
218 Interview (no. 26) 
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required when the decision of Polish accession had been taken, and the internal reforms 
in Ukraine could always follow the political decision to enlarge the EU. The membership 
prospect of Ukraine is considered as potentially a very effective incentive for internal 
reforms and the example used frequently to support this is the fact that such strategy 
worked in the case of the CEECs and the Western Balkans. It is also argued that the 
reforms have already started in Ukraine, especially relating to the democratization of the 
public sphere, and the freedom of the media. Taking into account such Polish positions, it 
becomes apparent that the introduction of the ENP, grouping Ukraine with the states 
without membership aspirations, was not warmly welcomed by the Poles. This is why 
any possible end or substantial transformation of the ENP, allowing for more privileged 
relations with Ukraine, would be appreciated by the Polish side. 
It should also be mentioned that Poland has been conducting something of a `dual' policy 
towards its Eastern neighbour. MFA officials and diplomats within EU circles presented 
different positions to those often expressed by high-level politicians in bilateral relations. 
Bilaterally, Poland is portraying itself as a very strong supporter of Ukrainian EU 
membership. For example, the newly elected President Lech Kaczyliski, during his visit 
to Ukraine between 28 February and I March 2006, declared that he would advocate on 
behalf of Poland Ukrainian interests in relation to NATO and the EU. 219 Ile has also 
expressed his support for the `Orange Coalition' in the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections220 (the EU, in principle does not support any concrete parties or persons, just 
democratic processes and fair elections). At the same time, in the internal meetings 
within the Council, Poland accepted for the moment that the prospect of Ukrainian EU 
membership would not raised in any formal discussions. As such, it is also not trying to 
exert pressure to put this point on the agenda. Polish diplomats acknowledged that it is 
not in the long-term interest of the state to present radical positions that have no chance 
of being accepted by the other member states. This may serve as a proof of 
Europeanisation as regards behavioural norms, but does not support the argument of 
219 
, L. Kaczynski: Polska rzecznikiem Ukrainy", PAP, 
Gazeta Wyborcza on-line, 28.02.06, www. gazeta. pl 220 EuroPAP: Wizyta Prezydenta Kaczynskiego na Ukrainie, 01.03.06, www. euro. pap. pl. 
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change in the case of a vital national interest. In sum, national adaptation takes place here 
but rather in terms of a shift in strategies than a shift in perceived interests. 
The initially strong Polish statements regarding future Ukrainian EU membership were 
provocative to some other EU member states. This led to the Presidencies merely noting 
the radical position that did not follow the consensus, and which would then be 
"forgotten". 221 It was acknowledged by the Polish decision-makers that there was strong 
opposition to such proposals within the Council. They repeatedly made attempts to refer 
to European norms and interests. As one Polish diplomat explained: "Here, in the 
institutions, there is a specific language being used, which is not the case in bilateral 
relations. "222 At the same time, the Poles started to promote their ideas regarding Ukraine 
at various different levels of the decision-making process in the Council (from the lower 
experts' level of COEST to the higher levels of the Ambassadors in COREPER II and the 
Ministers in GAERC), bilaterally (for example assigning the task to Polish embassies in 
the EU member states or during the talks of the Minster of Foreign Affairs with the 
Commissioner for external relations or High Representative Solana) or other multilateral 
organisations (e. g. within the regional organisations such as the Visegrad Group). Still, it 
seems that these efforts were always primarily aimed at the `like-minded' countries that 
were already positively responding to Polish initiatives. The discussions with the 
countries of different preferences were still not given enough importance and attention. 
Visa regime: an example of circular Europeanisation 
Even though visa issues have traditionally been treated as part of third-pillar policies in 
the EU (now partially communitarised), they are very closely related to foreign policy 
and often used as its instrument. Hence, an important change in the overall Polish- 
Ukrainian relations was due to Poland's obligation to introduce a new, stricter visa 
regime once it joined the EU. Prior to the accession the movement of people between the 
two states was visa-free. The border-regime had to become more restricted due to the 
221 Interview (no. 23) 
222 Interview (no. 23) 
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entry requirement of harmonising the visa policy with that of the EU. In this perspective, 
the introduction of visas for Ukrainian citizens in October 2003 was seen as having 
potentially negative consequences for Polish-Ukrainian relations and hence the Poles 
delayed introducing the measure (Herranz and Natorski, 2006: 12-13). 
Subsequently, one of the major Polish goals to be `uploaded' to the EU level was the 
facilitation of this visa regime with Ukraine, which was perceived as an instrument of the 
"Europeanisation of Ukraine" (Fierranz and Natorski, 2006: 14). As claimed by one 
Polish diplomat, Poland was trying to convince its European partners that Ukrainian 
citizens should be allowed to benefit from at least as much consideration in visa regimes 
as the Russians (EuroPAP, 2005). Some Polish experts argued that the EU should have 
already introduced free visas for Ukrainians in the aftermath of the Orange revolution 
(Zurawski vel Grajewski, 2007: 82). This is yet another example of Poland trying to 
counterbalance EU - Russia relations with the EU - Ukraine relationship. 
The example of the visa regime shows the circular nature of the process of 
Europeanisation. First, even though it was perceived as harmful for Polish foreign policy, 
Poland had to introduce adjustments to its visa regime. This action was caused by strong 
adaptational pressures from the EU, as any non-compliance could endanger or at least 
delay the whole project of EU accession. However, as soon as Poland joined the Union, 
itstarted a campaign in order to `repair the damage' and to reduce the costly misfit. The 
first successes in this field were noted in April 2006, when the EU decided that the 
member states were free to exempt Ukrainians from the Sehengen visa fees. 
Working with the EU at the time of the Orange Revolution 
The unexpected events in Ukraine, prompted by the presidential elections in November 
2004 proved to be the first real test of whether Polish decision-makers would decide to 
take part in events on just a bilateral basis or whether they would go to Ukraine `with 
Europe'. It ought to be recalled that Europeanisation is usually least expected in relation 
to countries or issues of special national importance for the member states. There are 
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examples of `ring-fencing' (not involving the EU in the matters) or in other words, 
retaining the issues as `domaines reserve' (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 11 and 266). 
This could be expected to happen with Polish-Ukrainian relations and particularly in 
relation to the way that Poland chose to deal with the Orange Revolution. Such `ring- 
fencing' would be an argument against the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy. This 
section of the chapter analyses whether one can find traces of Europeanisation in the case 
of the Orange Revolution. It is discussed here in two parts. The first one provides a brief 
background of the role played by Poland and the EU. The second part refers to the 
European response to the developments in Ukraine. It analyses the diplomatic initiatives 
undertaken by Poland in order to influence the final outcome of the EU's policy. 
For more than a decade, Poland had established good contacts in Ukraine, including 
advisors to political parties and therefore had access to reliable and updated information 
from the region. President Aleksander Kwagniewski was asked to facilitate the talks by 
both sides of the 'Orange' conflict on 23 November 2004 (Kwa§nicwski, 2004). He went 
to Ukraine at the request of President Leonid Kuchma and Victor Yuschcnko, with a 
three-fold mandate: finding the right formula to repeat the elections, conduct a political 
dialogue and achieve a full renunciation of the use of force (Kwagniewski, 2005). 
Incidentally, Kuchma owed Kwasniewski a favour, as the latter continued to talk to him 
during the infamous Gongadze-gate (Wilson, 2005: 138). Later, the Polish President 
made a famous phone-call to Javier Solana and convinced him to get involved in 
Ukraine. 223 The High Representative held emergency meetings with the member states to 
learn about their approach to the situation. Generally, as one official claimed, 224 Solana is 
trusted by the EU member states and hence his participation in the mission was a kind of 
assurance for the member states of a balanced approach. Apparently, some 
representatives feared that the new member states would chose to act less as mediators 
instead favouring one of the parties involved. 
223 Interview (no. 40) 
224 Interview (no. 40) 
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During the events, Solana was very careful not to be perceived as a mediator, but as a 
facilitator for discussions. Together with the two Heads of States from the new member 
states, Kwasniewski and the President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus, Solana played an 
important role in the negotiations. Many Polish politicians became involved in Ukraine, 
in support of Yuschenko, like the former president and Nobel price winner Lech Walesa, 
who delivered a passionate speech to the Ukrainian crowds on 25 November and is also 
believed to have played a conciliatory role in informal talks (Wilson, 2005: 138). 
In his account of the events, Kwasniewski (2005) emphasised the importance of the 
personal contacts he established among the Ukrainian politicians from both sides 
involved in the conflict. lie was reported as saying: "During the nine years of my 
presidency, I got to know all those personalities. (... ) They were convinced that I was the 
only one who was able to solve the conflict" (Normann, 2007: 171). He claimed that 
thanks to this, he was able to request that the miners be allowed to walk through the city 
of Kiev. This is confirmed by the account of the events given by Wilson (2005: 139), 
with a comment that the Polish president was able to call practically any Ukrainian 
politician, due to his excellent contacts in that country. During the revolution, 
Kwasniewski held phone conversations, seeking and ensuring the support of George 
Bush, Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schroeder, the President of the European Council, at the 
time Jan Peter Balkenende, and Tony Blair. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski provided an important answer to why he decided to play a more 
moderate role and why Poland made such a great effort in order to engage the EU high 
Representative Solana in Ukraine. He asserted: 
"The Polish contribution, conducted without any restrictions, could lead to the 
situation when the world would consider the idea of re-running the elections as 
the Polish action. This is why it was so important to involve Adamkus, Solana and 
the representatives of Russia and the OSCE in the mediation". 
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He also gave another explanation: 
"I was trying to give the whole affair a European significance and not only a 
Polish one. For Poland it was risky to take sides in a conflict with Russia here, 
Poland over there, Ukraine in the middle, with the splendid isolation of the EU. 
Therefore, without any delay, I started talks with the High Representative Solana, 
our MEPs exerted pressure and he understood he had to act" (Kwagniewski, 
2004). 
In light of the above, the willingness to `internationalise' the events in Ukraine and 
involve the EU, may be understood in different ways. First, the involvement of the EU 
was perceived as a `legitimising' factor for Polish national foreign policy. As the EU 
became involved, the Polish action could no longer be perceived as the mere pursuit of 
Polish geo-strategic goals. The Poles used the EU as an `extension' to pursue a policy 
strategic to its national security. At the same time, however, they intended to raise their 
profile within the EU. 
As Kwasniewski explained (2005), even though some member states were irritated that 
Poland supported the Ukrainian case so strongly, at least they appreciated that Poland 
was "not just one of the new member states that was busy only arranging its offices in 
Brussels - they also knew how to behave in this new environment". Such perception was 
confirmed not only by external observers (e. g. Schneider and Saurenbach, 2005: 3) but 
also by a diplomat from a much lower level of decision-making, the Polish expert from 
the Council Working Group (COEST). This clearly shows that `uploading' was an 
important matter for the Poles in the case of Ukraine and the Orange Revolution. The EU 
was perceived by decision-makers as an important forum in which to raise the problem, 
instead of just dealing with it at the national level and this is an important element in the 
Europeanisation process. It also proves, once again, that Poland had great ambitions to be 
an important `player' in the EU's policy towards the East. 
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The expert from COEST also claimed that Polish participation during the Orange 
Revolution gained him some credit within the group and he found it easier to 
communicate his ideas, which would usually gain *increased attention. 225 On the other 
hand, Poland was criticised by some of the smaller member states, such as the Visegrad 
partners, who complained that they were not consulted by President Kwagniewski on his 
activities in Ukraine (Roth, 2007a: 102). This demonstrated the weakness of Poland as a 
prospective leader of a coalition of states, advocating for example EU membership for 
Ukraine and it may be seen as a potential obstacle to effective Polish `uploading'. 
Establishing the working link between working within the EU and developing their own 
national policy may well have reaffirmed the already prevailing belief among the Polish 
officials that the CFSP should be treated as an opportunity for national foreign policy. In 
this regard, as asserted by Geoffrey Edwards (2006), "the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
was a turning point, leading many CEECs to take the CFSP and the High Representatives 
seriously". 
European response to the Orange Revolution 
After the success of the Orange Revolution, the EU welcomed the election of the new 
President and stressed its "full support for President Yushchcnko and the Ukrainian 
people", claiming it was "pleased at the extensive and ambitious political reforms" 
(GAERC, 2005a). Still, it became apparent that "a large part of the EU (... ) seemed 
detennined that nothing had changed" (Wilson, 2005: 190). When drafting the text, first 
at the level of the Working Group (COEST) as usual, some representatives wanted to 
express gratitude to the parties involved, like the High Representative Solana and the 
relevant international organizations. The Polish delegation wished to have the name of 
President Kwasniewski mentioned as well, which in turn prompted other delegations, like 
the Lithuanians, to have their representatives included in the text. The Poles raised the 
issue at the higher level of COREPER II, which was not well received by several other 
225 Interview (no. 23) 
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delegations and EU officials. 226 As one of them claimed: "I think it would have probably 
been wiser not to push for any names there. Poland never pushed for a lie, it is true, but 
probably it would have been better if they had played a bit less. (... ) I would imagine you 
learn with time and another time there would be a different reaction". 227 Eventually, the 
references did not appear in the final text. 
As a direct aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the Poles and Lithuanians tried to pursue 
their long-term strategic goal and bring the issue of prospective membership for Ukraine 
to the EU table. As early as December 2004, the Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz called for making a clear membership offer to Ukraine (Roth, 2007b: 57). 
However, the idea still had too few supporters within the EU and therefore could not be 
implemented. Even though most reactions to the Polish role were positive, there were 
those who accused the Poles yet again, of "revanchism in Europe" (Normann, 2007: 171) 
and "acting under the US influence", as the President of the European Parliament put it in 
private (Wilson, 2005: 190). 
The Action Plan with Ukraine had been negotiated before the Orange Revolution took 
place. The new government, therefore, was reluctant to sign it for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, because it had been negotiated by the old government and secondly, because they 
were hoping to include the clause relating to prospective membership. Polish diplomats 
were actively promoting an idea that the EU should change the Action Plan and create the 
so-called `Action Plan PLUS' and so deliver a stronger message to the Ukrainians. As 
claimed by President Kwasniewski (2005) in January: "The Action Plan has to be more 
courageous and contain a date when the EU could start talks about the prospective 
accession of Ukraine". Nonetheless, the Commission took a firn stand that there would 
be no re-negotiations taking place, as the refonns included in the Action Plan had to be 
introduced by any government in power. Polish diplomats claimed that they had played 
an active part in convincing their Ukrainian colleagues that they should agree to what was 
being put on the table, as there was nothing more to be gained at that moment. This is 
226 Interviews (no. 18 and 40) 
227 Interview (no. 40) 
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another aspect of the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy and the new role for its 
diplomats, acting as advocates for European approach towards third countries. 
In its Conclusions the Council used a phrase that had often been used in the past and it 
acknowledged "Ukraine's European aspirations", welcoming "Ukraine's European 
choice" (GAERC, 2004b: 14). It did not go as far as was suggested in the joint German- 
Polish-Lithuanian document from January (Gromadzki et al, 2005: 15). Nonetheless, 
Poland was satisfied that the phrase was finally kept in the text, even though this was in 
cautious language. Some reservations were expressed by the delegations of Spain, 
Portugal and France. Polish proposals went even further, proposing the building of deep 
and intensive relations with Ukraine. However, even this position did not find initial 
support among the other member states, and was finally moved to the end of the text. The 
last point of the Conclusion was also added after the Polish input and referred to 
providing assistance to Ukraine through the relevant instruments "in order to help to 
pursue the reform process". Overall, the ten points were not very innovative when it came 
to substance and each of them was connected to the Action Plan itself. 228 The 
significance of adopting the points was rather political, a gesture on the part of the EU 
towards the new Ukrainian President. 
The `small steps' approach and negotiating the New Enhanced Agreement 
After the failure to launch a powerful European response to the Orange Revolution, 
Poland has accepted that prospect of Ukrainian EU membership was off the table and it 
seemed that the strategy of `small steps' and active promotion of medium-terns goals 
prevailed. The strategic goal of future Ukrainian EU membership, as defined in the non- 
paper from 2003 (MFA, 2003a), still remained unchanged, but the Polish side did not 
want to irritate its European partners and was waiting for the right moment to bring the 
issue back to the discussions. As one EU official expressed it: 
228 Even though some authors would disagree with this claim. They argued for their relative significance 
and called for including them into a long-term framework (Gromadzki and Suszko, 2005: 14). 
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"those pushing for membership for Ukraine noticed that if they come to the 
meeting and say let's grant membership then nothing happens; but if they come 
and say, let's engage in building up a free trade area, let's try to do enhanced 
agreement, slowly, slowly, things move ahead". 229 
This proves that there has been a shift in the strategies, caused by unsuccessful previous 
initiatives and a Polish acknowledgment of the prevailing rules of negotiations and 
lobbying for one's interests in Brussels. Once again, one can observe Europeanisation in 
the domain of behaviour rather than strategic goals of national foreign policy. 
Meanwhile, at the beginning of 2005, the following main aims could be identified in the 
strategy of Polish diplomacy: promoting the strengthening of the political and security 
dialogue between the EU and Ukraine; support for granting Ukraine MES status as soon 
as possible; launching negotiations on the FTA and the new agrecinent that would in time 
replace the PCA, and advocating visa-facilitation. The FTA, according to the Polish view, 
should slowly prepare the Ukrainian side for participation in the common market. 
One of these points, granting Ukraine MES status, was successfully concluded at the end 
of the British Presidency in December 2005. The efforts of Poland, alongside other new 
member states, were also supported by the active'position of the UK Presidency and the 
Commission, who pushed for achieving consensus and a prompt closure. At the last stage 
of the negotiations, reservations were made by the delegations of Italy, France, Spain and 
Belgium. A compromise was agreed so that the final text would refer to the EU and not 
the member states granting MES status. The Polish representative remained in close 
contact with Warsaw, convincing the capital that such a consensus was worth 
accepting. 230 
229 Interview (no. 40) 
230 Interviews (no. 23 and 45) 
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At the beginning of 2006, the talks at expert level in COEST focused on the issue of 
negotiating a new, enhanced agreement with the Ukrainians. As stated in the Council 
Conclusions from 21 February 2005, the EU would 
"initiate early consultations on an enhanced agreement between EU and Ukraine, 
to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement at the end of its initial ten- 
year period, as soon as the political priorities of the Action Plan have been 
addressed" (GAERC, 2005b). 
As it happened, the Ukrainian parliamentary elections in March lived up to the 
international standards and thus opened the way to negotiations on the new agreement. 
The document, as usual, was to be drafted by the Commission. Even before it was put on 
the table, the member states expressed their ideas and doubts as to its future nature. The 
Poles took a very active part in the discussions. The Polish representative was the first 
one to speak of the possibility of calling the new document an Association Agreement. 
The bottom line of Polish diplomacy was at least to achieve a reference in the text to 
article 49 of the EU Treaty. 231 Once again, the Poles decided to give up on the more 
straightforward push for European membership in the negotiations, considering the 
political atmosphere was not right and thus, the possibilities of consensus on the matter 
close to zero. 232 
It soon turned out, that even a modest proposal was difficult to argue for233 and did not 
receive much support. Apparently, in such circumstances, the bottom line was lowered 
even further, and the Poles wanted to make sure that there would be no wording in the 
new agreement pointing to the fact that enlargement was not on the agenda. They also 
raised an argument that if the EU did not offer anything new to Ukraine, the latter could 
refuse to sign the document altogether. The FTA was included in the PCA, so the new 
agreement would not be adding this important new element. They also insisted that the 
231 Interview (no. 45) 
232 Interview (no. 45) 
233 Interview (no. 46) 
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new agreement contained the commitment to common values, such as democracy and 
rule of law, good governance, respect for human and minority rights, as well as a market 
economy and sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, the issue of prospective membership did come up at this early stage of the 
talks, but it was brought up not by the Poles but by a delegation of another new member 
state (Slovakia). It was not only not backed by the Poles, for the reasons explained above, 
but also caused some mild irritation among the Polish diplomats, as the initiative was 
perceived as potentially harmful for the long-term goal and unnecessarily irritating for 
some other member states. This indicates a very clear shift in strategies, bearing in mind 
the fact that the long-term interest of bringing Ukraine to the EU remained unchanged. 
Another issue raised by the Poles, also in bilateral talks with the Ukrainian side, was the 
necessity to `get out of the ENP', as the framework did not live up to the expectations of 
a country with European membership aspirations. The Action Plan was thus criticized for 
not containing enough substance. 
Conclusions: first successes with policy `uploading' in the case of Ukraine 
Since Poland joined the EU, policy towards Ukraine has remained the focal point of 
Polish interest in the East. As a matter of utmost importance for the country's security 
and bilateral relations, one could doubt whether this policy would ever become a subject 
of Europeanisation processes. There are examples in the literature of the policies which 
have been `ring-fenced' by the member states as special relationships or policies that 
simply should not be raised within EU circles (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 11). 
The Ukrainian case has shown the shift in the strategies and the behaviour of Polish 
diplomats. In the beginning they spoke strongly in favour of Ukrainian membership, but 
quickly discovered that this was not the right `way-of-doing-things' in the Council. Their 
radical positions were not `taken on board' by the Presidencies. Therefore, instead of 
pushing for the policies that were unacceptable to some EU member states (like the 
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membership perspective for Ukraine), they found the ways to build coalitions of `like- 
minded states' but also to cooperate with the institutions. As one of the diplomats stated: 
"We have now learnt that there is a general line that is presented by the 
Secretariat General. Also the Commission has its internal plan regarding Ukraine. 
Now, the game is to convince the other states not to put a halt to these plans. Our 
role is to support the institutions that arc acting in our interest and not to sell our 
foreign policy as a separate dossier". 234 
This was only possible after the enlargement and could partly explain the failure to 
launch the Eastern dimension (or at least its main ideas) with more success earlier. 
Polish participation in the Orange Revolution was notably the biggest success of its 
Eastern policy to date. However, the aftermath remains a mixed record for the Poles with 
a rather disillusioning experience of not being able to convince their partners to grant 
Ukraine the prospect of membership. It was also a painful lesson of the way in which 
foreign policy is made in Brussels - as long as there were states opposing any Polish 
initiative, it would not have any chances of success. At the same time, events showed 
how the CFSP was perceived by the Polish elites and how they tried to use it in pursuit of 
national policy goals. The public discourse reveals the belief that the European platform 
can provide legitimacy and sometimes also `weight' to the national policy. Even though, 
as shown by the example of Ukraine, it comes with the cost of coin promising one's own 
goals, the trade-off was perceived as worth accepting. 
2-34 Interview (no. 23) 
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CIIAPTER 6 
POLAND, THE EU AND POLICY TOWARDS II; LARUS 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the analysis of the Europeanisation of the substance of Polish 
foreign policy. In order to identify change and possible Polish influence on EU policy 
towards Belarus, the chapter begins with an analysis of the policy that the Union and its 
member states have pursued towards Belarus. It emphasises the following two aspects: a 
historical outline of the relationship and an analysis of the policy goals that the EU 
member states have been able to agree on, as well as those where divergence still persists. 
This serves the objective of providing the context to the more detailed analysis of the 
Polish role in EU relations with Belarus that follows in the second part of the chapter. 
This is where the changes that Poland had to introduce prior to enlargement (national 
adaptation) are discussed followed by an analysis of the stance that Poland took towards 
the EU's Belarus policy once it became a member of the EU. The focus in the second part 
of the chapter is on a few chosen examples: the official EU policy on contacts with the 
Belarusian government discussed in November 2004 including the question of a visa 
regime for citizens of Belarus; the issue of harassment of the Union of Poles in Belarus 
(UPB) in 2005 and the EU response to the unsatisfactory (from a democratic perspective) 
Presidential elections in Belarus in March 2006. By so doing, this chapter attempts to 
determine the impact that Polish representatives made on EU policy and also whether 
there were any significant changes in their behaviour or the strategies that they pursued 
during the period in question. 
The Policy of the EU and its member states towards Belarus 
Since the 2004 enlargement, the EU has become a direct neighbour of Belarus but is not 
linked to it by any formal agreement. Such a situation poses an evident challenge for the 
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EU, which has recently described the promotion of security in its neighbourhood amongst 
its top three strategic objectives (ESS, 2003). Prior to 2004, Belarus remained largely off 
the EU political radar, but this changed once the new member states made their presence 
felt in the Council. Increased attention was given to the effort to create a coherent policy 
towards the EU's neighbours. In the case of Belarus, the EU's interest has been 
strengthened further by the fact that significant energy supplies from Russia to the EU are 
delivered through Belarusian territories. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the EU's ambitions to promote democracy as a "force for good" 
(Council of the EU, 2003), its policy has had arguably no substantial effect on Bclarus 
and neither conditionality nor the restrictive measures that have been introduced have had 
any real impact. In this case the EU's famous `power of attraction' does not seem to 
work. Instead, the EU found itself at an impasse without an exit strategy, facing "the 
challenge of fostering the conditions for democracy in a climate hostile to its fundamental 
principles" (Ferrero-Waldner). As Dov Lynch (2006: 156) has put it: "[t]he problem with 
our attempts to influence political developments in Minsk is that Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
could not care less". The current domestic conditions in Belarus are also advantageous 
for the president, as, in spite of the measures undertaken by the EU, Bclarus has recently 
experienced economic growth, 11% in 2004 and 8% in 2005, mainly as a result of the 
low prices of oil and gas imported from Russia (Gromadzki and Vesely, 2006: 13). 
The (lack of) EU-Belarus relations 
After Belarus gained independence in 1991, bilateral relations with the EU progressed 
with the negotiation of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1995. 
Nonetheless, the document never came into force due to the internal situation in Bclarus. 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has exercised authoritarian power since 1996, when he 
called a referendum on amending the constitution to change the country's political system 
and strengthen the presidential power (for more sec: Burger and Minchuk, 2006). 
Consequently, in 1997, GAC Conclusions introduced restrictions on the EU-Belarus 
relationship, which meant suspending the ratification of the PCA, with any bilateral 
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contacts at ministerial level to be established only through the EU Presidency or Troika 
(GAC, 1997). 235 Since that time, the EU has been pursuing a policy of "declarations" 
(Lynch, 2005b: 97). This usually involved expressing displeasure with for instance the 
way in which the elections are conducted or how the opposition was treated. 
A serious crisis between the EU and Belarus began the following year, in April 1998, 
when a number of Western ambassadors were evicted from their embassy buildings 
because of what the Belarusian authorities called, `technical reasons', meaning the so- 
called need for repairs. Some observers speculated that Lukashenka did not wish to have 
foreign ambassadors living so close to himself and other government officials (Burger 
and Minchuk, 2006: 30). This action was considered by the West as a violation of the 
Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. As a result, in June, 13 diplomats from the 
EU member states were called back to their capitals. To make things worse, Lukashcnka 
ordered the tearing down of the diplomatic enclosures and removed diplomatic seals from 
the ambassadorial residences. In response, on 13 July 1998, the EU, together with the US, 
introduced a visa ban on the President and 130 other officials, which lasted for seven 
months. It was only lifted in February 1999, when the crisis was resolved. 
Since the EU-Belarus relations were formally suspended in 1997 and the EU expressed 
its'deep concern' over the arbitrary arrests of opposition party members (GAERC, 1997), 
it has repeatedly used political shaming in its various declarations, condemning the 
actions of the Belarusian government and calling on it to embark on democratic reforms. 
Over the years, the discourse has become much stronger. However, there are serious 
doubts regarding the actual effectiveness of this declaratory policy and one of the 
diplomats interviewed expressed scepticism regarding the significance of the Council 
Conclusions for the Belarussians themselves. 236 Considering the fact that the Council 
Conclusions are unavailable in Russian or Belarusian and that an information black out is 
exercised by the government, Belarusian civil society does not even recognize their 
235 Troika represents the EU in external relations, falling under the scope of the second pillar and consists 
of the Foreign affairs Minister of the country holding the Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP 
and the Commissioner in charge of external relations and the ENP. The Presidency can also be assisted by a 
reresentative of the forthcoming Presidency. 
236 Interview (no. 42) 
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existence. Still, even if they were widely known, the EU is perceived by a large part of 
the population as an association of states which are already unfriendly to Russia and 
Belarus (Lynch, 2005: 102), with recent opinion polls showing that more than 48% of 
respondents believe the West is `hostile' towards Belarus. 237 In this sense, the policy of 
the EU might be reaffirming negative attitudes in Belarus. 
The first presidential elections under the changed constitutional law were held in Bclarus 
in 2001. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe / Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODHIR), they did not meet the 
standards of democratic conduct, but were won by Lukashenka with a surprisingly strong 
support from the population. He claimed to have won 75.66% of the votes and this was 
enough to avoid the need for a second round of voting (Burger and Minchuk, 2006: 31). 
Subsequently, in 2002, the EU introduced a new element to its relations with Belarus, the 
so-called `benchmark approach'. It was based on the policy-line set in 1997, but was 
designed to reward any small steps that Belarus took in the direction of democratic 
change (Lynch 2005b: 109). However this too proved to have little impact. 
Relations between the EU and Belarus worsened further in the same year, when in 
September Lukashenka expelled OSCE monitors from Belarus. The EU Council noted in 
its November 2001 Conclusions that most of its member states were prepared to 
introduce another visa-ban on President Lukashcnka, the head of Presidential 
Administration, the Prime Minister, Chairman of the Committee of State Security and 
four other officials. The ban was subsequently implemented by 14 out of 15 member 
states. Portugal did not introduce the measure, as Lukashcnka was about to attend the 
OSCE meeting in Lisbon (BBC, 2001). This instrument was lifted in 2003, when a new 
OSCE office was established in Minsk. 
237 Meanwhile, president Lukashenka remains the most popular politician in the country, gaining the 
support of ca. 60% voters at the last elections, according to the independent polls. The data was gathered by 
the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS). 
http: //www. iiseps. org/ecommentl. html and http: //www. iiseps. org/edata06-04I. html 
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The first parliamentary elections under the 1996 constitution were held on 17 October 
2004, together with the referendum on the limits of presidential term. 238 They were both 
proclaimed by the EU to be neither free nor fair (GAERC, 2004a). A month later, the 
Union announced the introduction of a visa-ban239 in response and emphasised once more 
that the official bilateral contacts would be established solely by the Presidency, high 
Representative or the Troika, whereas other ministerial-level meetings would be kept to a 
minimum. Poland played an important role in the discussions over these Council 
Conclusions, arguing successfully for minimising, but not abolishing, meetings with the 
Belarusian officials at ministerial level. This will be discussed in the second part of this 
chapter. 
With the development of the ENP, the EU had to make a decision regarding the place of 
Belarus in the new policy framework. On the one hand, it should be logically included, 
being one of Union's neighbours, without any membership possibilities in the foreseeable 
future. On the other hand, these relations had been frozen and the EU was not eager to re- 
establish them without any changes in the regime. Eventually, it was decided that Belarus 
would in theory be eligible to participate in the ENP, but this was dependent upon the 
practical execution of the EU demands for free and fair elections. The ENP Strategy 
Paper (European Commission, 2004a: 11) established that the EU long-term goals240 
would be reinforced through the ENP, but only after fundamental political and economic 
reforms would Belarus be able to make use of the program. The Council Conclusions 
(GAERC, 2004a) from 22-23 November 2004 called on President Lukashenka and his 
government to "reverse their present policies and to embark on fundamental democratic 
and economic reforms to bring the country closer to European common values". This was 
238 The question that was put in the referendum was the following: "Do you allow the first President of the 
Republic of Belarus Alyaksandr Ilryhorevitch Lukashenka to participate in the presidential election as a 
candidate for the post of the President of the republic of Belarus and do you accept Part I of Article 81 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus in the wording as follows, The President shall be elected 
directly by the people of the Republic of Belarus for a term of five years by universal, free, equal, direct, 
and secret ballot"' (as quoted in Burger and Minchuk, 2006: 32). The outcome, according to Belarussian 
election commission was 86.2% in favour of the amendment (Ibid. ). 
239 The actual decision on extending the list of persons with travel restrictions was adopted in a Common 
position by GAERC in its Conclusions from 13 December 2004 (OrAERC, 2004b). 
ý0 In the Paper the goals are spelled out as "for Belarus to be a democratic, stable, reliable, and 
increasingly prosperous partner with which the enlarged EU will share not only common borders, but also a 
common agenda driven by shared values" (Commission, 2004a: 11). 
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later repeated in the Council Conclusions of 7 November 2005 (GAERC, 2005c), 30-31 
January (GAERC, 2006a) and 10-11 April 2006 (GAERC, 2006b), which stated that "the 
EU wishes to have closer and better relations with Belarus (... ) once the Belarusian 
authorities clearly demonstrate their willingness to respect democratic values, human 
rights and the rule of law". 
The first Country Strategy Paper on Belarus was adopted by the European Commission 
on 28 May 2004 (European Commission, 2004b). It listed long-term strategic goals in its 
relations with Belarus, namely seeking a democratic, stable, reliable and increasingly 
prosperous partner "with which the enlarged EU will share not only common borders, but 
also common agenda driven by shared values" (European Commission, 2004b: 3). This 
also clearly represents the emphasis put by the EU on the values, which will condition 
any future EU-Belarus relationship. It also anticipates EU support for Belarus in a 
number of policy areas, provided there is an improvement in the overall EU-Belarus 
relations. 
The extent of the conditionality is sometimes criticized by the neighbouring states, such 
as Poland or Lithuania, for being ineffective with a more active approach being called 
for. As pointed out by Dov Lynch (2005), the policy lacks effectiveness due to a lack of 
sufficient incentives that could spark change. Also the alliance between 13clarus and 
Russia is proving to be a powerful alternative to the offer of an improved relationship 
with the EU. As one official claimed, the EU: 
"took the position of not accepting any undemocratic changes and minimizing the 
official contacts. (... ) The idea that once something changes there we will start 
cooperation did not work out and still, the EU did not develop any instruments to 
change this situation". 241 
The Union has also responded to the most recent presidential elections that took place in 
Belarus in March 2006. The election campaign was different from the previous ones, in 
241 Interview (no. 5) 
185 
the sense that the authorities undertook several restrictive measures even before the onset 
of the campaign and sent anyone who received funds from external partners, such as US 
or the EU, to prison (Marples, 2006: 100). The elections were pronounced by the 
OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) as failing to meet the 
OSCE standards for free elections. GAERC referred to the undemocratic conduct of the 
Presidential elections and "condemned" (the wording was repeated three times) the use of 
violence by the government against the opposition, the mistreatment of the detainees and 
the actions towards EU citizens (GAERC, 2006b: 10). The EU reintroduced the `visa- 
ban' on the President and the officials responsible for the violations of international 
standards (GAERC, 2006). In total, the `visa-ban' list consisted of 31 names and the EU 
emphasized that it could still be extended. 
In addition to the `visa-ban', the Union introduced financial restrictions and froze all 
funds and economic resources of individuals responsible for the violation of international 
standards during the elections. The decision was adopted in May 2006 and in practical 
terms meant freezing the bank accounts of Lukashenka and another 35 officials 242 
Nonetheless, as many observers and even some diplomats themselves admit, the decision 
was very unlikely to have any practical effect and could be seen as merely symbolic. The 
Council decision, despite the initial reluctance of some of the member states, was also 
prompted by the earlier threat by some EU officials that further restrictive measures 
would be implemented. However, because the action was predictable, as some observers 
pointed out, it gave the Belarusian officials plenty of time to transfer their funds to a safe 
location. 243 These restrictive measures have had so far arguably no 6r little real impact on 
the situation. As one EU official described it: 
"It is the kind of problem we have with Bclarus. We undertake these policies, 
which we know we have to take, because they don't respect human rights. But in 
242 Common Position 2006/276/CFSP. 
243 http: //service. spiegel. de/cache/international/0,1518,417069, OO. html 
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dramatically change its course because of the visa ban adopted by the EU. Hence, as 
pointed out by some observers, the EU restrictive measures have been perceived rather as 
a purely symbolic political gesture, targeted mainly at the EU domestic audience. In 
addition, they have been used by the Belarus regime as a tool in its propaganda against 
the 'West'. 246 
There is currently no official Commission Delegation to Bclarus in Minsk, but the 
Delegation in Kiev has represented the EC in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova since 
September 1993. Even though, opening a delegation in Minsk is high on the 
Commission's agenda, there are obvious objections on the part of the Belarusian 
government. The principle of conditionality, that the EU normally uses towards Bclarus, 
was `turned around' when the latter granted an agreement for opening the Commission's 
regionalized Delegation in Minsk, subordinate to the Delegation in Kiev, on the condition 
that bilateral relations were `normalized'. 247 This proposal was turned down by the EU, 
and the result was a stalemate. 248 
The EU has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed as supporting civil society 
(opposition) in Belarus. It has been financing programs such as the European 
Humanitarian University (EHU), reopened in Vilnius, aller it had been closed down by 
the authorities in July 2004. It has also made an attempt to support independent media 
broadcasts, as the regime dominates the media and uses it for its own propaganda, 
exerting repression for those not complying (more: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2005: 21). 
In autumn 2006, the EU launched regular radio news broadcast by Deutsche Welle and 
supported the programs aimed at providing other independent media services, such as 
satellite TV (Tapiola, 2006: 68). The Commission emphasizes that whatever the EU does 
in its relations with Belarus, in areas such as media broadcasts, the substance must be 
perceived as the balance of positions of all member states. Any bias and politicized views 
2w For example, in response to the recent sanctions and freezing of assets and some further restrictions by 
Canada and the US, Lukashenka threatened to ban Western flights over Belarus, referring to the necessity 
of showing that the Belarussians were a proud people. 
247 Interviews (no. 31,37) 
248 Interestingly, the majority of respondents to the opinion polls declared that they either did not care about 
this development or did not consider it as a good idea, with almost 40% supporting the opening. 
http: //www. iiseps. org/edata06-04 I . 
html 
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are to be avoided. 249 The majority of the Belarusians admit they do not have enough 
information about the EU and express their willingness to learn more. 250 
EU aid to Belarus has so far been delivered through the TACIS program. The EU has 
been delivering a few partnership programs in relations to Belarus, the most important 
ones being Tempus, Lien, City Twinning and the Civil Society Development Program 
(CSDP). The latter one covered areas, such as: media, institutional twinning and NGO's 
(European Commission, 2004b). In 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 TACIS funded two 
programs supporting civil society, each with the budget of E5 million (Jarabik, 2006: 86). 
In 2003, the "Belarus Action Program" 2003 allocated f6 million under TACIS25I for the 
programs to be implemented before December 2007. The funding was increased after the 
elections in 2004 to E12 million in 2005 and 2006 (Jarabik, 2006: 90). 
A criticism of the TACIS program, also expressed by Polish diplomats, is that it requires 
the agreement of the Belarusian authorities. Similar problems arise when the EU attempts 
to channel aid to NGOs in Belarus. According to the law in force they have to register 
their bank accounts with the Belarusian authorities. This may result in a quick end to any 
project funded by the EU by a simple refusal to register an NGO. This challenge has 
recently been partly solved by giving money to NGOs that are not formally located in 
Belarus. This may be conducted using another fund, administered by the Commission, 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDIIR). Only recently did 
Belarus become a priority state within this programme, which does not require the 
approval of the regime in Minsk. 
249 Interview (no. 31) 
2S0 http: //www. iiseps. org/edata06-042. html 
251 The TACIS program was launched by the European Commission in 1991 and provides assistance to 12 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
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The position of the member states on the EU's policy towards Belarus 
Diplomats from the EU member states and the EU institutions generally agree on the 
limitations of what the EU can realistically achieve in its relations with Belarus. 252 This is 
partly because, whereas there is an agreement regarding broad policy-goals, the 
differences still persist on the means and instruments to achieve it. Arguably, as long as 
there is no majority in the Council, the EU is locked in an impasse. 253 Therefore, the' 
chapter now turns to identify the points on which there is a general consensus within the 
Council, regarding medium and long-term goals. Then it proceeds by pinpointing the 
issues where no agreement has been reached so far because of different member state 
interests. The Polish position will be discussed here, but a more detailed analysis of 
Polish interests will follow in the next part of the chapter. 
There is general consensus among the member states regarding the very broad long-terns 
policy goals towards Belarus. They were spelled out in various EU documents, such as 
the ESS (Council of the EU, 2003) or the ENP Strategy Paper (European Commission, 
2004a). The ESS defined building security in the neighbourhood as one of the Union's 
strategic objectives. This should be achieved by promoting "a ring of well governed 
countries to the East of the European Union" (Council of the EU, 2003: 8). The document 
also expressed a desire to tackle political problems and extend the benefits of economic 
and political cooperation (Council of the EU, 2003: 8. ). On a number of occasions, the 
EU has called on the Belarusian government to "reverse their present policies and to 
embark on fundamental democratic and economic reforms to bring the country closer to 
European common values" (GAERC, 2004a). 254 The clear desire to foster democratic 
change in Belarus was also expressed by one of the Senior Advisors to High 
252 This should not be considered as something exclusively subscribed to the EU. Other international 
players, such as the US, also aiming to "democratise" Belarus, have also been faced with similar challenges 
and often admitted there is not much that could be done at present, when any military intervention is clearly 
ruled out (for the US position see e. g. Shepherd, 2006). 
253 Interview (no. 36) 
254 This was later repeated in both the 7 November and the 30-31 January 2006 Council Conclusions, 
stating that "the EU wishes to have closer and better relations with Belarus (... ) once the Belarusian 
authorities clearly demonstrate their willingness to respect democratic values, human rights and the rule of 
law" (GAERC, 2006a). 
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Representative Solana, who claimed that the aim of the EU was to "support the 
Belarusian population in assuming control of its own destiny, through the establishment 
of the democratic process" (Tapiola, 2006: 70). Nonetheless, the formulation of these 
goals remains very vague, which can be illustrated best by the EU expressing its 
commitment to a process that would lead Belarus to playing "a meaningful role on the 
European continent" (GAERC, 1997), whatever this rather broad phrase may mean. 
As far as there is consensus on the fundamental goal, there is less agreement among the 
member states when it comes to the short-term goals. Indeed, it is easier to detect what 
the EU would not like to be perceived to be doing and this can be gauged against the 
rhetoric used by the US administration. Most member states would be reluctant to 
subscribe to the strong US approach, which openly speaks about the time for regime- 
change and describes Belarus as the "last dictatorship in Europe" or an "outpost of 
tyranny" (BBC, 2005). President Bush, after signing the Belarus Democracy Act in 2004, 
has directly said that there was "no place in a Europe whole and free for a regime of this 
kind" (quoted in Shepherd, 2006: 71). The discourse used by the American 
administration is in clear contrast with the recent speech by Commissioner Ferrcro- 
Waldner (2006a) in which she refers to the need for "changing mindsets, not regimes" 
and to the preference of the EU for coercive diplomacy. 
In practice, there appear to be three alternative EU approaches towards Bclarus and most 
discussions revolve around them. They are: further isolation, engagement and no change 
in the current policy. Some of the new member states from Central Eastern Europe, like 
Poland or Lithuania, tend to be vocal and outspoken in their perception of the EU's 
policy towards Belarus, even described by some as `aggressive'. The newcomers have 
often argued for stricter isolation of the regime and blame the Commission for ineffective 
and inflexible management of some of its instruments. 255 Still, one EU official described 
a more general feeling that the regime change would take the EU "down a dangerous 
path, in contradiction with some of our values"256 and hence there was not much the EU 
2 55 Even a more radical approach is presented by the Members of the European Parliament. 
2% Interview (no. 44) 
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could do. Others argue that it is the population of the country itself that has to decide that 
`enough is enough'. This, arguably, leaves the EU with temporary agreement over what 
goal it does not want to work towards, but little alternative, considering diverging views 
of the member states. As a diplomat from a new member state described the situation: 
"there are two ways: a radical one or cooperation with the regime and we have to make a 
choice, because the in-between does not bring any results. "257 In the case of some new 
member states, among them Poland, one can observe a tension in any attempt to define 
the main lines of the policy towards Belangs. On the one hand, Polish diplomats admit 
themselves they should avoid isolating the neighbouring country for practical reasons. 
However, on the other hand, for political reasons and in order to avoid accusations of 
cooperation with undemocratic regimes, sometimes the political discourse seems more 
radical than some would wish. 
Nonetheless, there are actors who argue for maintaining precisely this `in-between 
policy'. The position of some member states, generally supported by the Commission, is 
that the approach should be based on restrictions imposed on the Bclarusian authorities 
and at the same time the provision of support for civil society movements. This policy is 
known as a `two-track' approach. Its proponents argue against providing support to any 
particular opposition leader, as advocated by other (mainly new) member states, on the 
grounds that democracy cannot be forced from outside and "democratic change is a long 
term project which requires sustained commitment from us all" (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a; 
Lynch, 2005b: 105). This approach thus foresees change as a longer-terns process. It 
depends on developing the middle class in Belarus by developing people-to-people 
contacts. In practical terns, the proponents argue for continuation of the policy pursued 
so far. 
Finally, there is another idea sometimes brought up in informal talks between officials in 
Brussels about further engagement with Belarus. Because of the current political situation 
after the undemocratic conduct of the presidential elections, it is generally accepted that 
the time is not currently right for any formal proposals towards increased engagement. 
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Nonetheless, there are requests made, for future Presidencies to launch a discussion on 
possible future changes in the EU-Belarus relationship. 58 As one Swedish diplomat 
claimed, while pressure on the regime should be sustained, "the attention should be 
shifted towards young Belarussians, including the officials at different levels of 
administration, as they posses the knowledge that may be useful in times of changes" 
(Jan Henrig in: Wqgrowska, 2006: 8). The difference still persists on issues such as who 
should be involved in the dialogue (which level of officials). The proponents, including 
some Polish diplomats, argue that only by socializing the mid-level administration or 
engaging in a dialogue with the officials and politicians, can the EU exert any effect on 
the actual policy conduct. The critics of this argument point out that any engagement 
would be equal to legitimizing the undemocratic actions by the authorities and stand in 
opposition to the EU values. 
Finally, some of the new member states, like Poland or Lithuania, have been very 
actively promoting the easing of travel restrictions for Belarusian citizens. This, in turn, is 
a sensitive issue for some other member states, like Gennany or France, who for 
domestic reasons prefer to avoid discussions over migration issues. 259 
It is important to bring Russia and the US into the picture of the EU-Belarus relations. 
This issue is valid for this research, as Poland has a strong opinion regarding this very 
sensitive subject and has been occasionally called `anti-Russian' or criticised for its 
excessive representation of American interests. Among the old member states, there are 
proponents of exerting pressure on Minsk through a closer dialogue with Moscow and 
those who object to any involvement of Russia in the relationship and question the 
motives behind such actions. Additionally, some observers point out that the policy of 
several member states and even the EU in general is conditioned by the `Russia factor'. 
In this respect, cooperation with both countries has been named in discussions over the 
effectiveness of the EU policy as a potentially strengthening factor, but also a possible 
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insisted on visa facilitation for Belarussians and re-opened the issue at COREPER. Poland was the only 
other state that openly supported these ideas, even though they did not have the chance of gaining enough 
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constraint. Recently, there has even been a proposal on the table to insert the formal need 
to cooperate with both Russia and the US in promoting democracy in Belarus in the text 
of the Council Conclusions. 260 It did not achieve enough support around the table and 
there are still dividing lines regarding who the EU should coordinate its actions with and 
to what extent. 
The issue of supporting democratic changes in Belarus has been raised at EU-Russia 
Summits, but the latter has repeatedly refused to discuss the matter, on the grounds that 
Belarus is an independent state. Some diplomats and academics have argued that the idea 
is not very practical, since Russian and European interests in Belarus arc divergent, if not 
actually clashing (Lynch, 2005: 114). After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Belarus is 
perceived by Russia as a symbol of its influence - its `last outpost' in the West. Even 
though Russia might also be interested in sparking changes in Minsk, as it can be argued 
that it is in line with Moscow's economic interests to `open-up' the regime in Minsk for 
the world economy, it is definitely not interested in any change determined by the West. 
Any ideas of cooperation with Russia are also treated with the utmost caution by the new 
member states, especially by Poland and Lithuania. Their relations with Russia have 
already deteriorated after their mutual engagement in the events in Ukraine. Some 
Russian officials have also accused these countries of exerting a negative influence on the 
overall EU-Russia relationship (Kubosova, 2006). Furthennore, the close links between 
Russia and Minsk and the subsidized gas deliveries are often pointed to as an indirect 
reason for the failure of the EU's policies. In other words, as long as cooperation with 
Russia is perceived in Belarus as an attractive alternative to anything that the EU can 
offer, coercive diplomacy will be faced with major challenges. Additionally, the current 
strategic dialogue between Russia and the EU, and the European dependence on Russian 
gas supplies, are strong reasons why neither of the sides would want to risk worsening 
relations. 
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Finally, the role of the US has to be noted briefly again. There is still no consensus 
among the member states regarding the role that the US should ideally play in the EU- 
Belarusian relations. There are member states, like Poland, calling for coordination of the 
EU policies with the US, as well as those arguing for cautiousness, pointing at the 
differences in the US overall approach. Belarus, being a relatively small and distant state, 
has managed to get a high place on the agenda of the Bush administration, as its case was 
linked to the issues of arms sales to `rogue states' (Shepherd, 2006: 71). In spite of the 
evident differences in the discourse, there have been efforts to coordinate European 
policy with that of the US and even a text of a joint demarche regarding the March 2006 
presidential elections was agreed upon. 261 The intention was for Robert Cooper, Director 
General for External and Political-Military Affairs of the Council and Dan Fried, US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Europe to present it together to Belarusian authorities on 
31 January 2006. Nonetheless, the Belarusian authorities did not issue visas for them to 
enter Belarus simultaneously. In this situation, the joint visit was cancelled and the 
demarche was presented by the US and the local EU Presidency separately. 
Subsequently, the EU and the US published an official statement on relations with 
Belarus on 3 February 2006.262 They repeated that the elections should be conducted in a 
free and fair manner. Both claimed that they would judge the results and respond 
accordingly. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen what action could be taken in such case. 
Generally, the EU and the US' ambitions for Belarus are very similar, but the style of 
diplomacy, the language and means are different. For example, the assistance to Belarus 
differs as the US is the biggest donor for civil society programs and it supports 
democratisation in a much more direct way than the EU (Jarabik, 2006: 86). Sonic EU 
officials noted the negotiations over the common demarche, mentioned above, as 
successful, simply because the EU was able to find a common language with the US. It 
was pointed out, that, the US is sometimes used as a point of reference for the EU to 
underline its distinctive, softer approach to Belarus. On the other hand, despite the 
241 Apparently, due to these differences in approach, as reported by some practitioners, the negotiations 
over a short text of a demarche were quite difficult regarding an attempt to find a middle way between the 
strong language of the US and a milder EU approach. 
262 http: //ue. eu. int/ueDocs/cms-Data/docs/pressdata/en/sg/88279. pdf (23.02.06) 
195 
differences in the discourse, the EU seems to have followed all the steps that had already 
been taken by the US, just at a slower pace. 
After this short outline of the different views of old and new member states with regard to 
the EU's approach to Belarus, the chapter proceeds with a more detailed analysis of the 
Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy in relation to that country. 
Poland and the EU's policy towards Belarus 
There are several factors that underpin the Polish stance towards Bclarus and which 
distinguish Poland from many of its EU partners. First of all, Poland holds direct borders 
with three post-Soviet states (Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania) as well as the Russian 
enclave of Kaliningrad. This has a profound impact on the policy lines towards them. In 
the case of Belarus - direct neighbourhood requires sustaining some form of cooperation 
in areas such as border management, human transit, ecology and security. 263 The 
condition for effective border management is cooperation with the Belarusian border 
control authorities. Secondly, there is a large Polish minority in Bclarus and that itself 
requires the Polish government to retain contacts with the Poles in Belarus. In 1989, 
approximately 417,000 people declared Polish nationality in Belarus and in 1999 the 
number went down to an estimate of 396,000 (Eberhardt, 2005). Finally, economic 
cooperation is quite substantial despite the political tensions. Therefore, Polish Eastern 
policy predominantly aims at supporting the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, 
refonns and modernization "in line with the European scenario". 264 
Political relations between Poland and Belarus were launched in March 1992. Shortly 
after gaining independence, the Belarusian nationalists expressed territorial claims 
towards Poland in relation to the region of Bialystok (Michta 1992: 73). To make things 
worse, because of its internal political situation, Belarus soon became internationally 
isolated. Earlier attempts by Polish politicians to enter a closer relationship with the 
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neighbour, in order to become its `window to Europe', provoked strong reactions from 
Russia (Hyde-Price 1996: 161-163). In 1996, Poland initiated a joint statement by the 
Presidents of Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania, calling for the government of Belarus to 
solve the political crisis with constitutional methods and to respect human rights. At the 
same time, the government adopted a strategy of `critical dialogue', criticising the 
disrespect for human rights, but maintaining political dialogue with Minsk (Menkiszak 
and Piotrowski, 2002: 233). Meanwhile, a number of Belarusian officials accused Poland 
of spying or interfering in internal affairs. In 1998, this issue led to the Belarusian 
ambassador being recalled to Minsk. Later the same year Poland broadcast Radio Free 
Belarus on its territory, which caused strong protests from the Belarusian authorities. 
Some Polish diplomats have argued that there was no force that could legally influence 
the internal Belarusian situation; hence, it is difficult to discuss the effectiveness of the 
Polish policy. However, Poland has a number of programs directed at Bclarus. The first 
one is aimed at putting an end to the information blockade and introducing free media, 
such as radio. The Polish government decided to commit PLN 950,000 for this project 265 
The challenges, as reported in the interviews, were that whereas Poland could broadcast 
on the long waves (LW), not many people listen to this frequency any more. 
Broadcasting on short wave would, in turn, require a lot of transmitting devices, whose 
placement would be illegal and broadcasting would breach international law. 266 The 
Polish Radio Racja, which can be translated as `righteous', began its transmissions at the 
beginning of 2006, two hours every day. At the same time the radio funded by the EU 
(Deutsche Welle) also started broadcasting. Apart from supporting the idea of an 
alternative radio, Poland promoted the idea of providing training for Belarusian 
journalists. Support has also been given to academia and Polish universities welcomed 
students from the European Human Studies University from Minsk. 
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Promoting the policy within the EU 
Polish policy prior to accession was divergent from the official EU stance. Therefore, 
following from the conceptual assumptions made earlier, one would expect after the 
initial (coercive) adaptation, attempts to `upload' the policy goals and influence the 
European policy so that it would converge with national policy. The Poles have always 
treated the EU's approach to Belarus in an emotional fashion, repeatedly criticising the 
EU for not doing enough. As claimed by one MFA official: 
"apart from the political gestures since 1997, the EU has not decided to arrange 
relations with Belarus so that both sides would be satisfied. Instead, it took an 
approach of not accepting the undemocratic changes over there and reducing 
contacts to a minimum. (... ) If you see the earlier TACIS programs, they did not 
bear any significance for the country development". 267 
According to many Polish officials, a crucial factor influencing the EU's policy towards 
Belarus is its interconnection with Russia. According to some Polish diplomats268 and 
experts (Zurawski vel Grajewski, 2005: 91), many of the EU member states have treated 
their policies towards Belarus, as a function of their policies towards Russia. The Poles 
see it as a mistake and a constraint on the EU's policy, which remains very passive. 
Meanwhile, the perception of security in Poland revolves around the role of Russia in the 
region. The Poles have been raising concerns that any potential instability in Bclarus may 
create a conflict of interest with Russia. 269 In this respect, the increasing interest of the 
member states in Belarus is in line with Poland's perception of its security interest. On 
the other hand, advocating actions such as "condemning the Russian government for the 
support it gives to the dictatorship in Belarus, thereby forcing Moscow to incur a political 
price for promoting this undemocratic regime" (Zurawski vcl Grajcwski, 2005: 94), 
provoked some member states and EU officials to label the Poles as `anti-Russian'. This 
can be very harmful and undermine day-to-day lobbying by Polish diplomats in the 
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Council. In addition, some Russians perceive the conflict between Poland and Belarus as 
a `Western crusade' against their country (Lindner, 2005: 3) and are very vocal in 
expressing this view to their European partners. 
The general belief that the policy towards Belarus should be conducted as independently 
as possible from relations with Moscow is complemented by the wish to encourage the 
EU to play a more `pro-active' role in Belarus. One of the most well-known Polish 
experts has repeatedly criticised EU policy for being merely reactive to the policy of 
Lukashenka, which puts the latter in a comfortable situation. Instead, it was suggested 
that something should be done without waiting for a move from the Bclarusian side 
(Gromadzki in: Wqgrowska, 2006: 9). However, very often, such analysis lacks an 
original input regarding any concrete steps that the EU might undertake and instead 
simply repeats the actions that are already in place, as pointed out by one of the national 
representatives of an old member state in Brussels. 270 
The most important issues that Polish diplomats have attempted to promote in the EU arc: 
providing stronger support for political opposition, including specific persons; 
introducing more flexible instruments for financing aid programs; increasing people-to- 
people contacts, especially through visa facilitation for Belarusians travelling to the EU; 
expanding the visa ban on the authorities and those involved in election frauds, as well as 
those involved in the repressions of the Union of Poles in Bclarus (UPB). They also 
insisted that the EU needed to implement long-term planning in relation to its neighbour. 
But these goals notwithstanding, there seem to be some clear tensions in the Polish 
position towards Belarus and some of the goals are contradictory on occasions. This may 
be a result of a competition between the centres of policy-making inside Poland, which 
became visible directly after the victory of Lech Kaczyc ski in the Polish Presidential 
elections. The policy towards the East became a subject of rivalry between the MFA, and 
particularly its Department of Europe and the DUE, as well as the President's 
chancellery. However, a more plausible explanation may be observed when one looks at 
270 Interview (no. 41) 
199 
j-ý 
relations in a longer perspective. On one hand, the Poles are eager to retain some form of 
formal contact and avoid isolating the neighbour, but on the other, there is strong pressure 
for `punishing' the undemocratic regime and not compromising on human rights. The 
latter tendency was strengthened especially after the undemocratic conduct of elections in 
Belarus in 2006. This will be discussed further below. 
Isolation or engagement? 
Prior to accession, in the active observer period, Poland did not align with the EU's 
common position regarding non-admission of Belarusian officials to the EU member 
states in June 1998.271 The decision to not align was taken in the Polish MFA after a 
debate at the highest levels of decision making, involving the minister himself. 272 There 
were just a few cases of non-alignment and occasionally they were caused simply by the 
procedural reasons or holidays in Poland. Nonetheless, the case of Belarus is different in 
this respect. It was a sign of Poland's special approach to one of its neighbours with a 
considerable Polish minority, but can certainly be better understood if we bear in mind 
that in 1998 Poland was chairing the OSCE. In such circumstances alignment with the 
EU position could have undermined Poland's efforts to engage Belarus in international 
dialogue and foster the development of democratic structures. During the Polish 
chairmanship, the OSCE Mission was established in Minsk. Nevertheless, as the Polish 
representative to OSCE admitted himself, the results of Polish actions in this field were 
rather disappointing (Nowak 1999). In the following years, Poland always saw it to be in 
its national interest to regard Belarus independently from Russia and therefore it 
undertook efforts to stop the international isolation of Minsk (Ksiazck, 2003). After a 
closer look at the numerous declarations regarding Belarus that were a subject of the 
CEECs alignment with the EU, it turns out that Poland joined all but the one mentioned 
above. 
271 Common Position of 9 July 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J. 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union, concerning Belarus, 98/448/CFSP. 
272 Interview (no. 2) 
200 
Another case of policy adaptation took place in the area of formal contacts between the 
officials. It was EU policy that contacts at the ministerial level would be avoided, 
whereas, as admitted by Polish diplomats, this was not respected by the Polish side before 
joining the EU. 273 Nevertheless, after the accession this rule had to be fully implemented 
as part of the acquis politique. The practice of holding informal meetings at higher 
political levels was sustained for some time, before it was completely stopped. 274 Still, 
Poland retained its view that official contacts were profitable in the case of such a 
centralised country and especially in the case of a neighbouring state. Therefore, the 
Poles began a diplomatic campaign to change the EU's policy and soften its approach. As 
one diplomat expressed it, Poland felt as if it was in a similar position regarding Bclarus 
as was Spain regarding Cuba. 275 Polish officials clearly saw the practical advantages of 
retaining formal contacts, but at the lower leve1276 and developing cooperation with 
medium level officials and local authorities. As one of them explained: "in a country that 
is based on hierarchy, without the ministerial contacts you cannot get anything done". 277 
This was a pragmatic approach driven by the necessity to cooperate, for example, with 
border control authorities. The `uploading' efforts brought results when the Council 
Conclusions from 22-23 November 2004 were negotiated (GAERC, 2004a). Poland 
argued against abolishing ministerial contacts completely and instead minimizing them, 
which was accepted by the other member states. The text said in its final version: 
"Bilateral contacts of the European Union and its Member States with President 
Lukashenka and his government will be established solely through the 
Presidency, SG/HR, the Commission and the Troika. Other contacts with the 
President Lukashenka and the members of his government, including multilateral 
contacts and contacts necessary for transborder relations, will be limited to the 
minimum" (GAERC 2004a; underlined by the author) 
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The Poles were especially content with the last sentence and considered it to be their own 
achievement, an example of one of the first successful actions. They were also 
determined that official contacts were an issue where they would continue to exert 
pressure on the EU because of their special importance. 278 This case shows a clear 
circular nature of the Europeanisation process. First, Poland had to adjust its policy 
conduct to EU requirements, which created a misfit between its own strategies and the 
ones pursued by the EU. As a result, once inside the Union, Polish diplomats made 
repeated efforts to reduce the misfit and introduce change in the Union's approach. 
In order to avoid the isolation of Belarus, Poland has also repeatedly expressed its view 
that it should be a prospective beneficiary of all the Union's assistance programs. When 
negotiating various initiatives regarding funding, Poland always insisted on inserting the 
clause that would allow for such assistance `under special circumstances', particularly 
when the recipient state does not fulfil all the necessary criteria and is unable to co- 
finance the project. Related to this, the Poles tried to promote the establishment of a 
European Democracy Fund that would manage assets available for support for 
democracy and civil society in the ENP states. Poland also supported a prompt 
establishment of the Commission's delegation to Belarus in Minsk. 
Another important issue that the Poles have tried to advocate in Brussels was fostering 
people-to-people contacts, preferably by means of visa facilitation. In this case Poland 
has a strong ally in neighbouring Lithuania. During the negotiations on the Council 
Conclusions of January 2006, the Lithuanian delegation strongly insisted on visa 
facilitation for the Belarusians and decided to re-open the issue in COREPER, after a 
failure to achieve consensus at the level of a Working Group. Poland was the only other 
state that openly supported these ideas, even though they had no practical chance of 
gaining broad support. In the end, the issue was not included in the text, but was to be 
discussed in the TACIS Working Group dealing with visa-issues. As commented by an 
EU official, the fact that they were pushing so much, in spite of lack of support meant 
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that "they haven't really learnt and in the long run this is going to hurt them". 279 The 
official was referring to the informal rules of consensus-building, respected among the 
member states and related to that the importance of legitimacy within the Council 
environment. Nonetheless, the fact that the issue was moved to the other Working Group 
was considered by some as at least partial success in terms of agenda-setting. 
On the other hand, Poland has argued for extending the list of Belarusian officials on the 
so-called visa-ban list. In November 2004, it proposed introducing tougher sanctions on 
the extended list of selected persons which added those responsible for frauds in the 
referendum. 280 Nonetheless, the EU did not accept these proposals. In effect, the Polish 
visa-ban list was longer than the EU one, which was related to the repression of the 
Union of Poles in Belarus. Recently, one of the Polish experts affiliated to the MFA's 
think-tank spoke in favour of extending the visa-ban list to approximately 400 names 
(Kucharczyk, 2006: 180). In contrast to the restrictions on the officials, as mentioned 
above, Polish diplomats have argued for the visa facilitation regime for Belarusian 
citizens. 
Council Conclusions November 2005 and the Union of Poles in Belar:: s 
The Poles have always treated the issue of solidarity within the EU very seriously. Once a 
member, their expectation was that the other member states and the Commission would 
provide them with support in the case of conflicting situations with third parties. In 
practice, this did not seem to happen automatically. On the contrary, bringing bilateral 
problems into the EU forum was not always appreciated. This may be illustrated with the 
example of harassment of the Union of Poles in Bclarus (ZKwigzek f'olaköw na Bialorusi, 
UPB) and the way the problem was successfully elevated by Polish diplomats to 
discussions in the Council of the EU in the autumn of 2005. 
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The UPB is an organization with around 20,000 - 25,000281 members, all Poles living in 
Belarus, and was set up in 1990. Since 2005, the UPB has entered into a phase of conflict 
with the government, which did not recognise its authority. It became subject to 
repression exerted by the Lukashenka regime and was one of the few incidents 
contributing to the worsening of Polish-Belarusian relations in recent years. 282 The Polish 
elites saw the necessity of involving the international environment into, what can be well- 
perceived as a bilateral conflict. As explained by one of the best known Polish experts on 
Belarus, it was: 
"crucial to make this issue an international case. Reducing it only to bilateral 
relations means pushing Poland on the outsider's position in the international 
relations, when in fact, the repressions towards the UPB arc nothing else but 
continuous restricting of the civil freedoms in that country" (Kazanecki, 2005). 
Raising the case within the EU was thus perceived as a good opportunity to pursue this 
goal, but, as will be explained later, some of Poland's EU partners did not share the view 
that bilateral relations should be reflected at the EU level. Therefore, it became a 
challenge for Polish diplomacy to portray the events and the issue as something important 
for EU-Belarus relations and respect for human rights in general, rather than a bilateral 
issue of abusing the rights of the Polish minority in Belarus. This was realised soon 
enough by the Polish diplomats and officials, who realised how important the discourse 
and deliberation were in the case of negotiations within the Council. 
Already in July, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Jack Straw, the then 
President of the EU Council of Ministers. Copies were also sent to the High 
Representative Javier Solana and the Commissioner for External Relations Bonita 
Ferrero-Waldner. The letter drew attention to the harassment of civil society in Belarus 
281 The number of members, which may seem relatively low compared to organisations in other countries, 
is quite extraordinary in the case of Belarus. UPB is one of the biggest NGOs in that country, where any 
independent structures with a few thousands members are very rare (Kazanecki, 2005). 
282 Already in 1998, Belarusian IIead of Security Service accused Poland of spying in Belarus (BBC, 
1998). These constant accusations were repeated on public TV, in which he accused Polish officials and 
NGOs of plotting against the Belarusian government. 
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and in particular of the UPB as well as the expulsion of three Polish diplomats. It 
emphasized that there were no ethnic grounds for the behaviour of the Belarusian 
authorities and the whole issue had to be considered as a political matter. 283 The Polish 
MFA issued a statement claiming that "(t)he cause of the crisis lies not in difficulties or 
problems in bilateral relations but in actions taken by the Belarusian authorities against 
their country's own citizens" and it was the position of the UPB as the largest 
independent NGO which was "the main reason why the attacks were launched against 
it". 284 In this respect, Minister Adam Rotfeld suggested raising the issue during the 
ministerial meeting in September. 
In the course of drafting the text of Council Conclusions for that meeting in COEST, the 
Poles wanted a stronger reference to the oppression of civil society and in particularly 
they wanted a mention of the UPB in the text. However, it is not a common practice in 
the EU to mention national minority issues, which are normally resolved in bilateral 
relations by individual member states. Therefore, the initial response of the Presidency 
was negative. The Poles subsequently argued in the Council that the case should not be 
considered by the EU as a minority issue, but should rather be seen in a broader context 
of a human rights violation by Lukashenka's regime. Polish diplomats decided to launch 
a broad lobbying campaign, in support of the case. After every PSC meeting, the EU 
representations were sent an account of recent events in Bclarus accompanied by a 
request for support. Initially, the Poles wanted to insert a clause referring to the broader 
repression of the UPB. 285 The final version of the adopted Council Conclusions' text 
read: 
"The Council will continue to monitor the situation in Belarus closely and will 
revert to it in January 2006. It also underlines its concern at the harassment of 
civil society organizations, including the Union of Poles in Belarus. The Council 
states its readiness to take further appropriate restrictive measures against the 
283 Information on the letter ofAdam Daniel Rotfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland on the situation 
in Belarus, Warsaw, 27 July 2005; http: //www. polishembassy. ie/bialorlistRP. htni (14.03.06) 
284 Polish-Belarussian relations: Statement of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 July 2005; 
http: //www. polishembassy. ie/belarus. htm (07.03.06). 
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responsible individuals in the event of failure to uphold international standards, in 
particular commitments made in the OSCE context" (underlined by the author). 
The EU officials and some representatives of other member states stressed that the word 
`including' was inserted in the text to make sure that the UPB was only used as an 
example. They affirmed that Polish diplomats emphasized that the UPB was the largest 
NGO in Belarus and therefore could be used as an example. The negotiations took some 
time, as the majority of the member states and the Commission still did not wish to single 
out anyone in particular. Some expressed doubts as to whether the insistence on including 
it in the text was not closely connected to the domestic political situation in Poland after 
the Parliamentary and Presidential elections. 286 Other representatives pointed out that an 
important role was played by Polish diplomats in Brussels, as they knew when to signal 
to Warsaw when would be the right time to stop pressing in order not to lose everything. 
There were also suggestions from non-Poles that the whole affair was a price the EU had 
to pay for the domestic politics of the newly elected Polish government. 
The presidential elections in 2006 and the EU's response 
Poland attempted to exert significant influence on EU policies in the case of the 
presidential elections in Belarus in March 2006. The `uploading' of national prerogatives 
began even before the elections took place. A substantial difference in the policies of 
Poland and the general line adopted by the EU (but certainly not by individual member 
states in their bilateral relations) was that the EU, in principle, supported democratic 
changes and civil society instead of providing support for the opposition or any particular 
party or person. The difference of views on this matter became apparent on the occasion 
of the visit of Alyaksandr Milinkevich287 to Brussels on 31 January 2006, before the 
Presidential elections. On the same day, the GAERC meeting was taking place in the 
Council. Lithuania and Poland worked together to organize the visit on that day, in the 
hope that this would be seen as a symbolic EU support for Lukashenka's opponent. 
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Therefore, in advance, they asked permission of the Austrian Presidency to use one of the 
Council rooms to hold the meeting on Monday morning, 31 January. 
Such a move was not warmly welcomed by some old member states. Some 
representatives claimed that the EU forum was being used in a very inappropriate way by 
Poland and Lithuania. Therefore, they decided not to send their Foreign Ministers to the 
meeting, but instead lower-ranking officials. Also the Council officials were confronted 
with the dilemma of how to react in such a situation in order not to violate the principle 
of not expressing support to any individuals prior to elections. Eventually, it was decided 
that the High Representative Javier Solana would meet with the Belarusian candidate, but 
separately from Milinkevich's meeting with the member states. The meetings were kept 
low-key and did not receive much media coverage. The whole situation showed clearly 
the divergent approaches to the situation in Belarus as well as to notions of how to deal 
with it. It is also worth mentioning that in the case of the 2006 Belarus and Ukrainian 
elections, Polish politicians clearly supported Milinkevich in Belarus and the Orange 
Coalition in the case of Ukrainian elections. 
In the aftermath to the elections, the Poles argued in favour of an immediate imposition 
of restrictive measures for those involved in what were seen as fraudulent electoral 
practices. However, this approach did not find support among many of the other member 
states. The deputy foreign minister of Poland was himself involved in arguing in favour 
of the sanctions. However, in his own account of the GAERC meeting in March, he 
admitted that none of the other foreign ministers objected to the idea, but they "said that 
we should not act in a hurry" (PAP, 2006). The Poles also started an immediate initiative 
aimed at extending the visa-ban list to the President and other regime officials. 288 
A few months after the elections, in June 2006, the Commission returned to the Council 
to discuss the withdrawal of the General System of Preferences (GSP) for Belarus, 
288 As claimed by the Deputy Minister Komorowski: "I don't see the possibility that Lukashenka came to 
ski in Zakopane. (... ) It is widely known that the Belarussian elites adore coming to Zakopane. " Ile also 
expressed his hope that other European states would adopt a similar approach and Lukashenka will not be 
able to ski in the Alps (PAP, 2006). 
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because it held that the regime was not respecting the rights of the workers' unions and 
the ILO Convention. On this issue, the Polish position was against undertaking further 
restrictive measures, as they could be regarded as attempts to isolate Bclarus even more 
and undermine the consistency of the EU's approach to different states. Poland was 
supported by a few other new member states, but it was not enough to influence the 
policy outcome. It was decided that the issue would become a subject of voting in the 
GSP Committee and in spite of several member states voting against, the overall 
recommendation was positive. 
Conclusions: a special case of circular Europeanisation? 
This chapter illustrates the circular process of Europeanisation. First, Poland had to adapt 
its policy to that of the EU, but after joining the negotiation table, it immediately tried to 
change the EU policy. It can be argued that in doing so, Poland tried to reduce the 
difference, or what some Europeanisation scholars called a `misfit', between the EU's 
policy and their own. In their attempts to `upload' their policy goals to the EU level, the 
Poles used different strategies, which changed with time. An important role was played 
by the Brussels-based diplomats, who socialised with their counterparts from different 
member states in the Council and learnt what behaviour was acceptable in the group. This 
was visible for example in the case of the UPB when it came to selecting the discourse to 
use in order to increase the chances of success. 
Regarding the influence of the `uploading' efforts, the impact of the Poles on the overall 
policy of the EU towards Belarus is difficult to dctennine. Nonetheless, some EU 
officials are quite positive about it and one of them stated that "it is fair to say that we 
would not have a policy towards Belarus, whatever that could be, if not for the fact that 
we have the Poles and Lithuanians sitting on this side of the table". 
289 A similar statement 
was made by another EU official, who claimed that before the enlargement there was a 
`complete stalemate' in relations with Belarus, whereas later the situation started to 
change. 290 Analysing the exact policy output does show that Bclarus appeared more often 
289 Interview (no. 44) 
290 Interview (no. 37) 
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on the political agenda and the EU started to deliver responses to the events taking place 
in that state. That seems to be a natural consequence of extending the EU border and 
becoming a direct neighbour of the regime. It was shown in this chapter that Poland 





This thesis has examined the process of Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy. It has 
used the Europeanisation approach in order to understand the interactions between Polish 
and EU foreign policy and it has focused on three different dimensions of changes. First, 
the way in which national (Polish) foreign policy and its institutions were transformed by 
participation in the EU's CFSP. Second, the way in which Polish diplomats have 
projected national foreign policy goals onto the EU level. The third dimension, 
`crossloading', even though identified on a few occasions, turned out not to play a major 
role in the Europeanisation process under examination. Nevertheless, there is clear 
evidence that the first two dimensions are useful ways of thinking about the interactions 
between the national and the EU levels of foreign policy. The thesis has also identified 
three mechanisms of change: conditionality, socialisation and learning which arte used to 
examine in more detail exactly how membership of the EU interacts with member state 
(Polish) foreign policy. 
Unlike most studies of Europeanisation to date, this thesis examined both policy process 
and policy substance. The chosen case studies focused on procedural changes in the 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and then on policy towards Poland's 
immediate eastern neighbours, Ukraine and Belarus. It has been clearly demonstrated that 
accession to the EU has exerted influence both on the procedures and substance of Polish 
foreign policy. It has had a profound impact on the organisation and every-day working 
procedures of the Polish MFA and engagement with the EU's CFSP has also prompted 
Polish decision-makers to pursue many national foreign policy objectives at the EU level. 
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This chapter summarises the main findings of the thesis and refers back to the analytical 
framework offered in the first chapter. The conclusions are divided into two parts. Firstly, 
some reflections are offered regarding the analytical framework, the nature of the 
Europeanisation process and the main mechanisms behind change: conditionality, 
socialisation and learning. Secondly, the conclusions refer to the new empirical data 
gathered in the study, giving some new insights into the process of the Europeanisation of 
Polish foreign policy. 
Methodological and conceptual conclusions 
This section discusses the most important aspects and findings of this research regarding 
the methodology and conceptual framework. Firstly, some views are offered on the 
possible contribution of this research in terms of linking procedural and substantive 
foreign policy change in one research framework. Then, the main findings regarding the 
three mechanisms that were identified behind change are presented, with the emphasis on 
their role in different dimensions of the Europeanisation process. Finally, before the 
empirical conclusions are summarised, this section is concluded with some thoughts on 
what this study can tell us about the relationship between national and EU foreign policy 
interests. 
The Europeanisation of foreign policy procedures and substance: searching for a link 
The methodological framework was not an attempt to make a theoretical contribution to 
the literature as such, but some issues related to the analytical framework, its concepts 
and results are worth, highlighting. One of the most important is making a distinction 
between adaptation and Europeanisation as this proved to be a useful way of approaching 
the study of interactions between the national and the EU level. 
This study has looked at the Europeanisation of policy process and policy substance. 
Methodologically, this proved to be a challenging task, as to date the academic literature 
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on Europeanisation as well as on foreign policy has been rather fragmented and studies 
on institutions and procedures (e. g. Allen and Oliver, 2004,2006a, 2006b; Goetz, 2001 a; 
Harmsen, 2000; Hocking and Spence, 2002; Page and Wouters, 1995; Wessels at al, 
2003) have usually been disconnected from the research on policy substance (e. g. 
Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Checkel, 2001; Favell, 1998; Howorth and Mcnon, 1997; 
Torreblanca 2001; Manners and Whitman, 2000). This has resulted in a situation where 
different research designs have been used to study each aspect separately. Studies of the 
Europeanisation of institutions, such as the MFAs, have looked to the organisational 
theories or to new institutionalism, while those that focus on policy substance have often 
used (or adapted) Foreign Policy Analysis and various other IR theories. Therefore, it has 
been difficult to draw comparative conclusions and establish any clear links between the 
Europeanisation processes of these two domains. 
In the case of procedures, the framework of analysis is usually much more structural than 
in the case of policy substance which tends to be more agent-oriented. This is due to the 
fact that the change in procedures usually takes place after the lessons learnt are 
communicated from the agents (diplomats in Brussels) to the capital and after they are 
properly institutionalised. Hence, the individual level bears only limited significance for 
understanding procedural change, but the two levels: individual and structural are 
interconnected with one another. In the case of policy substance this division is not that 
straightforward. It seems that the agents (at a number of different levels of policy- 
making) may have a considerable impact on policy substance. This differentiated 
approach presents further complications when trying to combine the study of foreign 
policy process with the study of foreign policy substance in one research project, with 
one coherent framework. Nevertheless, this study has looked into the Europcanisation 
processes as far as both procedures and substance in relation to Polish foreign policy are 
concerned and has attempted to establish some links that are presented below. 
First of all, the definition and nature of change in both process and substance should be 
clearly established. In the first case, explored in chapter three, change was defined in 
several different dimensions: organisational design, policy process and finally also in 
212 
institutional culture. In the case of policy substance, as shown in chapters four, five and 
six, change was more subtle and more difficult to define and determine. It has been 
operationalised as change in official discourse on policy, detectable in the documents and 
public speeches. In addition, some informal aspects were taken into account, such as the 
informal statements made by policy makers or `non-papers' presented to the EU partners. 
The methodological challenge of determining a clear change in policy substance can be 
partly explained by what Hill and Wallace (1996: 7) call, a "two-audience problem". It 
has been observed that when diplomats report their EU-related activities to their 
governments, they tend to overestimate their own input to the debate and downplay the 
concessions made in order to reach a compromise. This was confirmed by the empirical 
work in the course of this study. Even diplomats at lower levels were eager to emphasise 
the Polish input to any EU documents or initiative. This tendency was generally observed 
more often in the case of officials stationed in Warsaw than those who had been posted to 
Brussels for some time. Hence, the information from these sources had to be checked 
against the perceptions of the other member states' diplomats who would sometimes 
provide different accounts of events. 
Establishing causality between participation in the CFSP and changes at the national 
level, or in other words, `isolating the EU effect', has also been an exercise of a different. 
nature in the case of both procedures and substance. In relation to the procedural changes, 
these could be traced back more easily to the EU, even though some of them were also 
connected with broader processes, such as globalisation. For example, while the creation 
of the posts of the Political Director or the European Correspondent was clearly related to 
participation in CFSP, the changing role of the Polish MFA and the shift towards 
coordination tasks, rather than `gatekeeper' tasks (which were discussed in chapter three) 
may well be connected to the wider processes of globalisation (see: Hill, 2003; Hocking 
and Spence, 2002 etc. ). Meanwhile, in the case of policy substance, the number of 
intervening variables is so large (both domestic and international), that one has to be very 
careful to avoid overestimating the Europeanisation effects. This study has not set its 
focus on evaluating the outcome of Europeanisation, but rather examined it as a process. 
Hence, some of the above difficulties were avoided. 
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Another issue related to procedures and substance is the dynamics of change and any 
possible connections between changes in both. In other words, does the 
Europeanisation of one domain `spill over' automatically to other domains? Is the 
Europeanisation of one a precondition of change in the other one? Or does it lead to 'a 
more efficient change in the other, in other words `facilitate' it? The empirical evidence 
gathered in this study points to the fact that a very basic adaptation of foreign policy 
procedures is necessary to initiate changes in foreign policy substance. This is because 
the member state needs certain institutional arrangements in order to be able to interact 
and participate in the CFSP. This involves for example using electronic forms of 
communication, installing the ACN (later CORTESY) or implementing a system of 
preparing and sending instructions to national representatives in the Council. 
Furthermore, the more institutional change follows and the better the member state 
adjusts (Europeanises) its institutions and institutional practises (procedural 
downloading), the stronger the influence it may have on the substance of EU policies 
(substance uploading). In other words, the better the state understands the `rules of the 
Brussels game', the better and more effective a player it usually becomes at the EU level. 
On the other hand, while the uploading brings some results and the EU policies can be 
transformed by a member state, its national policy is also being subjected to change at the 
same time. 
While a logical conclusion to draw from the above is that the Europcanisation of 
institutions facilitates policy uploading, it does not necessarily bear the same effect for 
policy downloading. The Europeanisation of procedures is not automatically mirrored by 
the Europeanisation of policy substance, especially its downloading dimension. A 
member state may use its Europeanised institutions to strategically promote its policy 
goals at the EU level, while national foreign policy at its core remains largely unchanged. 
In this case a member state would use the EU arena instrumentally, for promotion of its 
national foreign policy goals. The uploading in the case of policy substance is possible 
only after a member state becomes an active observer inside the EU and may be 
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successful only if the procedures were already Europeanised to some extent (measuring 
the degree of Europeanisation has not been possible given the scope of this research). 
One of the differences between the Europeanisation of procedures and substance in this 
study seems to be marked by the relevance of different dimensions of the 
Europeanisation process to both procedures and substance: for the procedures it is the 
process of adaptation (downloading) that is in the focus of research and is easily 
detectable. For the policy substance, it is the opposite -a member state more easily 
engages in policy uploading, which can also be of strategic importance for the national 
policy-making elites. 
Explaining change: conditionality, socialisation and learning 
With the growing body of scientific evidence that EU membership in general and 
participation in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in particular have had an 
important influence on the national foreign policies of the member states and on the way 
in which they are conducted, there is an urgent need to develop a more sophisticated 
analytical framework for analysis of these phenomena. Such a framework would not only 
allow us to study whether or not change in CFSP or in national foreign policy occurs, but 
also how it does so. Europeanisation, while being a useful way of approaching the 
subject, does not really offer much in terms of understanding the nature of the processes. 
In other words, it does not allow the researcher to go much beyond establishing whether 
`Europe matters' or not. This is why, for a better understanding of how Europe matters, it 
seems important to combine the Europeanisation approach with other concepts, drawn 
from a wide range of theories, such as rational choice or social constructivism. The study 
identified three main mechanisms behind change: conditionality, learning and 
socialisation and the main findings on how they can be usefully combined with 
Europeanisation are presented below. 
Conditionality plays an important role in facilitating change before accession, when an 
applicant state is involved in entry negotiations. The relations between the applicant state 
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and the EU are asymmetrical and Europeanisation is limited to and best described as 
national adaptation. However, the results are easily detectable, especially in the case of 
the policy process. High adaptational pressures and strong incentives cause initial 
changes: reforms in the MFA and formal alignment with the substance of the European 
foreign policy. However the depth of such changes may be disputable and most of such 
changes are continued after accession, but, as this study has clearly shown, change is later 
caused by the other two mechanisms: socialisation and learning. 
Socialisation has played a significant role as a mechanism of change since the beginning 
of the period when an applicant state becomes and active observer. This is a time when 
the internal EU meetings are opened up to participation of the candidate states. It has 
been discussed in this study as a process of adaptation of certain rules of behaviour and 
`ways of doing things' within a specific group. Researching the Europeanisation of 
procedures and policy substance, the thesis focused on procedural (behavioural) norms. 
Unlike substantive norms that concern actors' deep beliefs, the procedural ones relate to 
the formal and informal norms that guide actors' behaviour in the Council, such as habits 
of coordination, seeking consensus or using an agreed language. The empirical evidence 
has shown that these rules were adapted strategically and no strong evidence on 
internalisation of any norms could be derived from the empirical data. On the other hand, 
the move from unilateral national foreign policy-making to a more consensual 
multilateral style in the EU can also be considered as an important norm that was adopted 
by the actors (Polish diplomats and decision-makers). 
The study tried to demonstrate how Polish diplomats became socialised to the procedural 
norms within the Council and how they went on to apply them in practice. The evidence 
points to the fact that the change in their behaviour came as a result of a rational process 
and was a strategic move, aimed at achieving certain national objectives. This does not 
necessarily exclude any deeper socialisation of norms, that may well occur in the future, 
but simply reflects the lack of any evidence in this matter. This may be due to the fact 
that the study focused on Poland, a newcomer to CFSP decision-making and the time that 
its diplomats spent in the Council, becoming socialised by their EU counterparts, has 
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been relatively short. On the other hand, considering the high rotation of national 
representatives (two to three years in the Working Groups and usually one or two years 
more in COREPER), even the old member states do not remain in one group for longer 
periods. 
Learning, for its part, has been understood as a rational process that involved changes in 
beliefs or practices. Some evidence was provided about different types of learning: 
learning by doing and learning from others. The significance of learning seems to be 
most important after the `active observer' period and is concerned mainly with 
procedures. In this study, learning was observed as a (circular) process, with feedback 
loops, in which the following stages were established: individual learning of the 
representative in Brussels; sending the report to Warsaw; possible institutionalising of 
lessons in Warsaw; sending instructions to the representatives in Brussels. If the lessons 
learnt are not properly evaluated and institutionalised, than there is a high probability that 
they will be `lost' when the representative leaves his/her post in Brussels. 
This study in particular has shown the important role that the representatives in Brussels 
play in the Europeanisation and learning processes. They arc the first ones who arc 
subjected to socialization and (social) learning. This leads to a situation whereby they arc 
`trapped' between the capital (Warsaw) and Brussels, becoming embedded into two 
different (organizational) environments: one of their ministries and one of the Council. 
An interesting question may be posed for future research: due to this `entrapment', do 
they `unlearn' the rules previously learnt in the capital? Or do they act as real `change 
agents' and attempt to change the organizational structure at home? 
The study has also shown that there is much more evidence of simple rather than 
complex learning. The shift in strategies concerning lobbying for a future Ukrainian 
membership (from direct talk of membership to the less ambitious `small-steps' 
approach) is one example of such simple learning. Complex learning would imply change 
in beliefs and calculations of national interest. It is probably too early to detect any direct 
evidence in the case of Poland. The fact that Polish diplomats do not speak fonnally 
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inside the Council about the need to give Ukraine the promise of membership does not 
prove that there was a shift in Poland's understanding of its national interest. Quite on the 
contrary, there is evidence that this strategic goal has not changed, but that the lessons 
were learnt regarding the `way-of-doing-things' in Brussels. 
The distinction between the processes of learning and socialisation in the case of foreign 
policy procedures is blurred and not clear-cut. Socialisation is interlinkcd with social 
learning and can even be perceived as a strategic action by the agents. In such case both 
processes are rational actions, aimed at maximising the effectiveness of the uploading 
procedures. The three mechanisms bear different significance for different dimensions of 
Europeanisation. Conditionality was directly a mechanism facilitating downloading only 
and worked at the organisational level (structure). Learning was a mechanism that first 
facilitated downloading, but in a longer perspective also uploading, as the `lessons learnt' 
were applied in order to promote national interests at the EU level. It worked at both 
levels: individual (first) and organisational (when the lessons were institutionalised). 
Socialisation has directly affected downloading and uploading, as the actors were 
socialised in a new environment, adapted its rules, but at the same time took an active 
part in creating a group atmosphere that other actors would become socialised into. It 
applied at the individual level, however, these individuals acted on some occasions as 
`change agents' in relation to their organisations (ministries). The above conclusions may 
be summarised as follows (figure 7): 
Figure 7. Three mechanisms of Europeanisation 
Mechanism Direction Level Time factor 
(of analysis) 
Conditionality Downloading Organisational Before membership 
Learning From downloading to Individual and Before and aller 
uploading Organisational membership 
Socialisation Downloading and Individual From active observer 
Uploading period 
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The thesis identified different strategies that a member state (Poland) uses when trying to 
upload national policy goals to the EU level, such as: agenda setting, entering formal and 
informal coalitions of like-minded groups of states, applying `Eurojargon' discourse and 
attempting persuasion in the Council, disseminating information through formal channels 
like CORTESY (e. g. non-papers) and holding bilateral meetings. On the other hand, in 
the course of the thesis, some motives behind such attempts also became apparent: 
legitimising national policies `through Europe' on the wider international scene (as in the 
case of Polish involvement in the Orange revolution), gaining support for national policy 
prerogatives (bringing Ukraine closer to the EU), seeking international support in the 
case of bilateral conflicts (as in the case of harassment of the UPB in Belarus) or using 
success in the EU as an asset in domestic politics. 
Where is the line between national and European interests? 
The thesis has often referred to the concepts of national and European interests. For 
example, one possible effect of the Europeanisation process on policy substance would 
be a possible change in (the perception of) national interest. Even though the empirical 
evidence does not support such a far-reaching hypothesis, it is apparent that there has 
been a change of context in which the Polish national interest is now formulated. Hence, 
in this study the European and Polish national foreign policies are not perceived in zero- 
sum terms. In practice, the process is much more complex and both policies seem to be 
complementing each other and exerting mutual influence on each other. 
In this respect, the findings of this study are in line with the earlier research conducted by 
Ben Tonra, who concluded that "institutional coordination - common work practices and 
structures, a shared information base and the establishment of a common substantive 
agenda - set up a truly collective context in which a large proportion of national 
foreign 
policy is being formulated and pursued" (Tonra, 2001: 230-231). This involved the 
adaptation of procedures, caused by EU membership, such as the development of a 
coordination reflex or consensus-building practices at the EU level. Such a situation 
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limits the usefulness of the `misfit' concept, sometimes applied in Europeanisation 
studies. If the national interest is formulated in a changing context and Europcanisation is 
understood as a circular process, it is difficult to determine where to look for evidence of 
such a misfit, in other words, where the national interest ends and the European interest 
begins? 
Another finding of the thesis related to interests. Occasionally one set of policy goals are 
presented in Poland's bilateral relations and another at the EU (multilateral) level. Which 
one of them points to the `real' national interest, if one can assume that it exists? Again, 
the findings do not offer any straightforward answer. Such dualism of policy 
demonstrates itself through tensions not only between Brussels and Warsaw but also 
between the professional diplomats / civil servants (experts) and politicians. While the 
former undergo socialisation processes in the Council, the latter are not subjected to such 
an intense process because they meet with each other less frequently? 
Another (methodological) difficulty is related to the fact that there might be multiple 
decision-making centres in a member state such as Poland which occasionally compete 
with one another in the course of defining national foreign policy. In other words, it 
becomes difficult to determine who defines the national foreign policy. Such a situation 
was observed in the case of Polish foreign policy towards her immediate Eastern 
neighbours, especially after the parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2005. The role 
of the Polish MFA was seriously challenged by both the Prime Minister's office and that 
of the President. On top of that, the course advocated by the Prime Minister's advisors 
would on occasions be different from that proposed by the MFA. In such cases, it is 
difficult to determine the definite national interest, when foreign policy lacks consistency 
and not all the foreign policy actors involved speak with one voice. 
Finally, an interesting idea for future research might be to look at the domestic factors 
influencing the Europeanisation process. Studying this thesis, the influence of domestic 
politics and changes in government, have been treated here as a `black box'. However, as 
the recent presidential and parliamentary elections (2005) have shown, these factors had 
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considerable impact on the overall policy of Poland inside the EU. However, in the case 
of foreign policy, these changes of course were mainly at'the highest levels, while at the 
levels of experts the work done was typically `business as usual' with the application of 
lessons learnt. As for the procedures, there could be a possibility of un-learning, 
especially given that a large number of the foreign policy staff, including many of those 
interviewed for this thesis, have either left or been made redundant (sonne also left to 
work for the EU institutions). 
The insights from the four substantive cases 
This part of the conclusions discusses the main findings of the empirical data, it 
summarises it and refers to any similar research done in other studies. The findings of all 
explanatory cases both on the process and on the policy substance are brought together. 
The Europeanisation of the Polish MFA: change in policy process 
The main empirical findings of the thesis relate to the influence that participation in 
CFSP had on the process and substance of Polish foreign policy. It was shown that the 
Polish MFA had to adapt the structures, rhythm and some of the underlying principles of 
its work. After the changes in 1989, becoming an active observer and then a member of 
the EU were very important events of ministerial history. The adaptation to CFSP was 
quite difficult, considering the organisational baggage that the MFA took over from the 
communist period. Some very deep-rooted habits of officials had to be changed, such as 
(lack of) information sharing or team-building. Also the hierarchical structure, very 
characteristic of the communist regime's executive, had to be adapted to allow for the 
delegation of more powers to the level of experts. The most important findings are 
discussed below. 
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Adaptation in the organisational structure, policy process and institutional culture 
Research on the Polish MFA identified several types of change that took place as a result 
of Polish participation in the CFSP. The earliest change, that began even before the active 
observer period was caused mainly by conditionality and was organisational. It involved 
creating new departments dealing with the EU (DUEiONA, later the DUE) and the unit 
responsible for CFSP. Also within the territorial departments of the MFA, the positions 
of desk officers responsible for CFSP matters were created. This fostered the new role of 
the DUE that shifted mainly towards that of coordinator of the CFSP dossier within the 
ministry and even within the government. Europeanisation could also be observed in the 
establishment of new posts (or adding new functions to already existing positions), such 
as that of the European Correspondent, his/her deputy, the Political Director or the PSC 
Ambassador. Active participation in the CFSP meetings required teamwork and 
information-sharing on the part of the officials from different units and departments. Both 
of these processes meant substantial changes in the way the work was organised and 
information circulated. As one of the diplomats noted, the greatest challenge was to 
convince the officials in the MFA that they should start acknowledging the necessity to 
work in a multilateral, rather than a bilateral environment. 
Next to the MFA, the role and organisation of the Polish Permanent Representation to the 
EU in Brussels has changed. Two sub-sections were created in the external relations 
section: one dealing with CFSP and one with ESDP issues. When Poland gained the 
status of active observer, the number of personnel in the Pcnnanent Representation 
tripled and new coordination mechanisms were introduced. The rhythm of work changed 
substantially and was adapted to the work of the EU institutions, particularly the Council 
of the EU. It included a number of preparatory meetings before EU meetings, such as 
COREPER II or the PSC. Also a system of preparing instructions in Warsaw, getting 
them authorised, sent on time to Brussels and then timely reporting back to the Polish 
MFA by the representatives had to be implemented. The coordination system for EC and 
CFSP related issues was established to first manage the accession negotiations and later 
to facilitate Polish input to the EU's politics. It remained rather cumbersome, involving a 
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lot of different actors and it is still in flux. For example, after a significant debate about 
the situation of UKIE after accession, its role still remains uncertain. 
Europeanisation has also meant modernisation in technical issues and every-day work 
management, as innovations were also introduced in this area. New communication 
systems were installed, first the EU-32, then ACN and finally CORTESY. From the very 
beginning, Poland faced problems introducing a safe electronic network, a challenge that 
has yet not been fully overcome. This has obstructed the circulation of documents, which 
is crucial in managing a dynamic area like the CFSP, when time is an important factor in 
the decision-making process. 
Regarding the internal working organisation and culture, EU membership and the 
establishment of the DUE resulted in a clear generation gap in the Polish MFA. This gap 
seemed more significant than the different political orientations of the officials. It was 
mostly young diplomats that dealt with the CFSP and, as many of them claimed in the 
course of this study, they became the least liked ministerial department, bringing with 
them revolutionary changes. This gap has not been closed and one of the insiders 
observed gloomily that it seemed almost impossible to do so in the near future. 
Another significant change in terms of policy making and institutional culture was the 
fact that officials in the Polish MFA became a part of an EU coordination reflex with 
their counterparts from other member states. They now began to consider what the others 
might think before even preparing their own national position/instructions for 
representatives in Brussels. Such consultations would take place in various forms, on a 
bilateral basis, in Warsaw and in other European capitals or in groups of `like-minded' 
member states that would often prepare joint strategies for the formal meetings. 
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The role of national representatives in Brussels as `change agents' in the 
Europeanisation process 
The findings of the study indicate that national representatives in Brussels, even at the 
level of experts, have an impact on the procedures and substance of national (Polish) 
foreign policy and take an active part in the process of Europeanisation. They act as 
`change agents' in relation to the capital, initiating changes at the domestic level. One 
mechanism fostering their influence is providing instructions and advice to the capital, 
which may lead to the institutionalisation of the lessons learnt. It may take different 
forms: in some cases it is reporting back from a mneeting, providing feedback or a 
contribution to non-papers and other policy documents or assisting higher ranking 
officials in their meetings and advising them on the strategy of pursuing national goals. 
The role of the national representatives in Brussels as `change agents' is reflected in the 
evidence reported. They have undergone an intense process of socialisation during the 
Council meetings and entered the learning process. The change in their behaviour during 
meetings became apparent to the other participants and was reported in the interviews. At 
the same time, their colleagues in Warsaw were not subjected to the same socialisation 
and learning processes or to such an extent and soon a gap in experience and knowledge 
opened between those based in Brussels and those based in Warsaw. One of the results 
was that the representatives were observed to adopt a less radical line and discourse than 
Warsaw might wish, as a result of gaining confidence and learning the procedural nouns 
in the Council. They would also often signal to Warsaw how far it could press for a 
favourable solution and when such actions would endanger the state's credibility among 
its partners. 
In this respect, the experts in Brussels had an important impact on the strategies that 
Poland chose, providing legitimacy to new ideas, based on their newly-gained expertise 
inside the Council. This was generally recognised by their colleagues in Warsaw, who 
often admitted in the interviews that they learnt from their Brussels-based counterparts. 
But the consensus oriented nature of negotiations in the EU was an important lesson for 
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all levels of decision-making in Poland. As expressed by the Prime Minster, in the EU 
everyone has their own interest, but one cannot allow the situation when one member 
state would feel it unacceptable to stay in the EU. Hence, as he claimed "if for someone 
the word `compromise' is a bad one, he is not a true European" (Belka, 2005). 
Perceptions of CFSP by diplomats and MFA officials 
In the course of this thesis, it became apparent that there was a shift in the perception of 
the CFSP among Polish officials and diplomats from the MFA. As explained by one of 
them, in the beginning it was seen as something that Brussels was confronting with the 
Polish national policy. Such a view was especially common among the older diplomats, 
whereas the younger generation seemed to be more open for change. Such fears may be 
related to the fact that Poland had been in a position to create its own independent foreign 
policy for a few years before having to face up to the requirements of the CFSP. Slogans, 
like `from Moscow to Brussels', illustrated some popular fears that Polish state 
sovereignty in the domain of foreign policy, once lost to Moscow, could again be made 
subordinate, this time to the EU. Hence, the `opposition reflex' described by one 
practitioner was closely linked to the issues of independence in policy-making. 
Nonetheless, this situation has been changing with time and now, more then three years 
after accession, the CFSP is perceived as an opportunity rather than a constraint on 
national foreign policy. This became very clear from the results of the interviews both in 
Brussels and in Warsaw. There are a few reasons behind this shift in perceptions. First, 
the channels and mechanisms of uploading were discovered and used. Even though the 
Poles were disillusioned with the fact that only part of their ideas were taken on-board, 
they have experienced an active shaping of the policy of the 25 (now 27) member states, 
something they were unsuccessfully trying to influence prior to the accession (for 
example in the case of the Eastern dimension). The Poles were also able to 
`internationalise' 'some of their national problems or priorities in national security. For 
example, the issue of the harassment of the Union of Poles in Belarus was condemned by 
the whole EU-25, which bore much more weight than if Poland had done it unilaterally. 
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Polish diplomats and politicians also managed to get the EU involved in the events of the 
Orange Revolution, despite an initial reluctance on the part of some old member states. 
Taking a leading role, together with Lithuania and the CFSP High Representative Javier 
Solana, they were able to pursue a policy that was central to the national interest with the 
support of the whole of the EU. 
The EU has also started to be perceived as an institution that the Polish MFA was part of 
and not something `alien' to it. This was illustrated in the language used for example in 
instructions or in the informal and public discourse, where the officials no longer refer to 
the EU as `them'. There is also less calling for action from a position of an outsider, but 
more pragmatism underpinned by an understanding that Poland has become one of the 
states responsible for the EU's policies and their implementation. Finally, Brussels has 
also become a valuable source of information and analysis, coming not only from the EU 
institutions, but also from other member states, for example via CORTESY network. This 
development has shown another advantage of CFSP and proved to many officials in the 
Polish MFA that EU foreign policy was based on an expertise that Poland could never 
have access to if it remained alone or at least outside the EU. On the other hand, it 
changed the context in which national foreign policy was formulated by providing some 
fundamental information. 
Between the member states: the `crossloading' dimension of Europeanisation 
The `crossloading' dimension, conceptualized earlier as an exchange of norms and 
practices between the member states, but outside of the EU institutional framework, 
receives the least attention in most academic studies. Also in the course of research on 
Polish foreign policy, there is very little evidence gathered to draw any substantial 
conclusions as to this aspect of Europeanisation. Most `crossloading' took place before 
Poland became an active observer to the EU. This is nothing surprising, considering the 
fact that in that period the EU institutional fora were largely unavailable to Polish 
officials. 
226 
There are a few documented attempts at `crossloading'. Before Poland joined the EU, 
several member states, such as the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark or France, offered to 
share their experiences of coordinating EU policy and in adjusting their own foreign 
ministries to working within the framework of the CFSP. Such courses were often 
sponsored by the EU, for example by the PHARE programme. The older member states 
also offered the Polish (Associated) European Correspondent some possibilities of 
practice-oriented training. For example, she was invited in 2000 to visit the FCO in the 
UK for a week, in the period preceding the General Affairs Council (GAC). There is, 
however, no evidence that those lessons were later institutionalized. 
After Poland became a member of the EU, a couple of officials from the DUE were 
hosted in 2005 by the UK and Austria to assist and learn from the experiences of holding 
the Presidency. An official from DUE was invited to the FCO's CFSP Unit in order to 
observe how the British dealt with the challenge of the Presidency. The same official was 
later made responsible for the preparations for the future Polish Presidency, so there is 
hope that the lessons she learnt in London will become institutionalized in the Polish 
MFA. Such evidence, however, is not there yet. 
Is the Polish case any different? Polish MFA and other ministries of the member states 
For Poland, as for many other member states, EU membership has posed considerable 
institutional challenges, not only in tenns of coordinating EU policies and managing the 
`blurring boundaries' between domestic and foreign affairs, but also concerning the 
design of effective systems that would allow for "projecting to and receiving from the 
EU" (Allen, 2005: 131). 
Many of the problems experienced by Poland are shared with other new member states, 
while others may be characteristic only for the largest of the newcomers. In relation to 
this issue, the old member states' representatives would most often refer to 
miscommunication between the capital and the representatives in Brussels, a relatively 
long decision path, retaining consistency between different Council Working Groups or 
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using aggressive rhetoric in the pursuit of national goals. Poland was usually named as 
the new member state with most resources at hand, but also the strongest ambition of 
playing an active role in the CFSP. In the case of a few smaller states, such as Slovenia or 
Malta, lack of human resources was a considerable problem and these countries were 
often unable to send representatives to all CFSP Working Groups. The lack of foreign 
policy traditions and institutions was listed as yet another obstacle, for example in the 
case of the Baltic States. 
The challenges to the role of the Polish MFA as a `gatekeeper' of the state's external 
relations is another feature held in common with other member states, resulting from 
global developments rather than the EU integration process alone. For example, academic 
studies on the adaptation of the Austrian (Neuhold, 2002) and Danish (Jorgensen, 2002) 
MFAs, as well as the British FCO (Allen, 2002; Oliver and Allen, 2006) have shown that 
they faced the same challenge. As Oliver and Allen put it, the main challenge brought 
about has been with foreign and EU policy increasingly becoming issues of coordination 
across government, with the FCO striving to remain a central department in this process 
(Allen and Oliver, 2006: 53 and 59). For some time now, the Polish MFA has been 
managing the challenge by accepting its new role of a `boundary-spanner' and it engages 
in more interaction with other ministries, where EU contact officials were established. 
But even this function was called into question during the negotiation period by the 
creation of the UKIE, with the initial aim of coordinating negotiations with the EU. 
However, after accession, the future of the UKIE still remains unclear. 
Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy: substance 
As well as policy procedures, the study has also looked at the Europeanisation of policy 
substance, focusing on policy towards Poland's immediate Eastern neighbours. This 
choice meant researching change in one of the most sensitive areas of Polish foreign 
policy. The evidence has shown that while some national adaptation took place and its 
degree is still difficult to determine, there were significant efforts made in order to upload 
national policy objectives to the European level. Strategies have been adapted and 
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changed with time, after the unsuccessful advocacy of the idea of creating the Eastern 
dimension before accession. Some explanation can be certainly provided by the fact that 
the Poles did not have any insight into the workings of the EU, as they did not yet have 
the privilege of sitting in the Council. This changed once Poland gained the status of an 
active observer. This initiative of creating the new dimension remained `on the shelf 
throughout most of the period which this study looked at and was brought back to the 
discussions by the Poles two years after their accession, in mid-2006. An initial 
assessment of how the Eastern Dimension was advocated on these two occasions points 
to the fact that some Europeanisation took place, such as thorough consultations with 
partners, informal seeking of necessary support or simple and pragmatic formulation of 
the main ideas, but not all the lessons have yet been learnt. 
The first period prior to accession, was characterised mainly by national adaptation and 
alignment with the EU acquis politique. In the case of the policy towards Poland's 
Eastern neighbours some formal adjustment took place. However, these were not 
revolutionary changes and the overall policy direction remained the same. Examples 
include restraining official contacts with the Belarusian officials at the ministerial level, 
which were taking place beforehand, or introducing a strict visa regime for Ukraine. The 
last one, while not being a part of the second pillar, is tightly connected to the foreign 
policy and had an influence on bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relations. 
The study focused on two of Poland's neighbours: Ukraine and Belarus. Because of the 
strategic importance of the two, one could expect that Poland would attempt to `ring- 
fence' these special relationships and keep them as a domaine reserve for bilateral 
relations. It was rather, however, the opposite that was noted. While in the case of 
Belarus, the Poles continued expressing quite harsh criticism of the EU's approach 
(coming especially from the Department of Europe in the MFA), they became actively 
involved in trying to change the current EU approach. In the case of Ukraine, the decision 
to go to the Orange Revolution with the EU, instead of limiting the participation to 
bilateral relations, is the best example of the Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy. At 
the same time, the issue of prospective EU membership for Ukraine remained a good 
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example of a national long-term goal that Poland has been pursuing within the EU. As the 
goal itself remained unchanged, there was a shift in strategies to a more pragmatic `small- 
steps' approach. This example also shows that as far as it is relatively easy to show the 
uploading dimension of Europeanisation, it is much more difficult to trace national 
adaptation and change in the core of national foreign policy. Here, the main national goal 
remained unchanged, even though, one could argue that the shift in strategy and 
discourse may also eventually influence the re-formulation of Poland's objectives. 
Another conclusion that may be drawn from the empirical research is the fact the Polish 
decision-makers decided to be active in the EU and use it as an arena for the 
`internationalisation' of some national strategic goals. When linked with the findings 
relating to the MFA, it shows that the shift in perceptions of the CFSP from a constraint 
to an opportunity for national foreign policy has occurred in favour of the latter. This is 
despite the often expressed criticism of the CFSP as being ineffective and `blurred' as a 
result of a compromise between the 25 member states. The cases analysed belong to the 
most sensitive components of Polish foreign policy. This may explain such intense 
uploading efforts and active participation, which did not take place in many other policy 
areas. 
An important role in this process of Europcanisation was played by those diplomats who 
were posted to Brussels or at least attended meetings in the Council. They took the 
responsibility for `translating Brussels' to Warsaw and often signalled what would be the 
best strategy or the best moment to accept a compromise. In the analysed cases, the 
COEST representative remained in very close contact with the MFA, usually with the 
European Correspondent, making important suggestions on the conduct of negotiations. 
The role of the Brussels-based officials was even appreciated by several of the EU 
officials and national representatives who were interviewed. An example of such a role 
might be the case of the UPB or the MES for Ukraine. 
This perception of an EU opportunity is linked to the role that the Polish officials 
envisage for the EU in their own areas within the policy-making process. As the example 
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of the Orange Revolution has shown, the EU forum may serve as a legitimising factor for 
national objectives. At the initial stage of Polish EU membership, this perception seemed 
to be taken to the extreme with an expectation that the EU would take Polish proposals 
onboard, even if they were not in line with the general consensus. This may be concluded 
from the example of the `Eastern Dimension' or the perceptions of some national 
representatives. However, such an attitude was bound to change later, when the basic 
principles of policy-making in the Council were discovered by the Polish representatives. 
The Eastern policy has also forced the Poles to generally raise their profile in the EU and 
show that they came to Brussels to do more than just to `arrange the offices' 
(Kwasniewski, 2005), as expressed by one of the quoted politicians. 
The example of Ukraine has also shown that Poland was not going to `ring-fence' its 
relationships with its strategic partners. On the contrary, Polish politicians decided to 
involve the EU and act through the EU, whether in the case of the revolution or providing 
support for Ukrainian WTO membership. This willingness to `go with the EU' went quite 
far in the case of the UPB. Here, as implicitly suggested by a few diplomats from other 
member states, Poland went even further than some other member states would usually 
go. It could be argued that as a result the bilateral contacts and minority issue, which 
would normally not feature that significantly on the EU agenda, were included in the EU 
discourse and the Council Conclusions. 
In the case of the Eastern policy the adaptation process also resulted in a change of 
discourse from a more nationalist, even aggressive, to a more compromising one. This 
process seems to be ongoing. Regarding the Belarusian question, there seems to be an 
ongoing `struggle' between Poland, who was pushing for a more active and radical 
policy, and the EU which tried to restrain Polish foreign policy. Thus, because this issue 
raises high emotions in Poland, Europeanisation does not always proceed without 
obstacles. It is an interesting question, related to the circular nature of Europeanisation, 
whether one will eventually manage to prevail. 
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Nonetheless, an active position within the EU has not prevented the Poles from 
conducting their own bilateral relations with the above mentioned neighbours. This is in 
itself nothing surprising, as the CFSP does not `override' national foreign policies, but 
occasionally the two were not fully convergent. In other words, the agreed policy with 
regard to high-level formal visits to Ukraine was not fully coherent with what the Polish 
diplomacy and the experts presented inside the Council. Such situations were, however, 
quite rare. An interesting idea for further research, stemming from this conclusion, is to 
ask whether it is possible that a member state (Poland) acts in a `Europeanised' way in 
multilateral forum but does not show any signs of Europeanisation when it comes to 
bilateral relations? 
In terms of the actual impact that the Poles managed to exert on the policy of the EU, it 
has been a mixed record. As noted a few times throughout the thesis, they undoubtedly 
raised the interests in the region on the Council's agenda. There were a few examples 
when they managed to convince their partners to alter their policies, such as in the case of 
participating in the Orange Revolution, not excluding limited contacts with Belarusian 
officials or granting Ukraine the MES. Nonetheless, often the negotiations ended with 
disappointing results; for example, the EU did not create an independent Eastern 
Dimension, it did not make any special offer to Ukraine after the revolution and the visa- 
ban list on Belarusian officials was not extended. Arguably, some important lessons were 
learnt from these failures and strategies and expectations were at least partially adjusted. 
Conclusions: not such an awkward partner after all? 
On the basis of this research it can be concluded that EU membership in general and 
participation in the CFSP in particular had a considerable impact on Poland's foreign 
policy procedures and on foreign policy-making in Poland. In the case of foreign policy 
substance, the most visible change took place prior to enlargement. The main shift 
happened in April 2003 when Poland gained the status of an active observer and was 
invited to join the meetings in the Council. This provided opportunities for socialisation 
and learning to take place. However, it may be also concluded that the main strategic 
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policy goals regarding Eastern Europe remained largely unchanged, in spite of a shift in 
the discourse, especially in the internal EU forums and the Europeanisation process is 




A. EU Official Documents 
Council of the EU (2003) European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
Council of the EU (1998) Common Position of 9 July 1998 defined by the Council on the 
basis ofArticle J. 2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning Belarus, 98/448/CFSP. 
Europe Agreement (1994) European Agreement establishing an association agreement 
between the European Communities and their member States, on one part, and the 
Republic of Poland, on the other part, Official Journal L 348, Brussels 
European Commission (2005) Communication to the Commission. Implementing and 
promoting the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 22 November 2005, 
SEC(2005) 1521. 
European Commission (2004a) European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy Paper, 
Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 final. 
European Commission (2004b) Country Strategy Paper, National Indicative Programme: 
Belarats 2005-2006,28 May 2004. 
European Commission (2004c) EU-Ukraine relations: fron co-operation to integration, 
Press Release, Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine, Kyiv, 25 November 
2004. 
234 
European Commission (2003) Wider Europe -Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003) 104 final. 
European Council (1999) Common Strategy on Ukraine, 1999/877/CFSP. 
GAC (1997) General Affairs Council Conclusions, Brussels, 29 April, 1997, Brussels. 
GAERC (2006a) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
30-31 January 2006, Brussels. 
GAERC (2006b) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
10-11 April 2006, Brussels. 
GAERC (2005a) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
31 January 2005, Brussels. 
GAERC (2005b) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
21 February 2005, Brussels. 
GAERC (2005c) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
7 November 2005, Brussels. 
GAERC (2004a) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
22-23 November 2004, Brussels. 
GAERC (2004b) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
13 December 2004, Brussels. 
GAERC (2002) General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 
18-19 November 2002, Brussels. 
235 
B. Documents of Polish Government 
Declaration of the Republic of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and the 
Republic of Hungary on the Cooperation in Pursuit of European Integration, 15 
February 1991, Visegrad, Zbior Dokumentow, 
http: //www. zbiordokumentow. pl/1991/l/18. html. 
Decyzja nr 14 Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych z dnia 29 kwietnia 2004 r 1v sprawie 
przeksztalcenia Przedstawicielstwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej przy IVspolnotach 
Europejskich, z siedziba w Brukseli w Stale Przedstawicielstwo Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 
przy Unii Europejskiej, Dziennik Urzgdowy Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych nr 4,2004. 
Joint Polish-Russian Declaration, Warsaw, 25 August 1993, Zbiör Dokurncntc w, 
http: //www. zbiordokumentow. pl/1993/3/7. html 
MFA (2003a) Non paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern 
neighbours after EU enlargement, Warsaw. 
MFA (2003b) National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw. 
MFA (2005) Polish-Belarusian relations: Statement of the Polish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 28 July 2005; http: //www. polishembassy. ie/belarus. htm (07.03.06). 
MFA (2005) Information on the letter of Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Poland on the situation in Belarus, Warsaw, 27 July 2005; 
http: //www. polishembassy. ie/bialorlistRP. htm (14 March 06). 
Narodowy Program Przygotowania do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europcjskiej, Warsaw, 4 
May 1999. 
236 
Opinie na temat Narodowego Prograrnu Przygotowania Polski do Czlonkostº1wa w Unii 
Europejskiej, Druk Sejmowy nr 1194, http: //biurose. sejm. gov. pi/tcksty/r-161. htm. 
`Poland's negotiation position in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy', 
Poland's Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union, 
Warsaw: Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland and Government 
Plenipotentiary for Poland's Accession Negotiations to the European Union, June 2000. 
Skubiszewski, K. (1990a) Note of the Government of the Republic of Poland to the USSR 
Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, Concerning Negotiations on the Withdrawal of 
Soviet Troops from Poland, Zbior Dokumentow, 
http: //www. zbiordokumentow. pl/I 990/3/5. html. 
System koordynacji polityki europejskiej w okresic poprzedzajcjcym czlonkosttit'o Polski it, 
UE, Dokument przyjety 28 lutego 2003 r. przez Zespöl Przygotowawczy Komitetu 
Integracji Europejskiej praz przez Rads Ministröw 4 marca 2003 r. 
Ustawa z dnia 4 wrzesnia 1997 r. o dzialach administracji rztldowej, Dzicnnik Urzgdowy 
Nr 141, poz. 943, Art. 32.2. 
Ustawa z dnia 8 sierpnia 1996r. o Komitecie Integracji Europejskiej, Dzicnnik 
Urzcdowy z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996r. 
Regelamin Organizacyjny Przedstawicielstwa RP przy JVspöhtotach Europejskich it, 
Brukseli, Brussels, 11.09.2000. 
Rozporzqdzenie Rady Ministröw z dnia 24 marca 1998 r. w sprawie ustanowienia 
Pelnomocnika Rzgdu do Spraw Negocjacji o Czlonkosiwo Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w 
Unii Europejskiej, Dziennik Ustaw RP, Warsaw 26 March 1998. 
lVewnctrzny Regulamin Stalego Przedstawicielstwa RP prey EU w Brukseli, 8 grudnia 
2004. 
237 
Zarzqdzenie Prezesa Rady Ministröw z dnia 27 marca 1998 r. w sprawic Zcspolut 
Negocjacyjnego w Sprawie negocjacji o Czlonkostwo rzeczpospolitej 1'olskicj iv Unii 
Europejskiej, Kancelaria Rady Ministröw, P-121-19-98. 
Zarzqdzenie nr 1 Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych z dnia 23 stycznia 2004 r. w spratiwie 
zmiany regulaminu organizacyjnego Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznyc/t oraz uchylenia 
niektörych zarzgdzeri Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych, Dzicnnik Urzcdowy MSZ, Nr 1, 
2004. 
Zarzqdzenie nr 4/2003, Stale Przedstawicielstwo RP przy UE, Brussels. 
C. Speeches 
Belka, M. (2005) Migdzynarodowy Klub Dyskusyjny "Polityki "- Tczy titystcpVcnia 
Premiera Marka Belki, 16 marca 2005, Wroclaw, available on the official wcbsitc of the 
prime Minister's Office: http: //kprm. gov. pl/print. php? id=4756_13570. htin. 
Buzek, J. (1999) Address by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Jerzy 13u. ek 
before the North Atlantic Council, Brussels 16 March, Zbior Dokumcntow. no. 1-2. 
Cimoszewicz, W. (2004) Europe Enlarged but Open, Statement at the OECD Council, 
Paris, 22 April. 
Cimoszewicz, W. (2003) The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish 
View, Speech at the Conference `The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy', 20 
February 2003, Warsaw. 
Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006a) European Strategies for promoting Democracy in Post- 
Communist Countries, Speech delivered at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, 20 
January 2006, SPEECH/06/35. 
238 
Fcrrcro-Waldncr, B. (2006b) European Neighbourhood Policy, Spccch dclivcrcd at the 
Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm 7 March 2006, SPEECII/06/149. 
Gcrcmck, B. (1998) Statement of Atinistcr of Foreign 4ffairs of the Republic of Poland 
Bronislaw Geremck on Opening of Poland's Negotiations on Membership in the 
European Union, Warsaw: MSZ. 
Kulakowski, J. (2001) Skat tc cmocjc? Fragmcnty wystapicnia ministra Jana 
Kulakowskicgo podczas plcnarncj scsji Scjmu 6 czcrwca 2001 roku, Unia cF Polska, 
http: //www. unia-polska. pl/indcx. plip? id=4&q=331. 
Kwanicwski, A. (1999) Speech by President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander 
Kivasnicwski delivered during the Gala Event in Ilashington, Marking the 50th 
Anniversary of the Establishment of NATO, Zbior Dokumcntow, no. 1-2. 
Landaburu, E. (2006) From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy., are there Concrete 
alternatives o enlargement?, Speech delivered at the CEPS Conference "Revitalizing 
Europe", Brussels, 23 January 2006. 
Mazowiccki, T. (1990) Sejm Expose by the Polish Prime Minister Tadcus: Aficowiccki, 
littp: //www. zbiordokuiiiciitow. pl/I990/1/l. litilil. 
Mcllcr, S. (2006) Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2006. Presented at 
the session of the Scjm. Warsaw, 15 February 2006. 
Olcchowski, A. (1994a) Presentation of Polish Foreign Policy in 1994 - Statement l 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Andaej Olechoitski irr Sejm, 
Warsaw May 12 1994, Zbior Dokumcntow, no. 2, 
littp: //www. zbiordokumcntow. pl/indcx. html 
Olcchawski, A. (1994b) Statcmcnt of the Minister of Foreign . 1fiirs of the Republic of 
1'oland Andrej Olcchon-ski on the Alain Elements of Polish Eastern Policy at a meeting 
of Foreign Affairs Canmiucc, Senat of the Republic of Poland, Zbior Dokumcntow, 
litip: //www. zbiordokuiilciitow. pi/i 994/! /7. html. 
239 
Pcrelyhin, Y. (2003) Speech delivered at a conference 'Where Ukraine is heading? ' in: J. 
Onyszkicwisz (cd. ) Where Ukraine is heading? Sample of conference proceedings, 
Warsaw: Center for International Relations. 
Prodi, R. (2002) A Wider Europe -A proximity Policy as the key to stability, Speech 
delivered at the Sixth ECSA-World Confcrcnce, Brussels 5-6 December 2002. 
Skubiszcwski, K. (1993) Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Poland Krzysztof Skubis e ski concerning Poland's policy towards NATO, particularly 
in the context of the letter of Russian President Boris Yelisin to the leaders of France, 
Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom on September 15 1993, Zbior 
Dokumcntow, bttp: //www. zbiordokumcntow. pl/I993/4/3. html. 
Skubiszcwski, K. (1991) `Foreign Policy Issues at the start of 1991, Address by the 
Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in the Scjm, Zbior DoAwncntow, 
http: //www. zbiordokumcntow. pl/1991/2/I. litml. 
Skubiszcwski, K. (I990b) Poland and European security, Address by the Polish Foreign 
Minister Krzysztof Skubiszcwski to the North Atlantic Assembly, Zbior Dokumcntow, 
littp: //www. zbiordokuinciitow. lil/1990/4/l. litiiii. 
Skubiszcwski, K. (1990c) Poland and the East, Statement by the Polish Forcign Minister 
Krzysztof Skubiszcwski in the Senate, Zbior Dokumentow, 
http: //www. zbiordokumcntow. pl/1990/3/4. html 
Skubiszcwski, K. (1990d) Pr cmowicnie Alinistra Spraw Zagranicarych RI' Krrysziofa 
Skubiszexskiego na spolkaniu ministcrialnl'nn konferencji '2 + 4', Zbior Dokumcntow, 
http: //www. zbiordokumcntow. pl/I 990/3/8. html. 
Skubiszcwski, K. (1990c) Scjm cxposc by ! Minster for Foreign Affairs of the 1t11, 
KrzysrtofSkubis: cwski, Zbior Dokumcntow, 
http: /hvww. zbiordokumcntow. pl/1990/2/2. html. 
Vcnccugcn, 0. (2003) EU Enlargement and Me Union's Neighbourhood Policy, Speech 
delivered at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, 27 October 2003. 
240 
Walesa, L. (1994) Address by the President of the Republic of Poland Leeb Walesa at the 
official luncheon of the Presidents of the Visegrad Group countries and the President of 
the United States ofAincrica Bill Clinton, Zbior Dokumcntow. 
Walesa, L. (1993) Letter from the President of the Republic of Poland Lech Walesa to 
Manfred WVvrner, General Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty concerning Polish 
rncmbcrship of NATO, Warsaw Scptcnibcr 1 1993, Zbior Dokumcntow. 
SEcoNDAR ' SOURCES 
A. Books, articles in academic journals and papers 
Aggcstam, L. (1999) `Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy', 
ARENA Working Papers, WP 99/8. 
Agh, A. (1999) `Europeanization of policy-making in East Ccntral Europe: the I lungarian 
approach to EU acccssion', Journal of rvirol can Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 839- 
854. 
Allen, D. (2005) `The United Kingdom: A Europeanized Government in a non- 
Europeanized Polity' in: S. Bulmer and C. Lcqucsne (eels. ) 77te Afemb'r States of the 
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Allcn, D. and Olivcr, T. (2006a) `The Europeanisation of British Forcign Policy' in: 1. 
flache and A. Jordan (cds. ) The Europeanisation of British Politics, Basingstoke: 
Palgravc Macmillan. 
Allcn, D. and Olivcr, T. (2006b) `The Europcanisation of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Ot ice' in: I. Bache and A. Jordan (cds. ) The Europcanisation of British 
Politics, Basingstokc: Palgravc Macmillan. 
241 
Allen, D. and Oliver, T. (2004) The Europeanisation of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, paper presented at the ESRC/UACES Seminar Series on EBPP, 16 July 2004, 
Sheffield. 
Allen, D. and Wallace, W. (1982) `European Political Cooperation: The Historical and 
Contemporary Background', in D. Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessels (cds. ) European 
Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for 11'estern Europe, London: 
Buttcnvorths. 
Andersen, S. and Eliasscn, K. (1993) Ataking policy in Europe: The Etuopcfication of 
National Policy-Making, London: Sage. 
Bache, 1. and Marshall, A. (2004) `Europcanisation and Domestic Change: A Govcrnancc 
Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain', Quccn's papers on l uropcanisation, no. 
5. 
ßarcz, J. (1992) `Nicmcy - Polska: Micchy szansa a wyzwanicm' in: It. Ku)niar (cd. ), 
Krajobraz po transformacji. Srodowisko micdzyvrarvdowc 1'olski it, Tatach 
dzicwiccd: icsialych, Warsaw: Instytut Stosunkow Micdzynarodowych. 
13cllicr, I. (2000) `A Europeanised clitc? An anthropology of E"urolican Commission 
Officials' in: R. Ilarmscn and T. M. Wilson (cols. ) Europeani. ation: Institutions, Identities 
and Citizenship. Yearbook of Europcan Studies, Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
ßcycrs, J. and Trondal, J. (2003) 'l low Nation-States '! lit' Europe - Ambiguity and 
Representation in the European Union', European Integration online Papers, vol. 7, no. 
5. 
Bcycrs, J. (2002) `Multiple, Embcddcdncss and Socialization in Europe,: The Case, of 
Council Officials', ARENA 11'orking Papers, WP 02/33. 
242 
Biclcn, S. (1992) `ZSRR - wiclka nicwiadoma' in: It. Kufniar (cd. ) Krajobra po 
transformacji. Srodoivisko micdzynarodowc Polski w latach d: icwiccd: icsia! }ych, 
Warsaw: Instytut Stosunkow Micdzynarodowych. 
Biskupski, M. B. (2000) The History of Poland, Wcstport and London: Grccnwood Press. 
ßlyth, M. (2002) `Institutions and Idcas' in: Marsh, D. and Stokcr, G. (cds. ) Theory and 
Methods in political Science, Basingstokc: Palgravc Macmillan 
ßornbcrb, E. and Pctcrson, J. (2000) `Policy Transfcr and Europcanization: Passing the 
Ilcinckcn Tcst', Queen's Papers on Luropcani: ation, na. 2, 
http: //www. club. ac. uk/schools/Schoolo(PoliticsintcrnationalStudics/FiIcStorc/Europcanis 
ationFilcs/FiIctoupload, 5303, cn. pd f. 
Börzcl, T. (2005) `Europeanization: I low the European Union interacts with its Member 
States' in: S. Bulmcr and C, Lcyucsnc (cds. ) The Member States of the European Union, 
Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity Press. 
Börzcl, T. (2003) `Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member State Responses to 
Europeanization', 
littp: //www. qub. ac. uk/schools/Scliooloil'oliticsintcrnationalStu(lics/FilcStorc/Europcanis 
ationFi lcs/Filctoupload, 5270, cn. pd f. 
ßörzcl, T. (2002) `Pact-Setting, Foot Dragging, and Fence-Setting: Member Statt 
responses to Europeanization', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, PP. 
193-214. 
Borkowski, J. (1998) `Koordynacja polskicj polityki intcgracji curopcjskicj', Studia 
EuropeJskic, no. 2, vol. 6. 
243 
ßowkcr, M. (1995) `Russian Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe' in P. Shcannan 
(cd. ) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, Oxford: Wcstvicw Press. 
Browning, C. and Joannicrni, P. (2003) `Thc Europcan Union's Two Dimcnsions: The 
Eastern and The Northern', Security Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 463-478. 
Brzczinski, Z. (1991) `Sclcctivc Global Commitnicnt', Foreign A/J"airs, vol. 70, no. 4, pp. 
1-20. 
Duller, J. and Gamble, A. (2002) `Conceptualising Eurolicanisation', Public Policy and 
Administration, vol. 17, no. 2, rh. 4-24. 
ßulnur, S. (2007) `Thcorizing Eurohcanization' in: P. Graziano and M. Vink (cds. ) 
Europeanization. New Research Agendas, I3asingstokc: Palgravc Macmillan. 
Bulmcr J. and Burch (2000) `The Europcanisation of central British government' in: 
Rhodes, R. (cd. ) Transforming British government, Volume I Changing Institutions, 
London: Macmillan. 
Bulmcr, S. J. and Radaclli, C. M. (2004) `Thc Europeanisation of National Policy? ' 
Qucrn's Papers on Europeanization, no 1, 
littp: //www. qub. ac. uk/scllools/Sclioololl, ol iticslntcrnationalStudics/FilcStorc/Europcanis 
ationFilcs/Fi I ctoupload, 5 182, cn. pd f. 
ßulmcr, S. (1998) `New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European 
Market', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 3, p{p. 365 - 386. 
I3urant, S. (1993) `Intcmational Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern 
Ncighbours - Lithuania, Uclarus, Ukrainc', Europe - Asia Studies, no. 3, pp. 395418. 
244 
Buras, P. and Pomorska K. (2006) `Poland and the European Neighbourhood Policy', 
Foreign Policy in Dialogue, vol. 6 no. 19, pp. 34-43. 
Burgcr, E. S. and Minchuk, V. (2006) 'Alcksandr Lukashcnka's Consolidation of Powcr' 
in: Forbrig ct al. (cds) Prospects for Democracy in 13clarus, Washington: The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States 
Calka, M. J. (1998) `Polska polityka wschodnia 1989-1997. Proba occny, nowc wyzwania 
i pcrspcktywy', Rocznik I'olskicj 11olityki 7_agranic: nej, Warsaw: Akadcmia 
Dyplornatyczna MSZ. 
Calka, M. J. (1995) `Polska polityka wschodnia w 1994 r. ', Rocvnik 1'olskicj 1'olitykl 
Zagranimrej. Warsaw: Akadernia Dyplomatyczna MSZ. 
Castle, M. and Taras, R. (2002) Ucmocracy in Poland, Boulder: Wcstvicw Press. 
Centre for Eastern Studies (2005) Rclarus, the EU's unknown neighbour, Warsaw: OSW. 
Check-cl, J. (2005) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework, International Organizatiön, Fall 2005,59, rli. 801-826 
Chcckcl, J. (2001a) "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change", 
International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 553-588 
Chcckcl, J (2001b) `The Europeanization of citizenship? ' in: M. G. Cowles, J. A. 
Caporaso, and T. Rissc-Kappcn (eds. ) 7ransf rming Europe: Europeaniration and 
domestic change, London: Cornell University Press. 
Cicszkowski, A. (2004) `Polityka Unii Europejskicj wobes wschodnich sgsiadOw - wklad 
Polski', Rocznfk 1'olskicj 1'olityki Zagranicrnej, Warsaw: Akadcmia Dyplomatyczina 
MSZ. 
245 
Clacs, D. H. (2002) . 'The process of Europcanisation - the case of Norway and the 
internal Energy Market', ARENA Working Paper, no. 12, 
http: //www. arcna. uio. no/pub] ications/wp02_l 2. htm. 
Crowe, B. (2004) `The Significance of the New Europcan Foreign Minister', CFSP 
Foriun, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 1-4. 
Czubiiiski, Z. A. (2000b) `The European Union and NATO from the Polish pcrspcctivc: 
Expectations and Rcality', Centre for European Studies, 
http: //www. ccs. uj. edu. pl/czubinski/cxpcctations. htm (31.09.05). 
Czubifiski, Z. A. (2000a) `Polish perspectives on the European Union's Common Foreign 
and Security Policy', Ccntrc for European Studies: 
http: //www. ccs. uj. cdu. pl/czubinski/policy_abstract. htm (31.09.05). 
Davies, N. (2005) God's Playground. A History of Poland. 61olunze 11, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Deutsch, K. ct al. (1957) Political Community and the North . ftlantic Area, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton Univcrsity Press. 
Dimitrova, A. (2002) `Rnlargcmcnt, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative, 
Capacity Requirement', IVest Eu olcan politics, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 171-190. 
Dukc, S. (2006) `Tic Commission and the CFSP', LIPA 11'orking Paper 20061W/01. 
Dukc, S. (2004) `The European External Action Scrvicc: A Diplomatic Service in the 
Making', CFSP Forum, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 4-7. 
246 
Duke, S. and Vanhoonackcr, S. (2006) `Administrative Governance in CFSP: 
Development and Practice', European Foreign Affairs Rcvicsv, vol. 11, no. 2, pr. 163- 
182. 
Dunay, P., Kcndc, T. and Szücs, T. (1997) `The Integration of Ccntral and Eastern 
Europe into the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Fifccn', in: M. 
Marcsccau (cd. ) Enlarging the European Union. Relations bctºt'cc,: the EU and Central 
and Eastern Europe, London: Longman. 
Dunay, P. (1994) `Security Cooperation in the Visegrad Quadrangle: Present and Future' 
in: A. J. Williams (cd. ) Rcorgani: ing Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the 
Refashioning of Europe's Security Architecture, Dartmouth: Aldershot. 
Dutkicwicz, P. and Lodzinski, S. (1998) `Thc'Grcy Zone'. Poland's Sccurity Policy sincc 
1989' in: P. Dutkicwicz and R. J. Jackson (c(ls. ) N. 1 TO looks East, London: Pracger. 
Ebcrhardt, P. (2005) Polacy na 13ialorusi. Liczcbnosc I rozmics: c enlc hidnosci polskicj 
wedlug ostalnich s/)isow pol srcclu tivch, http: //www. wspol fata- 
polska. orb. pl/indcx. php? id=pwko0l (10.03.06). 
Edwards, G. (2006) Nic New Alcmbcr States and EU Foreign Policy Afaking, EKEM 
Ilcllcnic Center for European Studies, no. 3 2006, 
http: //www. ckcm. gr/arciiivcs/2006/02/thc_new_mcmbcr. litml flmorc. 
Emmcrson, M. (2004) Two cheers for the European Neighbourhood Policy, CEPS 
Commcntary, June 2004. 
Favc11, A. (1998) `The Europcanisation of immigration politics', Eurvpcan Integration 
online Papers, vol. 2, no. 10. 
247 
Feldman, L. G. (1999) `The principle and practice of `reconciliation' in German foreign 
policy: relations with France, Israel, Poland, Czech Republic', International AAf airs, vol. 
75, no 2, pp. 333-356. 
Fcathcrstonc, K. (2003) `Introduction: In the Namc of Europc' in: K. Fcathcrstonc and 
C. M. Radaclli (cds. ) The Politics of Europcanfzalion, Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity Press. 
Fcathcrstonc, K. and Radacili, C. M. (2003) The Politics of Gurvpcani: ation, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Frccdman, L. and Mcnon, A. (1997) `Conclusion' in: J. Iloworth and A. Mcnon (cds. ) 
The European Union and National Defence Policy, London: Rout ledge. 
Gajda, E. (1974) Polska Polilyka Zagr"anicrna 1944 - 1974, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo 
NIinistcrstwa Obrony Narodowcj. 
Gajcwski, J. (2002) `Europa Srodkowa w polskicj politycc zagraniczncj' in: It. Kutaiiar 
and K. Szczcpanik (eds. ) 1'alityka ragranic: na RI' 1989 - 2002, Warsaw: ASKON 
Fundacja Studiow Micdzynarodowych. 
Glarbo, K. (1999) `Wide-awake diplomacy: reconstructing the common foreign and 
security policy of the European Union', Journal of Eurohcan Public 1'olicv, vol. 6 no. 4, 
pp. 634 - 65 1. 
Goetz, K. (2001 a) `European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search for 
an Effect? ' in: K. Goetz and S. IIix (eds. ) Europeanised politics? European Integration 
and National Political Syslcros, London: Frank Cass. 
Goctz, K. (2001b) `Making sense of post-communist central administration: 
modernization, Europeanization or Latinization? ', Journal of European: Public Policy, 
vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 1032-1051. 
248 
Goetz, K. (2000) Europeanising the National Executive? ! Nestern and Eastern Style, 
Paper given at the URCES 30th Annual Conference, Budapest, 2000. 
Grabbc, 11. (2003) `Europcanisation Gocs East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU 
Accession Process', in: K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (cds. ) The Politics of 
Europeanisalion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Grant, C. and Leonard, M. (2006) The EU's awkward neighbour; time for a new policy 
on Belarus, Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, 16 March 2006. 
Grela, M. (2003) `Polska w unijncj Europic - implikacjc dla polskicj dyplomacji', 
Rocznik Siratcgiczny 2002/2003, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowc Scholar, pp. 37-44. 
Gromadzki, G. and Suszko, 0. (2005) Afic'dy sarysfakcjcq a ro: craroººwaºricin. Rclacjc 
UE-Ukraina rok po pomarai croºvcj rcº+'olucji, Warsaw: Fundacja im. Stcfana ßatorcgo. 
Gromadzki, G. cl a! (2005) Po rcivohicji poinaraic. owcj: rclacjc EU-UA-raina do itios, ty 
2006 roku, Warsaw: Fundacja ins. Stcfana Batorego. 
Gromadzki, G. And Vcscly, L. (2006) Akrvwrnic i wspölnic. UE wobec ITialorust, 
Warsaw: Fundacja im. Stdana I3atorcgo. 
ffaas, P. (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic Communitics and International Policy 
Coordination', International Organkation, vol. 46, no. 1, rp. 1-36. 
flail, P. A. and Taylor, R. C. (1996) I'olitical Science and 77tree New Institutio,: alisms, 
Paper presented as a public lecture during the MPIFG Scientific Advisory Board Meeting 
on May 9,1996. 
249 
Ilannscn, R. (2000) `Europeanization and Govcrnancc: A New Institutionalist 
Perspective', Yearbook of European Studies, no. 14, pp. 51-81. 
Ilannscn, R. and Wilson, T. M. (2000) `Introduction: Approaches to Europcanization' in: 
R. IIannscn and T. M. Wilson (cds. ') Europeanization: Institutions, Identities and 
Citizenship. Ycarbook of European Studics, Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Havcrland, M. (2007) 'Methodology' in: P. Graziano and M. Vink (cds. ) 
Europeanization. Ncw Research Abendas, Basingstokc: Palgravc Macmillan 
Ilavcrland, M. (2003a) Methodological issues in lfuropcanisation research: the 'Ito 
rariation' Problem, Parer prcparcd for ECPR Conference, Marburg, 18-21 September 
2003, 
littp: //www. csscx. ac. uk/ccpr/cvcnts/gcncralcon fcrcncc/marburg/l)apcrs/ 15/1 /I Iavcrland. p 
df 
tlavcrland, M. (2003b) `The impact of the European Union on environmental policies' in: 
K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaclli (eds. ) The Politics of I: uropcani. ation, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ilay, C. and Wincott D. (1998) `Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism', 
Political Studies, Vol. XLVI, pp. 951-957. 
Iicriticr, A., Kcrwcr, D., Knill, C., Lchmkuhl, D., Tcutsch, M. and Douillct, A-C. (2001) 
Differentiated Europe. The European Union Impact on National Policymnaking, I3ouldcr: 
Rowman and Littlcfcld. 
f Icrranz, A. and Natorski, M. (2006) The impact of German-Russian and Polish- 
Ukrainian special relations on European Foreign Policy: enemy supplies and visas in 
the EU neighbourhood, Paper presented at the 4'h CEEISA Convention in Tartu, 25.27 
Junc, 2006. 
250 
Hill, C. (2003) The Changing Politics of Forcign Policy, London: Palgravc Macmillan. 
Bill, C. (2002) `The geopolitical implications of cnlarbcmcnt' in: J. Ziclonka (cd. ) 
Europe unbound: enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union, 
London: Routlcdgc. 
I fill, C. (1996) The Actors in Europe's Forcign Policy, London: Routlcgc. 
Hill, C. (1983) National foreign policies and European political cooperation, London: 
Allcn & Unwin. 
Ilix, S. and Goctz, K. (2001) `Introduction: European Integration and National Political 
Systems' in: K. Goctz and S. Ilix (eels. ) Europeanised Politics? European Integration 
and National political Systems, London: Frank Cass. 
I locking, B. (2002) `Introduction: Gatckeepers and Boundary-Spanncrs - Thinking about 
Foreign Ministries in the European Union' in: 11. [locking and D. Spcncc, I oreign 
Ministries in the European Union. Integrating Diplomats, I3asinbstokc: Palgravc. 
Hocking, B. (1999) Foreign A! inistries. Change and Adaptation, London: Macmillan 
Press. 
flocking, B. and Spcncc, D. (2002) Foreign Ministries in the European Union. 
Integrating Diplomats, ßasingstokc: Palgravc. 
Italzingcr, K. and Knill, C. (2005) `Causes and conditions of crass-national policy 
convcrgcncc', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, no 5, pp. 775.796. 
llowcll, K. E. (2004) `Dcvcloping Conceptualisations of Europeanisation: Synthcsising 
Methodological Approaches', Queen's Papers on Europeanisallon, no. 3, 
251 
http: //www. qub. ac. uk/schools/ScliooloiPoliticslntcniationalStudicsIFilcStorc/Europcanis 
ationFilcs/Filctoupload, 5181, cn. pdf. 
f iowcll, K. (2002) `Up-loading, Downloading and European Integration, Asscssing the 
Europeanization of UK Financial Scrviccs Rcgulation', Queen's Papcrs on 
Europcanisation, no. 11, 
http: //www. qub. ac. uk/schools/ScilooloflloliticslntcrnationalStudics/FileStorc/Europcanis 
ationFilcs/Filctoupload, 5272, cn. pd f. 
I Ioworth, J. and Mcnon, A. (1997) The European Union and National Defence Policy. 
London: Routlcdgc. 
I lydc-Pricc, A. (1996) The intcrnativnal politics of East Ccntral Europo, Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press. 
Jarabik, B. (2006) International Democracy Assistance to I3clarus: An EfThctivc Tool? ' 
in: Farbrig ct al. (eels. ) Prospccls for Democracy in 13clarus, Washington: The Gcrman 
Marshall Fund of the Unitod States. 
Jannuszko, S. (1999) 'Part cn rstwo dla Pokoju - najkrc tsza droga do NATO' in: W. Fchlcr 
and J. Tymanowski (cds. ) Aticd ynarodowe I ºvrººwnrtiVrc aslpckty c Ionkvºistººwa 1'alsUI ºº, 
NATO, Torun: Adam Marszalck. 
Juncos, A. and Pomorska, K. (2006a) `Learning the ropes and embedding the rules: CFSP 
institutions as arenas for learning and strategic socialisation', ººorking" Paper of the 
Observatory of European Foreign Policy, no. 70, July 2006,13cllatcrra (Barcelona): 
Institut Univcrsitari d'Estudis Euroi eus. 
Juncos, A. and Comorska, K. (2006b) 'Playing the Brussels game: strategic socialisation 
in the CFSP Working Groups', European Integration online Papers, vol. 10. 
252 
Johnston, A. I. (2001) `Trcating Intonational Institutions as' Social Environments', 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 45, pp. 487-515. 
Kamhiski, M. and Zacharias, M. (1998) Polityka ragraniczna IL-cc: ) pospolitcj l'olskicj 
1918-1939, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo LTW. 
Kassim, 11. (2005) `The Europcanisation of Member Statc Institutions' in: S. ßulmcr and 
C. Lcqucsnc (cds. ) The Member States of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford 
Univcrsity Press. 
Kassim, ! i. (2000) `Conclusion. The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: Confronting 
the Challcngc' in: 11. Kassim, G. Pctcrs and V. Wright (eds. ) The National Co-ordination 
of EU Policy. The Domestic Lcvcl, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kcukclcirc, S. and MacNaughtan, J. (2008) (cds. ) The Foreign Policy of the European 
Union, ßasingstokc: Paigravc Macmillan. 
Kc) Icy, J. (2005) New It Vine in Old 11 incskins: Policy learning and Adaptation in Me ne w 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Tcrry Stanford Institute of Public Policy, Working 
Papcrs Scrics SAN05-1. 
Knill C. and Lcnschow, A. (2001) 'Adjusting to EU Environmental policy: Change and 
Persistence of Domestic Adaptations' in: M. Cowlcs, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (cds. ) 
Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change. London: Cornell 
Univcrsity Press. 
Knill C. and Lcnschow, A. (1998) 'Coping with Europe: the impact of British and 
Gcrman administrations on the implcmentation of EU environmental policy', Journal of 
Europcan Public Policy, no. 5, vol. 4, pp. 595-614. 
253 
Knill, C. and Lchmkul, D. (2002) 'Thc national impact of European Union regulatory 
policy: Three Europcanization mechanisms', Eurohcan Journal of Political Research, 
vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 255-280. 
Knill, C. and Lchmkul, D. (1999) `flow Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of 
Europeanization', European Integration online Papers, vol. 3, no. 7. 
Kolodzicjczyk, K. (1998) 'Proccs stowarzyszania Polski z Unia Europcjska', Stosunki 
Aficd: ynarodowc, no. 19, pp. 69-84. 
Komar, h1. (2006) IV'ladyslaw Ilarlos: ctivski. Skcld Pan jest? Jr: v t'iad r: cka, Warsaw: 
Swiat Ksiq ki. 
Ksiazck, It. (2003) `Stosunki dwustronnc Polski: 13ialorus', Roc nik Polskicj 1'olityi; 1 
Zagranicancj, pp. 318-324, Warsaw: Akadcmia Dyplomatyczna MSZ. 
Kubicck, P. (2005) `The European Union and democratization in Ukraine', Communist 
and Post-Communist Studios, no. 38, lip. (269-292). 
Kulakowski, J. (1997) 'Polityka Polski wobcc Unii Eurohejskicj', Rocznik I'o! skicj 
! 'olitº-ki Zagranlczncj, Warsaw: Akadcmia Dyplomatyczna MSZ. 
Kucharczyk, J. (2006) 'Assisting Democratic Transition in i3clarus: lessons r om Pre- 
1989 Poland' in: Forbrig ct al. (eds. ) Prospects for Democracy in 11clarus, Washington: 
The German Marshall Fund of the United States. 
Kukulka, J. (2000) 'Organizacja polskicj sluxby zagraniczncj w latach 1944 - 1989', 
Stostutki AliCd_} narodowe, no. 21, rh. 109.122. 
Kupiccki, R. (2002) 'Czlonkostwo w NATO w polskicj politycc zagraniczncj' in: 
Kutniar R., Szczcpanik K. (cols. ) Polityka zagranic. na R1' 1989 - 2002, Warsaw: 
ASKON Fundacja Studiow Micdzynarodowych. 
254 
Kupiecki, R. and Szczcpanik, K. (1995) Polityka ragraniczna Polski 1918-1994, 
Warsaw: Scholar. 
Kuzio, T. (2003) `EU and Ukrainc: a turning point in 2004? ', Occasional ! 'apcr no 47, 
Paris: Institute for Sccurity Studies. 
Kuzio, T. (2000) Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, Ncw York: St. Martin's Press. 
Kuzniar, R. (1994) `Polityka zagraniczna RP - proba occny', Rocznik 1'olskicj I'olizjyki 
Zagranicrncj, Warsaw: Akadcmia Dyrlomatyczna MSZ. 
Kutniar, R. and Szczcpanik, K. (2002) `Wprowadzcnic. Podstawy polityki zagraniczncj 
RP' in: R. Kuiniar and K. Szczcpanik (cds) 1'olitvka -agranic: na R1' 1959-2002, 
Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ASKON. 
Kuhiiar, R. (1992) `Wszystkic drogi prowadza... na Zachod' in: . R. Kuzniar (cd. ) 
Krajobraz po transformacji. Stodoºvisko nzicd.: ynarodowc Polski it latach 
d: icºw"iccdricsiatych, Warsaw: Instytut Stosunkow Micdzynamdowych. 
Ladrcch, R. (2001) `Europcanisation and Political partics: Towards a Framcwork for 
Analysis', Queen's Papers on Europeanisalion, no. 2, 
http: //www. qub. ac. uk/schools/Schoolo(1'oliticslntcrnationalStudics/FilcStorc/Curopcanis 
ationFilcs/Filctoupload, 5294, cn. hdf. 
Ladrech, R. (1994) `Thc Eurohcanization of Domcstic Politics and Institutions: The Casc 
of France', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 69-88. 
Lang, K. (2005) `Poland and the East', 5117' Comments 23, litip: //www. swp. 
(11 July). 
Lastawski, P. (1994) 'NATO and East Central Europe: The Case of Poland' in A. J. 
Williams (cd. ) Reorganizing Eastcnr Europe: European Institutions and the Refashioning 
of Europe's Security Architecture, Aldcrshot: Dartmouth. 
255 
Lawton, T. (1999) 'Govcrning the Skics: Conditions for the Eurohcanisation of Airlinc 
Pol icy', Journal of Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 91-112. 
Layne, C. (1998) 'Why Die for Gdansk? NATO Enlargement and American Security 
Interests' in: G. Carpenter and B. Conry (eds. ) NA 70 Enlargement. Illusions and Reality, 
Washington: CATO Institute. 
Lchmkuhl, D. (2007) 'Conclusions' in: P. Graziano and M. Vink (eds. ) Europcanization. 
New Research Agendas, Basingstokc: Palgravc Macmillan. 
Lcvi-Faur, D. (2002) `On the `Net Impact' of Curopcanisation. The EU's tciccoms and 
electricity regimes between the global and the national', 1 uropean Integralion online 
Papers, vol. 6, no. 7. 
Levy, J. S. (1994) `Lcarning and Forcign Policy: Swccping a Conceptual Micreld', 
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 279-312. 
Lindncr, R. (2005)'C3clarus in a Sclf-Imposcd Isolation', S! J? ' Comments, no. 44, 
Genpan Institutc for International and Security Affairs. 
Lippcrt, B., Umbach, G. and Wcsscls, W. (2001) `Europeanization of CEE cxccutivcs: 
EU mcmbcrship negotiations as a shaping powcr', Journal of Europcan Public Policy, 
vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 980-1012. 
Lis, T. (1999) itiiclki Final. Kulisy xwslcpowania I'alski do NATO, Krakow: ZNAK. 
Los-Nowak, T. (1999) `Polityka zagraniczna RP w fazic tranzycji ustrajuwcj' in: A. 
Zukowski (cd. ) Polska polityka zagranlc: na w proccsic pr: cmlan 1,0 1989 roku, Olszt)nn: 
OSrodck I3adan Naukowych. 
256 
Lowndcs, V. (2002) `Institutionalism' in: Marsh, D. and Stokcr, G. (cds. ) T/icory and 
Methods in Political Science, Basingstokc: Paigravc Macmillan. 
Lynch, D. (2006) `A European Strategy towards ßclarus: Becoming Real' in: Forbrig ct 
al. (eds. ) Prospects for Democracy in Belarus, Washington: The German Marshall Fund 
of the United States. 
Lynch, D. (2005a) `Introduction' in: D. Lynch (cd. ) Changing 13rlarus, Paris: ISS 
Chaillot Papcr no 85. 
Lynch, D. (2005b) `Catalysing changc' in: D. Lynch (cd. ) Changing ! Trlarus, Paris: ISS 
Chaillot Papcr no 85 
Lastawski, K. (2001) `Polska tolsamosd narodowa a intcbracja curopcjska' in: M. 
Marczcwska-Rytko (cd. ) I'olska miCd y zachodcm a tilwschodcm it, dobic inlcgracji 
curopcjskicj, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwcrsytctu Marii Curic-Sklodowskicj. 
Major, C. and Pomorska, K. (2005) `Eurolicanisation: framework or fashion? ', CFSI' 
Forum, vol. 3 no. 5, pp. 1-4. 
Manners, I. and Whitman, It (cds) (2000) The Foreign Policies of European Union 
AlcmbcrStates, Manchcstcr: Manchester University Press. 
March J. G. and Olscn, J. P. (1998), `The institutional Dynamics of Intcmational Political 
Orders', International Organisations, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 943-969. 
March J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989), Rediscovering Institutions, London: Collier 
Macmillan. 
257 
Marplcs, D. (2006) `The Presidential Election Campaign: An Analysis' in: Forbrig ct al. 
(cds) Prospects for Democracy in l3elarus, Washington: The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States 
Marples, D. (2000) `Ukraine' in: Europe goes East: EU Enlargement, diversity and 
uncertainty, London: The Stationery Office. 
Mazowiccki, T. (2003) Polska w Uni! Europcjskicj: Jaka po/ityka ragranrimra?, 
Warsaw: PISM. 
Mcnkiszak, M. & Piotrowski, M. (2002) 'Polska polityka wschodnia' in: It. Kuzniar and 
K. Szczcpanik (cds) Polit}aka Zagranicrna R1' 1989 - 2002, Warsaw: ASKON Fundacja 
Studiow Micdzynarodowych. 
Michalowski, S. (2002) `Nowa jakosc w stosunkach z Nicmcami' in: R. Kuiniar and K. 
Szczcpanik (cds. ) Polityka zagranic: na R1' 1989 - 2002, Warsaw: ASKON Fundacja 
Studiow Micdzynarodowych. 
Michta, A. (1999) `Poland. A Linchpin of Regional Security' in A. Michta (cd. ) 
America's New Allics. Poland, llungary and Me Csech Republic in NATO, London: 
Univcrsity of Washington Press. 
Michta, A. (1992) `Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary: The Triangle in Search of 
Europe' in: A. Michta and I. Prizcl (eds. ) Postco, nmunist Eastern Europe. Crisis and 
Reform, Ncw York: St. Martin's Press. 
Microszcwski, J. (1970) `Thc Political Thought of Kultura' in: L. Tyrmand (cd. ) Kultura 
Essays, New York: The Free Press. 
Millard, F. (1996) 'Poland's 'Return, to Europe, 1989 - 94' in: It. [3idclcux & It. Taylor 
(cds. ) European Integration and Disintegration: East and hest, London and Ncw York: 
Routlcgc. 
258 
Modzclcwski, W. T. (1999) `GlGwnc kicrunki polskicj polityki zagraniczncj 1918-1989' 
in: A. Zukowski (cd. ) Polska polityka zagranic: na w procesic prcmian po 1989 roka, 
Olsztyn: Wrodck Badaii Naukowych. 
Normann, C. (2007) `Poland's involvement during the Orange Rcvolution in Ukraine: 
Between a Mediator and an Advocate' in: K. Kosior and A. Jurkowska (eds. ) Beyond the 
borders: Ukraine and the European neighbourhood Policy, RzeszOw: University of IT 
and Management. 
Nowina-Konopka, P. (2002) `Polska w unijncj Europic - irnhlikacjc dia polityki 
polskicj', Rornik Stralcgicrny 200212003, Warsaw: Wyclawnictwo Naukowc Scholar, 
pp. 31-36. 
Nowak, J. M. (1999) `Polskic przcwodnictwo OB VE , Roccnik I'olskicj Polih-Ai 
Zagraniczncj, Warsaw: Akadcmia Dyplomatyczna MSZ. 
Nugent, N. (2003) The Gorcrnmcnt and Politics of the European Union, Basingstoke: 
Palgravc Macmillan, Fifh Edition. 
Nuttall, S. (2000) European Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nuttall S. (1992) Eu opean Political Co-opcration, Oxford: Clarcndon Press. 
Olcchowski, A. (1995) `Europcjska ohcja polskicj politki zagraniczncj', Rocrnik ! 'olsU cj 
Polityki Zagraniczncj, Warsaw: Akadcmia Dyplomatyczna MSZ. 
Olsen, J. P. (2002) 'The Many Faces of Europeanization', ARENA 11 orking Papers, no 1, 
littp: //www. arcna. uio. iio/publicatioiis/wl)02_2. litiii. 
Pagc, E. C. and Wouters, L. (1995) `Thc Europcanization of the national bureaucracics? ' 
in: J. Picrrc (cd) Bureaucracy in the Modern State. An Introduction to the Public 
Administration, Aldershot: Edward Elbar. 
259 
Parzymies, S. (2002) `Integracja Europejska w Polityce Zagranicznej III RP' in: : R. 
Kuzniar and K. Szczepanik (eds. ) Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989 - 2002, Warsaw: 
ASKON Fundacja Studiow Miedzynarodowych. 
Pastusiak, L. (1998) `Poland on Her Way to NATO', European Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 
54-62. 
Pavliuk, O. (2000) Enlargement and Ukraine's Relations with Other Central and Eastern 
European Countries, Final Report, 1998-2000 NATO-EAPC Fellowship, Kiev: EastWest 
Institute. 
Pavliuk, 0. (1999) `The Ukrainian-Polish Strategic Partnership and Central European 
Geopolitics' in: K. R. Spillmann, A. Wenger and D. Moeller (eds. ) Between Russia and 
the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine, Studies in Contemporary 
History and Security Policy, Vol. 2, Bern: Peter Lang. 
Perez-Solörzano Borragän, Nieves (2004) `EU Accession and Interest Politics in Central 
and Eastern Europe', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 
243 - 272. 
Peters, B. G. (1999) Institutional Theory in Political Science. The 'New Institutionalism', 
London: Pinter. 
Pietras, J. (1999) `Dzialalnosc Urzedu Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej i Zespolu 
Negocjacyjnego w 1998 r. ', Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1999. 
Polska polityka zagraniczna: kontynuacja czy zerwanie? (2004), Warsaw: Batory 
Foundation; http: //www. batory. org. pl/doc/kont. pdf (3 July 2006) 
Prizel, I. (1998) National identity and foreign policy. Nationalism and Leadership in 
Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
260 
Prizel, I. (1.995) `Warsaw's Ostpolitik: A New Encounter with Positivism' in: I. Prizel & 
A. Michta (eds. ) Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered. Challenges of Independence, 
London: Macmillan. 
Rachwald, A. (1995) `Looking West' in: I. Prizel and A. Michta (eds. ) Polish Foreign 
Policy Reconsidered. Challenges of Independence, London: Macmillan. 
Radaelli, C. M. (2004) `Europeanisation: Solution or a problem? ', European Integration 
online Papers, vol. 8, no. 16. 
Radaelli, C. (2000) `Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive 
challenge', European Integration online Papers, vol. 4, no. 8. 
Radaelli, C. and Pasquier, R. (2007) `Conceptual Issues' in: P. Graziano and M. Vink 
(eds. ) Europeanization. New Research Agendas, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Regelsberger, E. (2004) `Are the problems arising from enlargement and the Draft Treaty 
leading to paralysis instead of synergy? ', Introductory remarks for the FORNET Group B 
Institutional Reform and Enlargement, April 2004. 
Reisch, A. (1993) `The Central European Initiative: To Be or Not to Be', RFE/RE 
Research Report, vol. 2, no 34, pp. 30-37. 
Reiderman, P. (2004) `External relations, foreign policy, security and defence' in: M. 
Westlake and D. Galloway (eds. ) The Council of the European Union (third edition), 
London: John Harper Publishing. 
Reynolds, C. (2005) `Understanding the development of the ESDP: Perspectives and 
insights from historical institutionalism and theories of learning', Working Paper no. 64, 
Bellaterra (Barcelona): Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus. 
261 
Risse, T., Cowles, M. and Caporaso, J. (2001) `Europeanization and Domestic Change: 
Introduction' in: M. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds. ) Transforming Europe. 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, London: Cornell University Press. 
Risse, T. (2000) "`Let's Argue! ": Communicative Action in World Politics', 
International Organisation, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 1-39. 
Romiszewska, I. (1992) `The European Communities and the Central and East European 
Countries: from Aloofness through Co-operation to Association and Membership? ', 
Polish Western Affairs, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 61-76. 
Rosenau J. N. (1981) The Study of Political Adaptation, London: Frances Pinter. 
Rose, R. (1991) `What is Lesson-Drawing? ', Journal of Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 
3-30. 
Rose, R. (1993) Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy. A Guide to Learning across Time and 
Space, Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, New Jersey 
Rotfeld, A. (2005) `Wschodnia polityka Unii Europejskiej: wklad Polski' in: M. 
Wqgrowska (ed. ) Unia Europejska i Europa Poludniovvo-lVschodnia, Conference 
Proceedings, Warsaw: Centre for International Relations. 
Roth, M. (2007a) `The dynamics of coalition-building among old and new member states 
in European Neighbourhood Policy towards Ukraine' in: The Eastern Dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Warsaw: Center for International Relations. 
Roth, M. (2007b) `European decision-making on the EU-Ukraine Action Plan after the 
Orange Revolution: the role of the new member states' in: K. Kosior and A. Jurkowska 
(eds) Beyond the borders: Ukraine and the European neighbourhood Policy, Rzeszbw: 
University of IT and Management. 
262 
Sanford, G. (2003) `Overcoming the Burden of History in Polish Foreign Policy', 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 178-203. 
Schendelen van, R. (2003) Machiavelli in Brussels. The Art of Lobbying the EU, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Shepherd, R. (2006) `The United States and Europe's Last Dictatorship' in: Forbrig et al. 
(eds. ) Prospects for Democracy in Belaruus, Washington: The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States. 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2007) `Candidate Countries and Conditionality' 
in: P. Graziano and M. Vink (eds. ) Europeanization. New Research Agendas, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) `Governance by conditionality: EU rule 
transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe', Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 661-679. 
` Schneider, E. and Saurenbach, C. (2005) `Kiev's EU ambitions', SIVP Comments 14, 
http: //www. swp-berlin. org/en/common/get_document. php? id=1232 (11 July 2006). 
Schneider, V. (2001) `Institutional Reform in Telecommunications: The European Union 
in Transnational Policy Diffusion' in: M. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds) 
Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change, London: Cornell 
University Press. 
Skubiszewski, K. (1992) `Racja stanu z perspektywy polskiej', Rocznik Polskiej Polityki 
Zagranicznej, Warsaw: Akademia Dyplomatyczna MSZ. 
Smith, K. (2005) `The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy', International 
Affairs, vol. 81 no. 4, pp. 757-773. 
263 
Smith, K. (2003) European Foreign Policy in a Changing Word, Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Smith, M. E. (2004a) Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The institutionalisation of 
Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, M. E. (2004b) `Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level 
governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe's common foreign and 
security policy', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 740-758. 
Smith, M. E. (2000) `Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy 
co-operation', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 613-631. 
Smith, M. A. (1999) `The NATO factor: a spanner in the works of EU and WEU 
enlargement? ' in: K. Henderson (ed. ) Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and 
the European Union, London: UCL Press. 
Spence, D. (2002) `The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European 
Union Affairs' in: B. Hocking and D. Spence, Foreign Ministries in the European Union. 
Integrating Diplomats, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Stadtmüller, E. (2001) The issue of NATO Enlargement in Polish - Russian Relations, 
Final Report for NATO Fellowship 2000-2001, http: //www. nato. int/acad/fellow/99- 
01/stadtmuller. pdf. 
Stavridis, S. (2003) `The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: A literature review', 
Discussion Paper No. 10, London: The Hellenic Observatory 
http: //www. lse. ac. uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/Stavridis-10. pdf. 
264 
Stavridis, S., Couloumbis, T. and Veremis, T. (1999) The Foreign Policies of the 
European Union's Medditerranean Countries and Applicant Countries in the 1990s, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Stawarska, R. (1999) `EU Enlargement from the Polish perspective', Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 822-838 
Stemplowski, R. (2004) Ksztaltowanie polskiej polityki zagranicznej. WVstgp do analizy, 
Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs. 
Stemplowski, R. (2001) `Polska w systemie swiatowym: zmiana ustroju i polityki 
zagranicznej', Polski PrzeglgdDyploniatyczny, vol. 1, no 2, pp. 5-19. 
Steves, F. (2001) `Poland and the international system: external influences on democratic 
consolidation', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, no. 34, pp. 339-352. 
Szczepanik, K. (2002) `Organizacja i funkcjonowanie sluzby dyplomatyczno - 
konsularnej' in: R. Kuzniar and K. Szczepanik (eds. ) Polityka Zagraniczna RP 1989 - 
2002, Warsaw: ASKON Fundacje Studiow Miedzynarodowych. 
Tabor, M. (1992) `Wojskowe aspekty srodowiska miedzynarodowego Polski' in: R. 
Kuzniar (ed. ) Krajobrazpo transformacji. Srodowisko miedzynarodowe Polski lat 
dziewiecdziesiatych, Warsaw: Instytut Stosunkow Miedzynarodowych. 
Tapiola, P. (2006) `European Union Policy towards Belarus: An Extended Hand' in: 
Forbrig et al. (eds. ) Prospects for Democracy in Belarus, Washington: The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States. 
Terriff, T. (2002) `U. S. ideas and Military Change in NATO, 1989 - 1994' in: Farrell, T. 
and Terriff, T. (eds. ) The Sources of Military Change. Culture, Politics, Technology, 
London: Lynne Rienner. 
265 
Terry, S. (2000) `Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence', 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, no. 33, pp. 7-37. 
Terzi, 0. (2005) `Europeanization of Foreign Policy and ý Candidate Countries: A 
Comparative Study of Greek and Turkish Cases', Politique europeenne, no. 17, pp. 113- 
136. 
Tokes, R. (1991) `From Visegrad to Krakow: Cooperation, Competition and Coexistence 
in Central Europe', Problems of Communism, November - December, pp. 100-114. 
Tonra, B. (2001) The Europeanisation of national foreign policy: Dutch, Danish and 
Irish foreign policy in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Torreblanca, J. (2001) `Ideas, preferences and institutions: Explaining the 
Europeanizations of Spanish Foreign Policy', ARENA Working Papers, no. 26. 
Vaduchova, M. A. (1993) `The Visegrad Four: No Alternative to Cooperation', RFE/RL 
Research Report, vol. 2, no. 34, pp. 38-47. 
Valki, L. (1994) `Security Problems and the New Europe: A Central European 
Viewpoint' in: W. A. J. (ed. ) Reorganizing Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the 
Refashioning of Europe's Security Architecture, Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Vink, M. and Graziano, P. (2007) `Challenges of a New Research Agenda' in: P. 
Graziano and M. Vink (eds. ) Europeanization. New Research Agendas, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Vinton, L. (1995) `Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1989 - 1993' in: I. Prizel and 
A. Michta (eds. ) Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered. Challenges of Independence, 
London: Macmillan. 
266 
Wallace, H. (2000a) `Europeanisation and Globalisation: Complementary or 
Contradictory Trends? ', New Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 369-382. 
Wallace, H. (2000b) `The Institutional Setting' in: H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds. ) 
Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wggrowska, M. (2006) Bialorus ijej sqsiedzi, Conference proceedings, Warsaw: Centre 
for International Relations. 
Weaver, R. K. and Rockman, B. A. (1993) `Assessing the Effects of Institutions' in: 
Weaver, R. K. and Rockman, B. A. (eds. ) Do Institutions Matter? Government 
Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington: The Brookings Institution. 
Webber, M. and Smith, M. (2002) Introduction in: M. Webber and M. Smith (eds. ) 
Foreign Policy in a Transformed World, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. 
Wessels et al (2003) Fifteen into one? The European Union and its member states, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Wessels, W. and Rometsch, D. (1996) `Conclusion: European Union and national 
institutions', in: D. Rometsch and W. Wessels (eds. ) The European Union and member 
states. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Weydenthal de, J. (1994) `Poland Builds Security Links with the West', RFE/RL 
Research Report, vol. 3, no. 14, pp. 28-30. 
White, B. (2001) Understanding European foreign policy, London: Palgrave. 
Wilson, A. (2005) Ukraine's Orange Revolution, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press. 
267 
Wolczuk, K. (2005) `Ukraine after the Orange Revolution', CER Policy Brief. 
Wolczuk, K. (2004) 'Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its policy towards 
the European Union', EUI Working Paper, RSCAS No. 2004/15. 
Wolczuk, K. (2001) Poland's Relations with Ukraine in the Context of EU Enlargement, 
http: //www. one-europe. ac. uk/pdf/bn4-O I . pdf. 
Wong, R. (2006a) The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy. France and the EU in 
East Asia, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wong, R. (2006b) `Foreign Policy' in: M. Vink and P. Graziano (eds. ) Europeanization: 
New Research Agendas, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Wong, R. (2005) `The Europeanization of Foreign Policy' in: C. Hill and M. Smith (eds. ) 
International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Zaborowski, M. (2004) Germany, Poland and Europe. Conflict, cooperation and 
Europeanisation, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Zaborowski, M. and Longhurst, K. (2003) `America's protege in the east? The emergence 
of Poland as a regional leader, International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 5, pp. 1009-10028. 
Zaborowski, M. (2002) `Europeanisation as a consensus building process: the case of 
Polish-German Relations', Thesis for discussion at a workshop on Europeanisation and 
Foreign Policy, London: LSE, 
http: //www. lse. ac. uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPUEuropeanisation-PolishGennan. pd f 
Zagorski, A. (2004) `Policies towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus' in: R. 
Dannreuther (ed. ) European Union Foreign and Security Policy. Towards a 
neighbourhood strategy, London: Routledge. 
268 
Zajgczkowski, W. (2000) `Poland and Kaliningrad Region: The Present and Future 
Prospects of Co-operation' in: Baxendale, J., Dewar, S. and Gowan, D. (eds) The EU and 
Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the Impact of the EU enlargement, London: Federal Trust. 
Zieba, R. (2001) `European Security and Defense Identity. The Polish Viewpoint', The 
Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 183-212. 
Zieba, R. (1992) `Polska w strefie miedzy Baltykiem a Adriatykiem' in: R. Kuzniar (ed. ) 
Krajobraz po transformacji. Srodowisko niiedzynarodowe Polski w latach 
dziewiecdziesiatych, Warsaw: Instytut Stosunkow Miedzynarodowych. 
Zieba, R. (1985) `Zagadnienie bezpieczenstwa w polskiej polityce zagranicznej', 
Stosunki Migdzynarodowe, vol. 3, pp. 35-63. 
Zubek, R. (2005) `Complying with Transposition Commitments in Poland: Collective 
Dillemas, Core Executives and Legislative Outcomes', West European Politics. Vol. 28, 
no. 3, pp. 592-619. 
Zurawski vel Grajewski, P. (2007) `European Neighbourhood Policy -a view from 
Poland in 2006' in: The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Warsaw: Center for International Relations 
Zurawski vel Grajewski, P. (2005) `Belarus: the unrecognized challenge' in: D. Lynch 
(cd. ) Changing Belaraus, Paris: ISS Chaillot Paper no 85. 
B. Newspaper articles and interviews 
BBC (2002) EU imposes Belarus travel ban, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/europe/2492939. stm (03 March 06) 
269 
BBC (2002) Solana seeks Ukraine as a special case, 30 September 2002, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/1ow/europe/2288130. stm (18 December 2007) 
BBC (2001) EU imposes Belarus travel ban, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/europe/2492939. stm (03 March 2006). 
BBC (1998) Belarus row with Poland deepens, 6 February 1998, 
http//: news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/world/europe/54143 (3 March 2006). 
Cimoszewicz, W. (2004) `Polska w zamccie swiata', Gazeta iVyborcza, 12-13 June 2004. 
EuroPAP (2006) IVizyta Prezydenta Kaczynskiego na Ukrainie, www. euro. pap. pl. (01 
March 06). 
EuroPAP (2005) KE rozpocznie negocjacje Ukrainq w sprawie ulatwien wizowych, 
7/11/2005, http: //old. euro. pap. pi/cgi-bin/raporty. pl? rap=67&dep=72871&lista=2 (7 July 
2006) 
EuroPAP (2003) Polska/Karp: nie mamy w Europie konkurencji, Warszawa, 
http: //www. euro. pap. pl/cgi-bin/europap. pl? gcupa=l&ID=41424 (21 February 2003) 
Gazeta Wyborcza (2006) L. Kaczynski: Polska rzecznikiem Ukrainy, Gazeta Wyborcza 
on-line, 28.02.06. 
Kazanecki, P. (2005) An interview with Radio Polonia, transcript accessible on-line: 
http: //www. polskieradio. pl/polonia/article. asp? tld=25648 (17 July 2006). 
Kubosova, L. (2006) New Member States hurt EU-Russia relations, Moscow says, 
euobserver. com, http: //euobserver. com/9/21667, (23 May 06) 
270 
Kwasniewski, A. (2005) An interview for Tygodnik Powszechny, available on the 
President's official website: http: //www. prezydent. pl/x. node? id=2542166 (8 July 2006). 
Kwasniewski, A. (2004) An interview for Polityka on 18 December 2004, available on 
the President's official website: http: //www. prezydent. pl/x. node? id2512106 (10 July 
2006) 
PAP (2006) Bialorus: UE krytykz je, ale nie naklada sankcji 20-03-2006, on-line: 
http: //serwisy. gazeta. pl/swiat/2029020,34174,3224091. htm (20 March 2006). 
PAP (2004) An interview by the Polish Press Agency with Minister Jaroslaw Pietras, 
Secretary of State in UKIE, 10 May, 2004. 
Solana, J. (2005) 'EU-Ukraine: A Partnership Between Citizens', Day, 1 December 2005. 
Strzelczyk, J. (2002) `Lech, Borys i NATO', Polityka, no. 45, 
http: //polityka. onet. pl/artykul. asp? DB= 162&ITEM=1100194. 
Swieboda, P. (2007) `Umieralismy za pierwiastek, przegralismy Bruksele', Przeglgd, no. 
27,8 July 2007, interview conducted by Robert Walenciak, pp. 12-13. 
271 
ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1: Research Declaration 
RESEARCH DECLARATION291 
In order to facilitate accuracy in social science research it is vitally important that the 
researcher have access to informed and authoritative sources. At the same time the 
researcher is under a strict obligation to protect the trust which such sources place in 
her/him. The recording of interviews is an important tool to ensure accuracy in the 
research process. 
In view of the above, I undertake to abide strictly by the following principles: 
" No material gathered in an "off-the-record" interview will be attributed to the 
interviewee, without the interviewee's written consent. 
" Quoted remarks will be attributed only in an agreed formula (e. g. "according to a 
former Minister for Foreign Affairs, according to a senior E. C. official"). 
" The interviewee may, at any time, opt to go "on background. " Such information is 
provided solely for purposes of elucidation and may not be quoted in any form. 
" An interviewee may, at any time, opt to go "on-the-record. " Such remarks are 
available for attributed quotation. 
"A list of interviewees must be appended to the final thesis. Any sources wishing 
anonymity may request that their names be provided on a separate list which shall 
be submitted only to the examining authorities. 
The above rules may also apply to a transcribed interview-- with written notes taken in 





291 The author would like to thank Ben Tonra for granting the permission to use this form in the 
interviewing process. 
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ANNEX 2: Polish Permanent Representation to the European Union, 2005/6 
Permanent RepresIIentative 
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ANNEX 3: Organisational structure of the Department of the European Union, DUE 
(2005/6) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Political Director, Deputy Minister I 
Department of the European Union 
Director of the Department I Institutional Unit 
Deputy Director Deputy Director Deputy Director 
European Correspondent 
Coordination of CFSP Unit Council of Europe and 
European European Institutions Unit 
Head of CFSP Unit 
Enlargement Unit Deputy European Correspondent Regional and Transborder 
Cooperation Unit 
European Neighbourhood 









c w 0 Dw c 






Ci o c < ü) 
is c 
cö w U) TO O Y 
c 0 
aý aý .n ö 
7 
C) 
ao ti c 0 ` 
C 
2 4- O 0 WC 
w Y 0 
















c3 O w 
ö c: 
Z-- 
"C )" z 
U) U) Mw 
co 
üU 




Ü T ý 
O 
O 
cß p U 
C C D( U) 
ü (1) CO 
0 
" w ca cý N - aD 
ö 6 Y 
c p L L O D O 
C = T 
- z w of . 
C_ O 
aý ý, w 012- C p QJ w 
w - D Do- U ` 
a) - 
LLý O LL 0 













> O- O cn 10 O 













O ) te M U Q 










- 0-0 5 
UQ 
it 
(ýJ 
